(High Court of Justice 5657/09 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Government of Israel, para. 67 (November 24, 2009) (hereinafter: the Jerbi Appointment Case). See also: High Court of Justice 8948/22 Sheinfeld v. Knesset, paragraph 2 of the opinion of Justice Yael Willner (January 18, 2023)).
It was further clarified that the appointment of a person who has been subjected to moral defects to the head of a public organization affects the image of that organization and the public service as a whole in the eyes of the public. Such an appointment may have a negative impact on the organizational culture of the body to which the person is appointed, and it encourages the perception that "The end sanctifies the means", and maybe even "A man shall do what is right in his eyes", among those who aspire to be appointed to senior positions (for more information, see: Appointment of an Orphan, at pp. 284-285; High Court of Justice 4648/08 Lavi v. Prime Minister, paragraph 26 (12.10.2008) (Hereinafter: The Lavi Matter)).
- Moreover, there is a close connection between the integrity of those serving in the seven senior positions and the preservation of the public service bodies in Israel: "The integrity of the service and the ranks is the basis of the public service and the basis of our social structure" (High Court of Justice 6163/92 Eisenberg v. Minister of Construction and Housing, IsrSC 47(2) 229, 266 (hereinafter: the Ginosar Appointment Case)); High Court of Justice 8815/05 Landstein v. Spiegler, para. 8 (2005); Yitzhak Zamir, "Political Appointments," Mishpatim 20:19, 24-25 (1990)). Acting President Yitzhak Amit's words regarding the foundations on which the police operate also apply to the other security organizations whose heads the committee is engaged in: "The police insist on three things - professionalism, independence and stateliness. Statehood is expressed, inter alia, in the exercise of the powers of the police on a professional basis, in an egalitarian manner and without impartiality" (HCJ 8987/22 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Knesset, para. 17 (January 2, 2025) (hereinafter: the matter of the amendment tothe Police Ordinance)). This stateliness ensures that the activities of the organizations are intended to protect the national interests of the state, without deviating from the norm in order to benefit a particular political element or subgroups in society. It ensures that these organizations will be the police, the army, the service or the institution of the state and the public and not a police, army, service or government institution (as for the police, see: the matter of the amendment tothe Police Ordinance, in paragraph 114 of the judgment of the Acting President (ret.) Uzi Fogelman and in paragraph 4 of my opinion. As for the army, see: section 1 of the Basic Law: The Army). Moreover, in the absence of legal regulation, this basic rule (which is not disputed) is not enshrined in the Freedom Law with regard to the institution, and this requires extreme care to preserve the integrity of the person who heads it.
Another layer in the perception of statehood is the subordination of the security organizations despite the government (which does not apply to the Bank of Israel, which enjoys independent status, and which heads it - The Governor and the Deputy - They are also appointed after the committee's recommendation). This is how the various laws regulating the activities of these security bodies are explicitly established (see: Section 2 Basic Law: The Army, Section 8B of the Police Ordinance [New Version], 5731-1971 (hereinafter: Police Ordinance)), and this is appropriate in a democratic regime in which the justification for the use of force stems from the subordination of the executive echelon to the elected officials (Issue Amendment to the Police Ordinance, in paragraphs 132-137 of the judgment of the Acting President Fogelman and in paragraph 3 of my opinion). It can be argued that the demand for subordination to the government alongside the demand for independence from it is literal, but in practice this is the reality in which Israel's security organizations have operated and are operating. The burden of settling these conflicting demands falls on all those who serve in the security organizations, but it falls - First and foremost - on the shoulders of those who head those organizations (see: Interest Appointment of Shabtai, in paragraphs 17-18; Interest Amendment toPolice Ordinance, in paragraphs 163-171 of the judgment of the Acting President Fogelman; High Court of Justice 54321-03-25 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Government of Israel, Paragraph 38 To the President's Judgment Associate (May 21, 2025) (hereinafter: The matter of Bar's dismissal)). The constant balance between independence from the elected echelon and its subordination is, therefore, one of the most important and delicate tasks that the heads of the security organizations must fulfill. Therefore, when appointing the head of one of these organizations, the appointing body is required to carefully examine not only the candidate's competence to perform the complex and essential professional tasks involved in the position assigned to him, but also the degree of the candidate's ability to maintain the organization's stateliness. This examination is done, first and foremost, by insisting on the integrity of the candidate - A matter for which the Advisory Committee is entrusted, as clarified.
