For example, in his testimony, Zeiger referred to a case in which Harel won the project for a large storage system of Mekorot even though IBM gave priority to Lewis. This is how Zeiger described it in his interrogation: "I'll give an example. Mekorot has launched a tender for a very large storage system. IBM gave preference to Levy in this tender. Harel decided that the customer was strategic to Harel and therefore gave a price below its price value. In other words, I decided to subsidize the deal out of my own pocket, that is, to give a price below the cost price and take the deal at any price, because the customer is strategic to Harel. And indeed, it was. Therefore, the customer builds that perhaps for one of the suppliers the price or the transaction is strategic in order to cut the vein in order to take it, and perhaps that is why he tries to contact as many suppliers as possible" (P/224, paras. 36-44, underline added; In his testimony, Zeiger confirmed these statements, p. 5776, s. 16 - p. 5778, s. 25). In his testimony, Zeiger referred to another case in which, despite the preference given to NetApp storage products at IAI, Harel managed to penetrate while settling for a low commission (p. 5286, paras. 9-27, he was prepared "almost without commission", although he noted there that cases of submitting a bid in a "flat", i.e., without commission, when you "cut the vein", are rare).
For example, Oshri testified to a case – already mentioned above – in which Wee won a project in Lowry of a civil appeal despite IBM giving a special hand to Harel and despite Harel's comptroller's agreement (pp. 4820-4823, Wee won a cost minus even though Harel had a special in hand; see further reference to the matter, including that of Zeiger in paragraph 96 above). Beyond the specific case, on the general level, Oshri's testimony indicated that from his point of view, it was possible to compete with a supplier that received priority from IBM, but for this it was necessary to make do with a low level of profitability or to offer at a cost price without profit. So when asked how to compete with a supplier who has been prioritized, Oshri replied: "So it has some disadvantages, one you can really estimate how much you are not prioritized, you usually don't really know either, you don't really tell them, you can evaluate based on past experience, do some calculations, chances are that either in order to compete with the competing supplier you will have to serve either in output or in very soup up, very low" (p. 4365, paras. 15-22, and see also p. 4368, paras. 4-21, where he demonstrated this numerically and reiterated that in order to compete with prioritization, it is necessary to make do with low profitability or offer at cost prices; Oshri's testimony further revealed that the submission of a low offer can lead to the customer turning to the preferred supplier for an improved offer, p. 4366, s. 21 - p. 3467, s. 7, in a manner that illustrates another possibility of harm to competition due to coordination).