Expanding the front is enough to reject the claim.
- Second, and even if it was not an extension of the façade, it is not possible to appeal for a award of compensation by way of an estimate, when the amount of the damage can be proven. The plaintiffs did not mention in their summaries and statement of claim how many plaintiffs in question had their assets foreclosed; for how long; And so on. Even if it were noted that the imposition of the foreclosure, in and of itself, does not establish entitlement to compensation, but rather requires a detailed description of the damage caused in practice. In this way, it was possible to specify the costs that were required to be borne in order to remove the foreclosures, etc. Hence, the head of the damage has not been proven on its merits.
- Finally, the affidavit of Adv. Har Shemesh, who handled this matter on behalf of the defendants, was not challenged in his interrogation. He explained that the foreclosures were due to a malfunction in the Tax Authority, while the Authority did not enter the extensions of the deadline for freezing assessments in accordance with the agreements with it. Shemesh further explained that every member of a class who approached him on the issue of the foreclosure had his case dealt with and settled (see: paragraph 37 of his affidavit, as well as in his testimony at p. 699 S. 29-23).
- Since I have considered that the claim should be dismissed in respect of this component on its merits, there is no need to decide the question of the statute of limitations raised by the defendants in relation to it.
The Collective Expenses Claim Component
- In paragraphs 27.4 and 27.6 of the amended statement of claim, the plaintiffs added an additional element that did not exist in the original statement of claim. In this component, reimbursement of collective expenses incurred by the group, most of which were paid to service providers (lawyers, appraisers, etc.), was demanded, and the cost of which was at least ILS 7,500 per notional housing unit.
However, this element was neglected in the plaintiffs' summaries, and therefore, in accordance with the case law, it should not be addressed.
- In light of this result, there is no need to rule on the claim of limitation raised by the defendants in the matter.
Reimbursement of fees
- The defendants received legal fees in the amount of ILS 440,615, which constituted half of the contractual fees for accompanying the project. I do not believe that they should be obligated to return it to the plaintiffs.
- Since I have considered that the absolute majority of the claim should be dismissed, the component of the claim of restitution of fees should be rejected. The plaintiffs' argument is based on tort law and contracts. These grounds require proof that the actual work done by the defendants did not justify the payments they received along the way.
With this burden, theplaintiffs did not meet. In their summaries (at paragraph 586(f)) they petitioned for an alternative remedy of reimbursement of fees by way of assessment. No such relief was claimed by them in the statement of claim. Nor on the merits of the matter, they did not mention in their summaries the value that they claimed the legal services that they had managed to receive from the defendants. They were content to say that the value of the services they had not yet received "significantly exceeded" half of the legal work set out in the agreement (paragraph 573 of their summary), but that this was a general argument that was not substantiated. The burden of establishing the restitution component at issue - whether by way of individual compensation or by way of assessment - is on them (see the analysis of other municipal requests 355/80 Natan Asimov in Tax Appeal v. Tirat Bat Sheva Hotel Ltd., IsrSC 35(2) 800, 808-809 (1981)); and the plaintiffs did not present data that would enable them to establish a reasonable basis for calculating the estimate, as requested by them. In their summaries (at paragraph 571), they noted a list of legal actions that they claimed were included in the agreement, and which had not yet been performed by the defendants, but did not price the letter to the required degree of detail.
- On the other hand, the defendants in their summaries (at paragraph 323) claimed that the legal services they provided to the plaintiffs far exceeded half of the contractual fees paid to them, and added that they also provided legal services beyond what was agreed upon in the agreements. Thus, for example, they noted the representation in the court of liquidation at the beginning of the process, and the holding of an opening motion regarding the comment that was registered in favor of Mizrahi Bank. The fact that additional services were provided, which cannot be disputed, makes it difficult to obtain the general analysis conducted by the plaintiffs.
In addition, the plaintiffs' argument that they are at an evidentiary disadvantage, and that the defendants must prove the scope of their work, should not be accepted. The issue of the scope of work could have been clarified in the preliminary proceedings, or through an expert opinion. In any case, the bottom line is that the plaintiffs did not lay a sufficient evidentiary foundation that could support this head of the claim.
- It is interesting to note thatthe issue at hand can have significance for basing the cause of action on the law of trust, and not on the law of torts or contracts.