- We will move on to examine what is the "purity of character in the broad sense" that the advisory committee must examine. In the case law, it was clarified that this term is a vague term, with open tissue. Thus, on the one hand, it is clear that it is not limited to examining the existence of criminal defects in the candidate's past, nor is it limited to defects that might have led to a criminal investigation and prosecution (Appointment of Ginosar, at p. 263; the Lavi case, at para. 14). On the other hand, there is no room to interpret the term "integrity in its broadest sense" as applying to any case in which the candidate did not act properly. The truth, as usual, lies in the middle: the committee's role is to examine whether the candidate's conduct is faulty in a way that not only testifies to his professional competence, but also significantly tarnishes his moral image. As has been clarified in the past: "The main test in this context is whether the alleged moral defect is real and serious enough to the extent that the appointment of a candidate to the designated public office is capable of harming the image of the public system, and having a material and profound impact on the public's confidence in the public service" (High Court of Justice 43/16 High Court of Justice 43/16 Ometz Movement v. Government of Israel, para. 64 (March 1, 2016) (hereinafter: the issue of Mandelblit's appointment). In other words, a defect in the integrity of the candidate is a defect that indicates that the candidate - God forbid - is liable to consider personal considerations, or other considerations that are not relevant during his tenure, or that he is not suitable to maintain the stateliness of the body he heads (see and compare: The Appointment of an Orphan, at p. 287; the matter of the appointment of Jerbi, at paragraph 69; Yitzhak Zamir, Administrative Authority, Vol. 1 - Public Administration 600 (2010)). The text of Resolution 3839 itself also mentions the paradigmatic cases in which there is concern that instead of state conduct, the candidate will act "on behalf of" the government that appointed him, and it states that the committee must ensure that candidates are not appointed for improper reasons, such as "a personal, business, or political affiliation to a government minister" (ibid., in section B).
- As a rule, the existence of a defect in moral integrity stems from an act or omission committed by the candidate himself. On the other hand, the acts or omissions of those for whom the candidate was in charge in the past do not, in the usual case, indicate a defect in the candidate's own qualities, but attest, at most, to deficiencies in his ability to function, whether on the professional level or at the managerial-command level. Thus, a person who knowingly does not comply with the provisions of the law or the procedures relevant to his position may attest, by his actions, to a defect in moral integrity. On the other hand, a person who follows the law and procedures himself, but fails to assimilate them among his subordinates, does not suffer from the level of values, even if this failure attests to his abilities as a manager. It should be noted that the existence of professional failures in the candidate's ability to ensure compliance with the law of his subordinates does not, in the normal state of affairs, affect his integrity. At the same time, there may be cases in which an act committed within the scope of the candidate's responsibility, by one of his subordinates, but without his knowledge, may also cast aspersions on his moral qualities. For example, if the candidate "turns a blind eye" in the face of the misconduct of his subordinates. This is also the case if the candidate's lack of supervision over the existence of a certain norm indicates a disregard on his part for that norm, in a manner that may lead to a moral defect.
- Another aspect that the committee must consider is the specific role for which the candidacy is being examined (among those in the field of its examination). This is because in cases where there is a connection between the alleged defect and the nature of the position, or where the position requires a particularly high level of integrity, this will be a relevant consideration - and at times, a central consideration - in examining the integrity of the candidate (see: the Lavi case, at paragraph 15; High Court of Justice 4921/13 Ometz Movement v. Mayor of Ramat Hasharon, IsrSC 66(3) 135, 184-185 (2014) (hereinafter: the Mayors case)). Maintaining integrity in this sense is of particular importance when it comes to the appointment of the head of the Mossad, as in our case, due to the low level of supervision of this organization. Unlike other authorities, the institution is not subject to routine criticism by government ministers, Knesset committees, or even by the media and the public. Unlike the police or the IPS, it does not operate under close judicial supervision; Unlike the IDF, it is not supervised, routinely, by the government and the cabinet; Unlike the ISA, it does not operate under a legal framework that defines its activity, and under the supervision of a designated ministerial committee (for details, see: pp. 4-5 of the Secret Services Bill, 5777-2017, P/4569/20, and pp. 1 and 4 of the letter of the outgoing head of the Mossad, which was submitted as part of the appendix "Materials that reached the committee on behalf of the Attorney General on May 20, 2026" (hereinafter: the letter of the outgoing head of the Mossad)). On the contrary, unlike all other state authorities, the entirety of the Mossad's activities are carried out under a heavy guise of secrecy, with an essential component of it being carried out outside the boundaries of the state (for more information, see: Raphael Bitton, The Legitimacy of Spying Among Nations, 29 U. Int'l L. Rev. 1009, 1010-1011 (2014); letter from the outgoing head of the Mossad, at p. 1). From a legal standpoint, then, the Mossad operates in a manner that has no parallel in any other body in Israel. Accordingly, relying on external supervision of the organization is impractical. Therefore, in this case, it is imperative that the organization's value outlook stem from within, and first and foremost, from its leader.
Specifically, this approach was also reflected in the work of the Advisory Committee itself. In the framework of the committee's opinion on the appointment of Maj. Gen. (res.) David Zini as head of the Shin Bet, it was noted that "The Requirement Regarding the Herd 'Political affiliation' of a candidate for the position of head of the service is even more obligatory than a candidate for the head of any of the other five bodies in the government's decision. This, This is because it is a secret body. The fear of activity that is not in a state manner and that is not in accordance with the rules of the democratic regime is great Read More Because the activity may be carried out inHide" (paragraph 4 of the Advisory Committee's decision of September 25, 2025 (emphasis added)). In the present proceeding, too, the Chairman of the Committee noted in his opinion that the concept of "integrity" should be given broad meaning, which must be examined.This is due to the enormous power of the relevant body and its head, in this case the institution and its head" (ibid., para. 3. It should be noted that the members of the majority opinion did not address this matter, positively or negatively, in the framework of their first or supplementary opinion).