The bottom line: Even if Harel had an advantage in the first place for one reason or another, the coordination of bid prices was clearly intended to ensure its winning, increase its chances, prevent the possibility that it would lose, and prevent difficulties that might arise in its way if lower competitive bids are submitted. For this reason, Harel's arguments that Gilad's conduct was contrary to Harel's interest and that it put Harel in danger should not be accepted (paragraph 312 of Harel's summaries). As stated, Gilad was not brought to testify. The evidence shows that he acted with the aim of ensuring Harel's win, and in any event, it cannot be said that he acted against it (see also Zeiger's statement that the conduct of the civil appeal and its choice to price even when the equipment was discussed under the Comptroller General's agreement is the reason why Gilad was in contact with the competitors in order to ensure that Harel would not lose; P/222, paras. 57-63 and the discussion in paragraph 97 above).
In summary, it should be noted that in real time, Knitwerk noted that Wii and Triple C refrained from submitting additional bids after the initial bids they submitted, according to them, "since the servers are 'pizzas' according to the Comptroller's agreement and have no advantage in the balance of the contents" (N/6 correspondence of May 6, 2010; In his testimony, he interpreted what he had written and explained that in view of the weight of the cost of the servers out of the total content, he understood that Wii and Triple C could not be competitive, apparently beyond the proposals they proposed, p. 542, paras. 8-19). In real time, and at the time he wrote this, Knitwerk did not know that the proposals he received were submitted in coordination. In any case, there is nothing in what he wrote while the coordination was concealed from him, to testify that there was no feasibility of competition.
- Wei and Harel sought to support their claims of fictitious pricing withadditional indications as well.
Wee argued that the WM's application itself was not submitted as evidence, because in its absence it is clear that this is a fictitious pricing, and that no documentation was found in Wie's computers regarding this project (Oshri testimony, p. 4435, paras. 1-4; see also Wee's arguments in this regard in the oral summaries, pp. 6989, 18 ff.). This does not change anything. As stated above, the evidence presented indicates that the suppliers were contacted for price quotes in Baltimore, that the demands were presented to the suppliers and that Wee itself, through Shahar, submitted its (coordinated) offer, while Shahar wrote to KinTurk explicitly that this was done in response to ELTA's request (see paragraph 301 above). The very fact that an e-mail correspondence from Shachar to ConnectiNetwork, to which Wei's proposal was attached, was submitted as evidence at trial (N/7), raises a question mark over Wei's claim that no documentation was found in its computers in relation to the project and the WMF in question.