As Naftali Ben-Zion noted, "The distinction between the various causes of action may have practical implications, for example, because the starting point of the law of trust is that the client is not required to prove damage (and it is possible, for example, to sue for the restitution of legal fees); The statutes of limitations are usually more lenient; and a claim of contributory fault is not possible" (Ben Zion Naftali, at p. 281). However, the plaintiffs did not make a real argument in this matter, and the aforesaid channel is also not easy to implement, taking into account that the breach of the fiduciary duty was expressed only in relation to some of the plaintiffs, and not to others, a fact that makes it difficult for an order to recover the full fees that the defendants received in respect of the entirety.
- In view of theresult, there is no need to decide the dispute between the parties regarding the interpretation of the agreement; and whether he intended that the first half of the fees would be only for the actions prior to the issuance of the building permit, or whether the agreement meant global fees that were not associated with certain parts of the defendants' work. In addition, there is no need to rule on the defendants' claim that the plaintiffs should have demanded the refund of the fees from the Cassuto-Nof law firm, and not from the defendants.
Additional Arguments
- In view of the result whereby I rejected most of the charges attributed to the defendants, I am not required to discuss in general the various waiver clauses that exist in the contractual system. As explained, with respect to the element in which there is a basis for the claim, the component of the additional demand for payment, the waiver clause cannot immunize against the imposition of liability.
- I am not required to accept the defendants' argument that contributory fault should be attributed to the plaintiffs when they decided not to proceed with the project. This matter cannot exempt from liability where such a case was found. Even on the merits, in the circumstances that arose, the decision not to continue the journey was completely legitimate, taking into account all the difficulties that occurred in the team's path.
- According to the plaintiffs, the defendants were negligent in not taking care of the first meeting earlier, and it convened only about a year and a half after the group's closure. However, they did not establish how this matter affects the damages claimed by them. Most of the causes of action relate to the stage of drafting and signing the agreements, and the element of unlawful advance payment is also not related to this issue.
In practice, the delay in the implementation of the project was created as a result of the difficulties that arose around its construction, taking into account the change in the policy of the local planning authorities. Hence, even if the meeting had convened earlier, it would not have led to a change in the overall conduct of the project.
- Since I have ruled that it has not been proven that the defendants represented the plaintiffs in the drafting and signing of the agreements, I also reject the plaintiffs' claim that the defendants acted in a conflict of interest. The plaintiffs referred to a ruling according to which it was also determined in other contexts that the sale agreements should include an explicit provision according to which the lawyers do not represent the buyers. However, as we have seen, the agreements included provisions in this regard (see above in paragraph68 onwards).
- In their summaries (paragraph 586), the plaintiffs noted alternative remedies to the relief they petitioned in the statement of claim. Alternative remedies tothe are included in the main remedies, and whilethey have been rejected for the most part, there is no room to recognize their individual components.
- The plaintiffs raised many arguments in their response summaries, but most of them reflected a repetition of their arguments in their summaries. Nevertheless, I found it necessary to relate to these two:
- In their reply summaries (in paragraph 46), the plaintiffs referred to the incriminating judgment of Ms. Or in a criminal case (Tel Aviv) 10115-09-19 State of Israel v. Inbal Miriam Or (published in the databases [Nevo], 2024). This judgment has no bearing on our case. It relates to the deception perpetrated by Ms. Or in relation to the publications of projects she published in the print media (see paragraph 454 of the same judgment). However, the statement of claim did not claim that the defendants were involved in these publications. As explained above, in the agreements before me it was stated that this was a purchasing group, and the plaintiffs failed to prove that the defendants misled them.
- I did not find a deviation from the conclusions I reached with respect to plaintiffs 43-44, given what was stated in the reply summaries. The agreement signed with Mr. Meir speaks for him, and according to its wording, the plaintiffs received their investment back at the full time they sold their rights to him.
- In the other arguments, I did not find any justification for changing my conclusions.
The Result
- In light of the above, the claim is mostly dismissed. Out of the amount of the claim of approximately ILS 12.7 million, Adv. Nof must pay those plaintiffs, who preempted the payment of the last part of the land component, all the sums that were illegally collected in the sum of ILS 595,950, together with ILS interest as of the date of their payment in 2014. The sums will be transferred to the plaintiffs' attorney, and their distribution will be made by them in accordance with the relative portions of the relevant plaintiffs.
Adv. Aharonson should not be charged with any charge for this claim.