From what has been described it appears that the plaintiffs were not consistent in the amount claimed, and there is no dispute that it became clear in the course of the proceeding that in the recent period in which the agreement between the parties applied, the plaintiffs were paid consideration in the sum of ILS 25, 000. However, notwithstanding the aforesaid, I have not found that the plaintiffs have not proven damage at all, and I am of the opinion that the inconsistency in their claims does not completely lay the groundwork under the plaintiffs' claim of the existence of damage and prevent the award of damage to the extent that was proven in the course of the proceeding. This is first of all because I do not find it acceptable to accept the defendant's arguments that the damage was not proven at all, given that evidence was presented indicating that the contractual consideration agreed upon by the parties was ILS 25, 000. This consideration was supported by the plaintiffs in written agreements between the parties - to which the defendant did not deny it. To this, it should be added that the defendant, on its part, not only did not deny the content of the contracts and the consideration stated therein, but also did not present any evidence showing that it did not pay the plaintiffs the consideration set out in the agreements. Moreover, with regard to the defendant's claim, and accordingly the plaintiff claimed for the first time in his supplementary affidavit for ongoing damage, I did not find anything in it, taking into account that in paragraph 5 of the statement of claim, the plaintiff claimed damages in the sum of ILS 2, 635, 500 for "damage caused by the defendant in the breach of contract, as detailed below, in a manner that in fact prevented the plaintiffs from continuing to make a living". In other words, already in the framework of the statement of claim, the defendants petitioned for ongoing damages resulting from the defendant's conduct preventing them from continuing to make a living. To this it should be added that apart from the argument and in accordance with it, the plaintiffs' claims regarding ongoing damage constitute an expansion of the façade, the defendant did not raise any argument in its summaries as to the manner in which the calculation was made by the plaintiff - that is, in response to the plaintiffs' argument that the amount of the monthly consideration should be multiplied by 27 months, which are the months that passed from the date of Zahavi's suspension until the date of the signing of his supplementary affidavit. To this, it should be added that in my approach, as long as Zahavi remained in the status of "suspended", the defendant should have paid his salary, and if she did not do so, and until the date on which the agreement is terminated, Zahavi is indeed entitled to payment of the contractual consideration. However, taking into account the fact that in their summaries the plaintiffs petitioned only for damages up to the date of the affidavits, I do not find it necessary to award him damages for a period beyond that.
- Duty to Reduce the Damage - As stated, the defendant further argues that the plaintiffs are not entitled to payment by the defendant, since they did not meet the obligation to reduce the damage that applies to them. This argument of the defendant is based on the provisions of section 14(a( of the Contracts and Remedies Law, which imposes on the injured party the duty to take reasonable measures to reduce the damage, from the time he became aware of the breach of contract or from a date close to it. In the framework of the case law, it was determined that the reasonableness of the means would be examined according to the circumstances of each and every case (Civil Appeal 195/85 Union Bank of Israel Ltd. Jacques Souraki, 42(4( 811; Civil Appeal 7298/10 Hadar Insurance Company Ltd. v. Ahad Ha'am Food and Investments Ltd., at paragraph 46 (July 9, 2012).
I will note that in this case the damage focuses on the payment of the monthly consideration set out in the agreement for the months of work from the date of Zahavi's suspension. For an issue similar to our case, the Supreme Court referred to other municipal applications 3437/93 Egged Cooperative Association for Transportation in Israel Ltd. v. Yoel Adler, 55(1( 817 (hereinafter: "the Adler case"), where payment to an Egged member by virtue of his membership was discussed. The Supreme Court emphasized that although this is not an employment relationship, it is possible to infer regarding this payment from the determination regarding the payment of wages to an employee who was determined retroactively that he was unlawfully fired - this inference is appropriate to my approach in our case as well. Therefore, I will cite the Supreme Court's rulings on the same matter: