As for Maj. Gen. (res.) Ron-Tal - without expressing a position as to whether the conflict of interest attributed to him by the tzaddik, on the merits of the matter, caused him to withdraw from the committee, I am of the opinion that real weight should be attributed to the very fact that he himself believed that he should resign from it. This is because the manner in which a person serving in office perceives his ability to act objectively, and the fear of harm to the appearance of justice stemming from his tenure, constitutes, in and of itself, a significant indication of the existence of a real difficulty in this context.
- It is not superfluous to note in this context that while it is possible to find among the members of the Committee that there is good reason to assume that he will recommend the closure of the station, it seems that there was not a single member among its members who had good reason to assume that his opinion was inclined in the opposite direction - that is, to keep the station in its current form. Thus, there is no one among the members of the committee for whom there is a basis to assume that considerations relating to freedom of expression or a free and independent press are at the top of his agenda, and that the fear of intimidating media figures, including public broadcasting, is expected to have a profound impact on his position. Moreover, there was not a single member of the committee whose main and clear occupation is in the field of journalism.
- The picture that emerges, then, also in the context of the composition of the committee, is that the arguments of the petitioners and the Attorney General have a solid basis: it is highly doubtful whether the establishment of the committee, even in view of its composition as described above, is sufficient to alleviate the concern that the decision to close the Galei Tzahal station was made in advance, and because of the improper consideration. In fact, there is good reason to believe that the opposite is true: not only does the composition of the committee not remove the concern, but it also strengthens it.
B.3. Interim Summary
- At this point in the discussion, it is possible to stop and summarize here: Against the background of all the above, I am of the opinion that it can be concluded that Ministers Karei and Katz - who were the main and leading bridesmaids of the move to close Army Radio, from his initial initiative until the formulation of the proposal that was brought to the government for approval - considered the improper consideration when promoting the decision to close the station, and that this consideration was included, at the very least, with the main considerations that guided them - if not the most important of them.
It is precise, as I noted above, that the determination that this is an improper consideration is not based on the fact that Ministers Karei and Katz held a certain worldview or ideology regarding the question of the existence of a military radio station dealing with current affairs. Such a consideration, which supports a reduction in the IDF's involvement in news and current affairs broadcasts for reasons of principle of separation between the military and politics, or an economic-ideological consideration that denies public funding for such activity, is a purely practical consideration that cannot be taken into account, and as we have seen, it has some expression in the ministers' own remarks. However, the analysis I conducted above shows that alongside this legitimate consideration, a fundamentally different consideration was also (and mainly) considered, and in a prominent and consistent manner, as a dominant consideration: a consideration based on the content of the statements that were voiced on the station's broadcasts, and in particular its identification, in the eyes of the ministers, In accordance with the positions of the Another side of the political map.
- However, the fact that I am convinced that Ministers Karei and Katz considered the improper consideration as a dominant consideration is not enough. The decision that is the focus of the petitions before us is not Minister Katz's decision to establish the committee, nor his decision to adopt its recommendations. The decision that is the subject of the petitions is the government's decision of December 22,2025. Ministers Karai and Katz, despite being particularly relevant to the subject of the resolution, are only two of the cabinet members who voted to adopt the same resolution. Therefore, in the circumstances of his case, the following question arises: How can it be determined that a collegial body - in our case, the government and its ministers - "considered" extraneous considerations, when the improper consideration is directly attributed to only two of its members? I will now turn to the examination of this question.
B.4. Examination of the Government's Decision and the Challenge in Applying the Grounds of Extraneous Considerations to a Collegial Body
- As stated above, one of the main challenges posed by the ground of extraneous considerations to the applicant is the difficulty of proof. This difficulty is heightened when the authority against which it is alleged to have considered extraneous considerations is a collegial body (plural organ), each of whose members may consider different considerations of its own. Indeed, as noted in the case law, "the difficulty of identifying the extraneous considerations and giving them signs increases when the administrative decision is made by a statutory-collective body with many members" ( The Open House case, at p. 40; See also: High Court of Justice 49181-12-24 Al-Qasemi Academy (R.A.) v. Council for Higher Education, para. 7 (May 5,2025); Yachimovich case, paragraph 12 of the judgment of President Beinisch).
Beyond the evidentiary difficulty, the application of the grounds of extraneous considerations to a decision of a collegiate body poses an additional and more complex question: suppose it has been proven that some of the members of the body considered extraneous considerations, while in relation to the rest of the members, it has been proven that they considered only substantive considerations; Or, alternatively, it is not known whether the decision of the other members was made on the basis of extraneous considerations or substantive considerations. Is there room in such circumstances to order the disqualification of the decision? In other words, how many members of the collegiate body have to consider extraneous considerations in order for the entire decision to be invalidated because of this - and the answer to this does not depend solely on their number, or also on their status and the extent of their influence on the other members?
- To the best of my knowledge, the case law of this court has not yet given an explicit answer to the above question. In order to provide an answer to the aforesaid question, the petitioners refer to the judgment in the Ilan case, and claim that there was established a clear precedent that applies, according to them, to our case as well. In the same matter, the court was asked whether a conflict of interest that existed among some of the members of a tenders committee invalidates the decision of the entire committee. The court answered this question in the affirmative, in view of the concern that a committee member who formulated his position in advance or holds a prejudice may influence his other committee members, whether by explicit or indirect statements. In the picturesque language of Justice Cheshin, who wrote the judgment in the Ilan case:
"... A spoiled apple in the box may also arrive Other apples. Indeed, a committee member who has formulated his position - or a committee member who holds a prejudice - can influence his other committee members, whether by explicit statements or indirect statements, and if he can influence, he is presumed to try to influence. Thus, if the position of that committee member was formulated in circumstances that disqualify his vote, he in any case transmits the virus of disqualification to his other members of the committee as well" (ibid., at p. 843).