Nahum-Naveh testified that Nahum was informed about the meeting and the understandings that were made in it (p. 81, paras. 3-17, confirming his statements from the interrogation P/2, paras. 169-175). This testimony of Naveh has not been contradicted and must be accepted. As noted, Nahum chose not to testify at the trial. Nahum's attempts to claim in the summaries that he did not know, relying, inter alia, on the dispute between him and the CEOs of Wei and Harel (Naveh's testimony, p. 286, paras. 9-19, paras. 23 - p. 287, s. 1) or on Nahum's reservations about continuing to do business with Elta (P/2, paras. 176-179, Naveh's testimony, p. 143, paras. 1-22), were not convincing and do not detract from Naveh's clear testimony on the matter. Even the argument that in the Belfer case, where Nahum was also prosecuted, there was no dispute that Nahum did not know about the arrangements there, does not change his knowledge in the case before us.
- When it was found above that Wei and Triple C should be convicted of the offense of a party to a restrictive arrangement as attributed to the first charge, the presumption arose that Oshri and Nahum violated the duty set forth in section 48(a) of the Competition Law to supervise and do everything possible to prevent an offense under the law (section 48(b) of the law). The burden of persuasion to contradict the presumption rests with the defendants.
- In the normative part, we referred to the fact that the arrangement set out in section 48 of the Competition Law was amended in the framework of Amendment 21 to the Law. The rationale - both before and after the amendment - is similar and is intended to impose liability on an officer who did not take action to prevent offenses in the corporation. The amendment expresses leniency in relation to the law that preceded it. The officer is no longer charged with the main offense (a party to a restrictive arrangement) as stipulated in the previous law, but rather with an independent offense of breach of the duty of supervision. Imposing liability on the officer is no longer dependent on the corporation committing an offense, as it was prior to the amendment. Violation of the duty to supervise constitutes an offense in itself. At the same time, the punishment set for the offense is lenient, and it was imposed on one year in prison.
- In accordance with the transitional provision set out in section 55a(c) of the Competition Law, the amendment to section 48 of the law is not considered to be null and void, with respect to section 4 of the Penal Law, and the wording after the amendment also applies to an offense committed prior to the amendment. As stated, the arrangement set forth in s. 48 both before and after the amendment expresses the concept of imposing criminal liability on an officer who did not act to ensure the existence of the provisions of the Competition Law. The amendment does not come to express a change in this position of the legislature with respect to the liability of officers, and in any case it does not indicate the cancellation of the liability of officers (Criminal Case 22847-12-10 State of Israel v. Bublil at paragraphs 131-136 (January 24, 2019)). Therefore, it appears that even if it were not for the explicit transitional provision, the conclusion would have been necessary that we are not dealing with the cancellation of the offense, and the transitional provision was intended only to clarify this (see and compare: Criminal Appeals Authority 8273/13 State of Israel (Tel Aviv-Jaffa Municipality) v. Haimovich at paragraph 34, and the discussion in its entirety at paragraphs 30-48 (December 25, 2024)).
- Defendants Oshri and Nahum did not dispute that section 48 should be applied in our case as drafted after the amendment (in accordance with the explicit transitional provision). At the same time, it was argued that in certain aspects the amendment constitutes a certain stringency in relation to the previous law, and that in these aspects the provisions of the previous law should be applied (for example, paragraph 74 of the triple C and Nahum summaries; paragraph 561 of the Wei and Oshri summaries). This argument is mine-based. This is in view of the transitional provision set out in section 55a(c) of the law. This provision, according to its clear language, clarifies the legal situation that began after the amendment and explicitly instructs that offenses committed prior to the entry into force of the amendment will be subject to the section as additional after the amendment, without reservations or adjustments, and in a manner that embodies the view that the amendment is lenient in its entirety and thus should be applied. In any event, in the circumstances here, it appears that there is no practical implication for the defendants' arguments with respect to aggravating aspects, and they do not change the conclusion. We will explain briefly.
Defendants Oshri and Nahum argued that it should be determined that the liability of an officer should be formed only where it was found that the corporation had committed an offense, in accordance with the provisions of the law that preceded the amendment, and even though this was not required after the amendment. However, this matter has no practical implications in our case, since it was found above that Wei and Triple C should be convicted in the restrictive arrangement that is the subject of the first indictment.