Liability in the case at hand
- Taking into account the sequence of events and their causes, and the law that applies in the case at hand, I found that the responsibility for the events rests, first and foremost, and even decisively, on IEC and the team that was responsible on its behalf for the loading process, headed by Corporal Gidron.
- As mentioned, the immediate cause of the event was the weather conditions and the change in the intensity and direction of the winds.
However, we are not talking about a momentary event, but rather a rolling event that lasts for several hours, and we are dealing with a central figure, which has a significant impact on the identification of the party responsible for the chain of events that took place later.
- As indicated by Gidron's report, already in the afternoon he identified the change in the direction of the wind in a northerly direction.
At 5:00 P.M., Corporal Gidron identified that the wind had reached a speed of 25 to 27 knots, and as a result, he decided to stop the supply of fuel to the ship.
At the same time, at this time (17:00), Corporal Gidron identified that cable No. 1 had been released from the winch for several meters, when the winch stop was not held.
Despite the above, Corporal Gidron did not decide to disconnect the ship from the confinement, and she continued to be captivated and exposed to the wind regime, whose speed continued to be 25 knots, with gusts of up to 30 knots.
- When the wind speed reached 30 knots, and this occurred at the latest around 19:30 (as noted in the Gidron report), Corporal Gidron did not decide to disconnect the fuel pipeline, even though according to IEC procedures, which dictated the checklist, at such a wind speed the pipeline should have been ordered to be disconnected (a decision made only around 20:00).
At a later stage, at around 8:10 P.M., when rope No. 1 was torn, Corporal Gidron did not decide to disconnect the ship from the connector, and so did at 8:30 P.M., when ropes 2 and 3 were torn and the cables on those buoys were released. It was only at 20:36 that Corporal Gidron gave the order to prepare the ship's engine for its departure, and only about an hour later did the ship leave the scene.
- As the person responsible for the loading process, Corporal Gidron had to address the conditions that developed from noon, and during the following hours; order the disconnection of the fuel pipeline from the ship at an earlier stage (possibly even around 17:00 or around 19:30 at the latest); and to order that the ship be detached from its confinement and removed from the link at an earlier stage than it actually occurred.
In view of the decisions of the party responsible for the loading process (i.e., Corporal Gidron), during the hours that the incident lasted, the fuel supply pipeline remained connected to the ship until 19:30; The ship remained confined until around 9:00 p.m.; During these hours, cables were loosened and ropes were torn gradually, until the damages that are the subject of the lawsuit were caused.
- Indeed, the check list (in section 48 thereof) anchored agreements between Corporal Gidron and the first officer of the ship regarding the maximum speed of the wind at which the ship should be disconnected, when it was agreed there that only at a speed of 25 knots should the fuel be stopped; at a speed of 30 knots, the charging tube must be disconnected; At a speed of 35 knots, the ship must be disconnected from the confinement.
However, alongside the fact that these agreements could not exempt Corporal Gidron, being the "person in charge of the loading", from making decisions in light of changes that developed at the site for hours, it became clear that these agreements anchored procedures set by IEC itself, which in fact dictated the checklist.