The indictment in the Belfer case  (as well as the original indictment in the proceeding before me) was filed prior to Amendment 21 of the Competition Law and in accordance with the normative arrangement that preceded the amendment.  Accordingly, separate offenses were attributed to Nahum in  the Belfer case  under section 48 together with section 47 of the law – that is, as a party to a restrictive arrangement – as an active manager of a corporation in which an offense was committed in each of the charges in which triple C was attributed offenses of a party to a restrictive arrangement at certain times.  Indeed, the judgment in the Belfer case  was given after Amendment 21 to the Law and on the basis of the wording of the provision of s. 48 after the amendment.  However, Nahum Shem was convicted of four offenses under section 48 of the Competition Law – breach of the duty of supervision – in relation to the four charges attributed to Triple C and the specific dates on which it was a party to restrictive arrangements (see paragraphs 280 and 320): end of June 2010, July 2010, August 2011, and March 2012 (ibid., paragraphs 6-9).  In other words, Nahum was attributed a breach of the duty of supervision with respect to certain dates.  The conviction did not apply to other dates or to the entire period preceding the filing of the indictment, as alleged.  In our case, the charges relevant to Nahum that remain on the agenda and in relation to which it was determined that the elements of the offense under section 48 of the Competition Law – the first, second, fourth and fifth charges – relate to different dates from the dates in  the Belfer case, all of which precede the dates in  the Belfer case, without any overlap (see also the accuser's statement in her oral summaries, p. 6498, s. 21 - p. 6949, s. 1).  In this state of affairs, the arguments must be rejected.  The same is true with respect to claims of protection from justice in connection with the proceeding that took place in the Belfer case.  These arguments were raised in a general manner, without any real detail and without Nahum testifying in the trial here.

711. One offense or separate offenses? - Nahum argued in his summaries that the result of Amendment 21 to the Competition Law is that an officer of a corporation who breached the duty of supervision should be charged with only one charge and by implication of only one offense under section 48 of the Law, and not with separate charges and separate offenses as was the case prior to the amendment to the Law (for example, paragraphs 40 and 56 of Triple C and Nahum summaries). As stated above, this was not done in the indictment in our case or in the indictment and in the verdict in the Belfer case  (without referring to the argument that was raised on his part in the matter in the proceeding here that precedes the summaries).  As already noted above, in our case, Nahum was charged – in the amended indictment that was filed after the amendment of the law – separate offenses of breach of the duty of supervision, in conjunction with concrete restrictive arrangement offenses and the dates on which they were committed (see the argument of Wei and Oshri at para. 622 for their summaries, and also p. 6949, paras. 15-17).  It is possible to find support for Nahum's argument for a conviction for a single offense since the offense of breach of the duty of supervision has a dimension of ongoing conduct and in accordance with the facts of the case (see and compare: CA 122/82 Alfi v. State of Israel (March 13, 1983); Prof. S.Z. Feller, "Questions and Answers on the Issue of the  Continuing Offense of Criminal Offense (Vol. 2, 5751-1991); and compare also to the case law regarding a multiple-item offense, Criminal Appeal 816/10 Gold v. State of Israel (September 3, 2012)). In her oral summaries, the accuser confirmed that today, after Amendment 21 to the Law, when prosecuting an officer for breach of the duty of supervision, she attributes to the officer one charge in relation to the breach of the duty of supervision and one offense under section 48 of the Law, which extends over a defined period that includes the period of the offenses of restrictive arrangements (p. 6949, paras. 18-19; and see, for example, paragraph 40 of the summaries of Nahum and Triple C, where an excerpt of the indictment was brought in a criminal case (Central District) 26762-03-21 State of Israel v. Evron It included six charges for restrictive arrangement offenses and one separate charge in which one offense was attributed under section 48 of the Law for an overall period).  In this state of affairs, and in view of this position of the accuser, I am of the opinion that Oshri and Nahum should each be convicted of one offense for breach of the duty of supervision under section 48 of the Law and with regard to the dates on which the restrictive arrangements were made that are the subject of the concrete charges.
