(For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that the defense tried to build on Weinschel's partial and qualified answers, for example, p. 645, paras. 2-15 ("There is a situation, I don't know"), or from certain answers it gave during the investigation of the ELA (which revolved around the ELA deal), which at the time did not locate Wei's offer to the LAPD (p. 649, s. 10 - p. 649, s. 1); and to argue that Wee did not submit a proposal to the BLM or that her proposal was not relevant, While ignoring other answers she gave (p. 645, s. 19-24, p. 646, s. 12-19, p. 647, s. 10 - p. 648, s. 1). In any case, the aforesaid does not change the clear conclusion that arose from the evidence in relation to the BLAM and what was submitted in response to it, or to change the existence of the elements of the offense).
- Harel claimed that Gilad acted against Harel's interest and in order to assist Shahar (paragraph 706 of Harel's summaries). The claim was raised without any real detail. Indeed, the proposal submitted by Gilad on behalf of Harel to the Licensing Renewal Committee was higher than Wee's proposal (in accordance with the coordination). However, as stated above, there is no room to examine Gilad's conduct in the renewal of licenses separately from the overall picture and the general improper conduct that took shape between Wi and Harel, and it cannot be said that he acted contrary to Harel's overall interest or that he acted to promote any personal interest (see similarly in paragraphs 395, 672 and 774 above, which is said in accordance with our case).
Claims in connection with the conduct of the ELA transaction and other general claims
- The defendants argued that Menashe's conduct and civil appeal as discovered in the ELA transaction attest in general to the method by which civil appeal operated in computer procurement transactions (for example, paragraph 519 of the Wee Summaries). The essence of the argument is that just as in the ELA transaction fictitious pricing was done under Menashe's conduct, so too in the other charges – including the indictment now under consideration relating to the license renewal proceedings – the proceedings of the ELA were fictitious.
- This argument should not be accepted.
- We noted above that the license renewal agreement and the ELA transaction revolved around different business outlines, and that the impropriety that adhered to the late conduct in connection with the ELA transaction cannot be attributed to the conduct and coordination with respect to the license renewal agreement.
- Beyond that, it is easy to see that there is a clear distinction between the conduct of the ELA transaction and the coordination that is the subject of the charges in the indictment.
In the ELA transaction, Menashe (on the client's side) approached Shahar (the winner – the person with whom the engagement was made) about two months after the decision to contract with Wee, and after the licenses had already been provided, and asked him (i.e., the winning supplier) to work with Gilad (a competing supplier) in order to get a higher price quote from him, Gilad, and while requesting that it be dated in a fictitious manner to an earlier date that will be close to the date of the submission of Wee's proposal (see the details in paragraph 902 above). In other words, Menashe – on the client's side – was the one who initiated the move, he was the one who asked one supplier to receive a fictitious and coordinated offer from another supplier, and in any case knew that it was a fictitious price quote, following coordination communication between the suppliers, which was made at his own request.