So yes, With regard to the cause of extraneous considerations in administrative law, it is not the "last line" of the decision that determines its validity, but rather the underlying consideration: not the "what", but the "why"..
- It is not superfluous to note that only recently was the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia in the United States (U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia) for a question related to our matter (see: National Public Radio, Inc. Trump, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69898 (D.D.C. Mar. 31,2026) (hereinafter: the NPR case). In the same case, the constitutionality of a presidential order ordering all federal authorities to cease all funding, direct or indirect, to two public broadcasters: National Public Radio and the Public Broadcasting Service (hereinafter, respectively: NPR and PBS) were discussed. In its judgment of March 31,2026, the court accepted, in essence, the claim of the broadcasters. The court noted that behind the executive order were the president's arguments that NPR and PBS "have fueled partisanship and left-wing propaganda with taxpayer dollars." Against this background, the court ruled that the presidential order discriminates between speakers on the basis of their point of view and constitutes a means of retaliation for protected speech, in violation of the First Amendment to the Constitution. Therefore, the court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the implementation of the presidential order.
Admittedly, dealing with this issue in the matter of NPR The constitutional right to freedom of expression enshrined in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, while in our case we are dealing with administrative review of the discretion of the executive branch by virtue of the grounds of extraneous considerations (for the position that one of the purposes of American freedom of expression laws, if not the main one, is to prevent the consideration of extraneous considerations, see: Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 413 (1996)). However, it seems to me that it is possible to point to a conceptual line that unites the two things: there is a fundamental difference between legitimate discretion in decisions relating to funding or public support, which is based on the purpose of the governmental action and on substantive criteria, and the improper use of governmental authority as a tool to punish or silence an opinion that is not to the liking of the person in power.
- A decision to close a broadcasting station - public, military, or any other station - that was made for budgetary, organizational, or any other practical reason, including the preservation of the statehood of the broadcasting body and its disconnection from the political arena - is a decision that is not wrong with the underlying considerations. On the other hand, a decision to close a broadcasting station, completely or partially, which was made not for these reasons, but due to the dissatisfaction of the decision makers with the content broadcast therein, with the political positions expressed in its broadcasts, or with the criticism voiced therein towards those in power at the time, is a decision made on the basis of extraneous considerations, and is therefore fundamentally unacceptable. For the sake of simplicity, I will refer below as the consideration underlying dissatisfaction with the content of the broadcast as it contradicts the positions of the authority holder and is critical of his actions - the "improper consideration".
- Now, all that remains to do is to turn around and examine whether the improper consideration is the dominant consideration that underpinned the government's decision to order the closure of the station. However, before I turn to this, I would like to stop at another last stop concerning the relationship between the cause of extraneous considerations and the cause of reasonableness, and the implications of the matter in our case.
- A careful distinction must be made between the ground of extraneous considerations, which we are dealing with in this chapter, and the ground of reasonableness. In Israeli law, the cause of extraneous considerations has historically far preceded the ground of reasonableness in its current form. In order not to bore the reader, I will not detail here the historical development of the ground of reasonableness in our legal system (for more details, see: the judgment regarding the cancellation of the grounds of reasonableness, in paragraphs 6-11 of the judgment of President (ret.) Hayut), and I will mention that today the "balanced" ground of reasonableness is applied in our law (for criticisms on this subject, see, for example: High Court of Justice 5853/07 Emunah - National Religious Women's Movement v. Prime Minister, IsrSC 62(3) 445,521-524 (2007) (hereinafter: the Emunah Case); Additional Hearing: High Court of Justice3660/17 The General Association of Merchants and Independents v. Minister of the Interior, paragraphs 35-36 of the opinion of Justice N. Sohlberg [Nevo] (October 26,2017); Noam Sohlberg, "On Subjective Values and Objective Judges, " Hashiloah 18 (2020)).
In accordance with the "balanced" reason of reasonableness, when it is required to review an administrative decision through the lens of the reason for reasonableness, the court is required to examine, inter alia, whether the administrative authority has considered all the relevant considerations in the matter, and whether each of the relevant considerations has been given its proper relative weight (see, several examples: High Court of Justice 1905/03 Akal v. Minister of the Interior, paragraph 17 of the judge's judgment A. Fogelman [Nevo] (5.12.2020); High Court of Justice 5657/09 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Government of Israel, paragraph 39 of the judge's judgment A. Procaccia [Nevo] (24.11.2009); Interest Faith, at pp. 486-487). Particularly striking, in this context, is the metaphor of my friend, the judge D. Barak-Erez, according to which: "It can be said that the dish can be boiled even when all the right ingredients are put in it, but in quantities that significantly exceed what is required" (Barak-Erez, Volume 2, at p. 725).