The arguments that this is not a "binding agreement" or that the agreement is not "specific enough" should also be rejected. Such requirements are inconsistent with the normative standard and with the broad manner in which the "arrangement" component is interpreted in case law. The conclusion in our case - even if we were classified as "understandings" in Naveh's words - falls without difficulty within the scope of a restrictive arrangement, and it is clear that the aforesaid understandings reached by the parties at the meeting go far beyond "any minimum level of common understanding" required for the formulation of an arrangement (Borowitz at paragraph 79).
Since we are dealing with mutual understandings, for non-interference with each other, the arguments for lack of consideration should also not be accepted, especially since consideration is not a necessary basis for formulating an arrangement. In contrast to criminal case (Jerusalem District) 1274/00 State of Israel v. Mudagal in Tax Appeal (March 22, 2010, paragraph 188) to which the defendants referred, in our case there is no doubt as to the nature of the understandings that were made between the participants in the meeting (and this is also true in relation to criminal case (Jerusalem District) 1061/05 State of Israel v. Geva (June 11, 2009)). More than necessary, it should be noted that Zeiger did not deny in his testimony that it was convenient for Shachar to think that an agreement had been made between the parties for the division of labor, even though Zeiger himself had no intention of fulfilling it (p. 5872, paras. 11-24). In other words, according to Zeiger - and even ignoring the fact that his version regarding the first charge should not be accepted - we are at least dealing with an ostensibly restrictive arrangement that can encourage his other partners to limit themselves. In accordance with the details in the normative part, an arrangement on the face of it is sufficient for the purpose of consolidating the offense (see paragraph 11 above).