In the case of Ms. Shani Schwartzman (plaintiff 27), too, the original claim amount in the sum of ILS 457,000 also included the component of completing the land in the sum of ILS 57,000, but in the amended statement of claim the land component is ILS 57,500 and not ILS 57,000, and it appears that this is a clerical error.
In the case of the sisters Tom and Lee Sinai Riklis (plaintiffs 43-44), the original claim amount includes the land completion component in the sum of ILS 167,000, but according to the amended statement of claim, their land completion component is ILS 167,500. However, as will be clarified below, their claim should be rejected when they sold their rights to their uncle, and therefore there is no need to dwell on this matter.
In the case of H.H. Tzipi and Meni Davidian (Plaintiffs 13-14), the original claim amount in the sum of ILS 519,716 included the component of completing the land in the sum of ILS 53,500, but also additional components.
In any event, all of this shows that the issue at hand was discussed in the original statement of claim and was clarified in the amended statement of claim. And when the original statement of claim was filed during the statute of limitations, the statute of limitations raised by the defendants was rejected.
- I also did not find any substance in the claim of delay that was raised. As is well known, the case law held that the passage of time is not sufficient to establish a delay in civil proceedings, but rather it is necessary to prove a change in the situation for the worse as a result of the delay, which stemmed from the plaintiff's bad faith conduct, or in light of a clear representation of waiver or waiver of his right (Civil Appeal 6805/99 Talmud Torah General and Yeshiva Etz Chaim in Jerusalem v. Local Planning and Building Committee, Jerusalem, IsrSC 57(5) 433; 448-446 (2003)). All of these were not substantiated in our case.
- And from here to the essence.
Adv. Nof served as the group's counsel - he should, at the very least, instruct those who approached him, and the other members of the class in their situation, not to pay until the matter was clarified with Ms.O.R.
- When we examine the matter in terms of substance, the normative point of departure is that Adv. Nof served as the attorney for the acquisition group. And when some of the members of the group approached him with the question of whether they should accede to Ms. Or's demand, he served as their representative, and as someone entrusted with promoting their interests.
Indeed, the contact with those group members was made not through him. Still, as we have seen, Adv. Nof is at this stage liable for the contractual obligations by virtue of the services agreement, and at the same time by virtue of the fiduciary duties imposed on him in light of his role as the lawyer who provides his services to the group.