712. Claim of statute of limitations for the offense under section 48 of the Law – Oshri claimed in his summaries that the offenses under section 48 of the Competition Law were statute of limitations (paragraphs 615-623 of the Wei and Oshri summaries). In the normative part, we noted that the arrangement set out in section 48 of the Law was amended in the framework of Amendment 21 to the Law.  Oshri's argument is that this is a material amendment that canceled the arrangement that had been set before it; that the transitional provision set forth in section 55a(c) of the Competition Law, according to which the amended version will also apply to an offense committed prior to the amendment, no matter the statute of limitations; and that on the date of the filing of the amended indictment relating to the violation of the duty of supervision as formulated after the amendment of the Law (December 14, 2020, pursuant to the decision of December 7, 2020) or on the date on which Amendment 21 to the Law came into effect (January 10, 2019), the statute of limitations of five years had already passed from the date of the commission of the offenses, the most recent of which was in March 2012 and the earlier than May 2009.

These arguments should not be accepted.  In accordance with the explicit transitional provision set forth in section 55a(c) of the Law, the amendment to section 48 of the law is not considered to be canceled in respect of section 4 of the Penal Law, and the wording after the amendment also applies to an offense committed prior to it.  We have seen above that the amendment does not come to express a change in the legislature's position with respect to the responsibility of an officer, and that it seems that even if it were not for the explicit transitional provision, the conclusion would have been drawn that we are not dealing with the cancellation of the offense and that the transitional provision was intended only to clarify the matter (see paragraphs 112-113 above, and the references therein, inter alia, to the Bublil case, which I accept the statement thereof; see also what is stated in paragraph 114 above that the transitional provision expresses the view that this is an amendment that is lenient in its entirety, and thus it should be applied).  The argument that this is an amendment that essentially nullified the arrangement that preceded it should therefore be rejected.  In this situation, there is also no basis for the argument that investigative actions in relation to the offense in question, which concerns the responsibility of an officer, which were committed prior to the amendment or prior to the original indictment in which offenses under section 48 in its previous version were attributed to the defendants, do not stop the race to the statute of limitations, because they were done in relation to the offense that was canceled and not in relation to the new offense.

Conclusion

713. The first indictment – I convict Wey, Zeiger, Harel and Triple C of the offense of a party to a restrictive arrangement under section 47(a)(1) of the Competition Law, as drafted on the eve of the commencement of Amendment No. 21, together with sections 2(a), 2(b)(1), 2(b)(2), 2(b)(3), 4 and 55A of the Competition Law. The conviction of Wei, Harel and Triple C is also based on section 23(a)(2) of the Penal Law.
714. The second charge – I convict Oshri, Wei, Zeiger, Harel and Triple C of the offense of a party to a restrictive arrangement under section 47(a)(1) of the Competition Law, as drafted on the eve of the commencement of Amendment No. 21, together with sections 2(a), 2(b)(1), 2(b)(3), 4 and 55A of the Competition Law. The conviction of Wei, Harel and Triple C is also based on section 23(a)(2) of the Penal Law.
715. The third charge – I convict Oshri, Wei and Harel of the offense of being a party to a restrictive arrangement under section 47(a)(1) of the Competition Law, as drafted on the eve of the commencement of Amendment No. 21, together with sections 2(a), 2(b)(1), 2(b)(3), 4 and 55A of the Competition Law, as well as the offense of fraudulent receipt under aggravated circumstances, an offense under section 415 of the Penal Law. The conviction of Wei and Harel is also based on section 23(a)(2) of the Penal Law.
716. The fourth charge – I convict Wee, Harel and Triple C of the offense of a party to a restrictive arrangement under section 47(a)(1) of the Competition Law, as drafted on the eve of the commencement of Amendment No. 21, together with sections 2(a), 2(b)(1), 2(b)(3), 4 and 55A of the Competition Law. The conviction is also based on section 23(a)(2) of the Penal Law.
