Caselaw

Civil Case (Haifa) 50975-11-21 The Phoenix Insurance Company Ltd. v. Hafnia Tankers Ship Holdings Singapure Pte Ltd - part 8

August 2, 2026
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This is what a rabbi confirmed."H.  Gidron in his interrogation in this proceeding (p.  16 of the transcript of the meeting):

Q: So I'll say it again, the person who set the procedure on the checklist that you referred us to is the Electric Company, right?

A: Yes."

Therefore, IEC cannot be perceived as having a checklist that only at a speed of 35 knots should the ship be disconnected, since this is a figure dictated by IEC.

Moreover.  This section of the checklist cannot be a solution to all the conditions prevailing in the place where the ship is confined, and more importantly, to the dynamic changes that occur in the confinement area over time, which must be addressed in real time.

For this reason, IEC also cannot rely on the fact that the ship's crew "agreed" in advance to these terms, since it is not concerned with the issue of contractual agreements of one kind or another, but rather with the steps that must be taken, and which are entrusted by the party responsible for the loading process.

  1. In the totality of the circumstances, there was no reason for the person in charge of loading to decide, for hours, not to disconnect the fuel pipeline, and not to disconnect the ship from its confinement, despite the change in the wind regime, which was accompanied by the release of cables as early as 17:00.

Indeed, in the investigation of the incident that is the subject of the lawsuit (P/7), it was determined in the recommendations chapter (paragraph 9 there) that "the tanker's confinement should be limited to a continuous wind power of 15 knots blowing from a direction perpendicular to the stern bow line of the tanker (approximately 265 knots).  or the imminent expectation that it will strengthen and change its direction, as stated.  Exceptional approval in certain circumstances will be in consultation with the port manager and the port captain."

Following this investigation, in 2017, Raspan issued procedures relating to the Port of Ashdod (P/2), in which it was determined that "as a rule, it will not be possible to stay and operate a tanker in the maritime link in conditions of north wind of 25 knots or more" (section 3.4.3.4 of the procedure).

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