I will discuss below what I called the "linguistic problem", and then - the limits of the exceptions set by the legislature.
- The linguistic problem:
As Adv. Margaliot noted in the judgments in the Ibn Ezra case and in the Hagag case, the wording of the clause apparently failed in its language. The section, in accordance with its language, places the "purchaser" at the center of the provision - and applies the presumption of the family unit to him.
If this is done, we run into a problem: the clause is worded in such a way that the purchaser is the parent, and therefore traps his spouse and minor children in the family unit together with him (the law ostensibly inadvertently states "their children", a matter that the Honorable Justice Kirsch discussed in the Hagag case and found in it a certain anchor in order to overcome the linguistic problem).
The clause ostensibly fails to achieve its goal, when the purchaser is the minor. In such a case, if we see the buyer, his spouse and his minor children, the result will be an empty group. The minor has no children, and usually does not even have a partner.
There is no doubt that this is not what the legislature intended, but on the face of it, we are dealing with a linguistic problem, which is not simple.
Indeed, the appellants did not raise this problem and did not base their arguments on it. Nevertheless, I found it appropriate to mention the following.
- As the Honorable Justice H. Kirsch noted in the Hagag case, it would have been appropriate for the legislature to pay attention to this difficulty, and to bring about its solution. This difficulty has been known and known for decades, and yet the legislature did not find its time for it (I will mention that a similar problem exists with regard to section 49(b) of the Law, with regard to the exemption of betterment tax - with all that this entails).
- However, the interpretation of the law - and this is the valid and binding interpretation - is what has been established in case law and practice, and as stated, it seems that even the appellants did not find a way to argue against it (and this certainly has significance).
As the majority opinion held in both the Ibn Ezra and Hagag cases, the purpose of the law is clear, and it was to encapsulate all the members of the family unit - parents and minor children - as a single unit. This position was apparently also accepted by the honorable panel that recommended the withdrawal of the appeal submitted to the Supreme Court in the Hagag case (Civil Appeal 4677/17 Hagag v. Tel Aviv Land Appreciation Tax Administration [Nevo] (April 4, 2019)), despite the fact that the linguistic problem was at the center of the arguments.