717. The fifth charge – I convict Wey, Harel and Triple C of the offense of being a party to a restrictive arrangement under section 47(a)(1) of the Competition Law, as drafted on the eve of the commencement of Amendment No. 21, together with sections 2(a), 2(b)(1), 2(b)(3), 4 and 55A of the Competition Law, as well as the offense of fraudulent receipt under aggravated circumstances, under section 415 of the Penal Law. The conviction is also based on section 23(a)(2) of the Penal Law.
718. The sixth charge – I convict Wei, Zeiger, Harel and Triple C of the offense of being a party to a restrictive arrangement under section 47(a)(1) of the Competition Law, as drafted on the eve of the commencement of Amendment No. 21, together with sections 2(a), 2(b)(1), 2(b)(3), 4 and 55A of the Competition Law, as well as the offense of fraudulent receipt under aggravated circumstances, under section 415 of the Penal Law. The conviction of Wei, Harel and Triple C is also based on section 23(a)(2) of the Penal Law.
719. The seventh indictment – I convict Harel and Triple C of the offense of being a party to a restrictive arrangement under section 47(a)(1) of the Competition Law, as drafted on the eve of the commencement of Amendment No. 21, together with sections 2(a), 2(b)(1), 2(b)(3), 4 and 55A of the Competition Law. The conviction is also based on section 23(a)(2) of the Penal Law.
720. The Eighth Charge – I convict Wei and Harel of the offense of being a party to a restrictive arrangement under Section 47(a)(1) of the Competition Law, as drafted on the eve of the commencement of Amendment No. 21, together with sections 2(a), 2(b)(1), 2(b)(3), 4 and 55A of the Competition Law. The conviction is also based on section 23(a)(2) of the Penal Law.
721. The ninth charge – I convict Wei and Harel of the offense of being a party to a restrictive arrangement under section 47(a)(1) of the Competition Law, as drafted on the eve of the commencement of Amendment No. 21, together with sections 2(a), 2(b)(1), 2(b)(3), 4 and 55A of the Competition Law, as well as the offense of fraudulent receipt under aggravated circumstances, under section 415 of the Penal Law. The conviction is also based on section 23(a)(2) of the Penal Law.
722. The Tenth Charge – I convict Wey, Zeiger and Harel of the offense of being a party to a restrictive arrangement under Section 47(a)(1) of the Competition Law, as drafted on the eve of the commencement of Amendment No. 21, together with Sections 2(a), 2(b)(1), 2(b)(3), 4 and 55A of the Competition Law, as well as the offense of fraudulent receipt under aggravated circumstances, under Section 415 of the Penal Law. The conviction of Wei and Harel is also based on section 23(a)(2) of the Penal Law.
723. The Eleventh Charge - I acquit Shochat and Matrix because of the doubt about the offenses attributed to them in the Eleventh Charge. I acquit Wei and Harel because of the doubt about the offenses attributed to them regarding online pricing, which is the second part of the eleventh charge.  With all that has been said in the Oranim case, which is the first part of the eleventh indictment, I convict Oshri, Wei and Harel of the offense of a party to a restrictive arrangement under section 47(a)(1) of the Competition Law, as drafted on the eve of the commencement of Amendment No. 21, together with sections 2(a), 2(b)(1), 2(b)(3), 4 and 55A of the Competition Law, as well as the offense of fraudulent receipt under aggravated circumstances.  According to Section 415 of the Penal Law.  The conviction of Wei and Harel is also based on section 23(a)(2) of the Penal Law.
724. The twelfth indictment – I convict Wei and Harel of the offense of being a party to a restrictive arrangement under section 47(a)(1) of the Competition Law, as drafted on the eve of the commencement of Amendment No. 21, together with sections 2(a), 2(b)(1), 2(b)(3), 4 and 55A of the Competition Law, as well as the offense of fraudulent receipt under aggravated circumstances, under section 415 of the Penal Law. The conviction is also based on section 23(a)(2) of the Penal Law.
725. The thirteenth indictment - I convict Oshri and Wei of the offense of being a party to a restrictive arrangement under section 47(a)(1) of the Competition Law, as drafted on the eve of the commencement of Amendment No. 21, together with sections 2(a), 2(b)(1), 2(b)(3), 4 and 55A of the Competition Law, as well as the offense of fraudulent receipt under aggravated circumstances, under section 415 of the Penal Law. I also convict Wei of the offense of attempting to make a restrictive arrangement under section 47(a)(1) of the Law as drafted at the relevant time, together with sections 2(a), 2(b)(1), 2(b)(3), 4 and 55a(b) of the Competition Law and section 25 of the Penal Law.  Wei's conviction is also based on section 23(a)(2) of the Penal Law.
726. The fourteenth indictment – I convict Wei and Harel of the offense of being a party to a restrictive arrangement under section 47(a)(1) of the Competition Law, as drafted on the eve of the commencement of Amendment No. 21, together with sections 2(a), 2(b)(1), 2(b)(3), 4 and 55A of the Competition Law. The conviction is also based on section 23(a)(2) of the Penal Law.
727. The fifteenth indictment – I convict Wei and Harel of the offense of being a party to a restrictive arrangement under section 47(a)(1) of the Competition Law, as drafted on the eve of the commencement of Amendment No. 21, together with sections 2(a), 2(b)(1), 2(b)(3), 4 and 55A of the Competition Law. The conviction is also based on section 23(a)(2) of the Penal Law.
728. The Sixteenth Charge – I convict Wei and Harel of the offense of being a party to a restrictive arrangement under Section 47(a)(1) of the Competition Law, as drafted on the eve of the commencement of Amendment No. 21, together with Sections 2(a), 2(b)(1), 2(b)(3), 4 and 55A of the Competition Law, as well as the offense of fraudulent receipt under aggravated circumstances, under Section 415 of the Penal Law. The conviction is also based on section 23(a)(2) of the Penal Law.
729. The seventeenth indictment – I convict Zeiger, Harel, Nahum, and Triple C of the offense of a party to a restrictive arrangement under section 47(a)(1) of the Competition Law, as drafted on the eve of the commencement of Amendment No. 21, together with sections 2(a), 2(b)(1), 2(b)(3), 4 and 55A of the Competition Law. The conviction of Harel and Triple C is also based on section 23(a)(2) of the Penal Law.
730. The eighteenth indictment - I convict Wey, Zeiger and Harel of the offense of being a party to a restrictive arrangement under section 47(a)(1) of the Competition Law, as drafted on the eve of the commencement of Amendment No. 21, together with sections 2(a), 2(b)(1), 2(b)(3), 4 and 55A of the Competition Law, as well as the offense of fraudulent receipt under aggravated circumstances, under section 415 of the Penal Law. I also convict Zeiger and Harel of the offense of attempting to make a restrictive arrangement under section 47(a)(1) of the law as drafted at the relevant time, together with sections 2(a), 2(b)(1), 2(b)(3), 4 and 55a(b) of the Competition Law and section 25 of the Penal Law.  The conviction of Wei and Harel is also based on section 23(a)(2) of the Penal Law.
731. Officer's Responsibility - I convict Oshri of the offense of breach of the duty to supervise and do everything possible to prevent an offense under Section 48 of the Competition Law, with respect to the charges on which Wei was convicted (the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth and eighteenth charges) and the dates on which they were committed.  I also convict Nahum of the offense of breach of the duty to supervise and do everything possible to prevent an offense under section 48 of the Competition Law, with respect to the first, second, fourth and fifth charges and the dates on which they were made.

Granted today, May 31, 2026, in the presence of the parties