From this the petitioners seek to draw an equal conclusion: just as it is sufficient that one member of a collegiate body is infected with a conflict of interest in order to "infect" the entire body with the "virus of disqualification", so also, according to them, it is sufficient that one of the members of the body considered an extraneous consideration in order to invalidate the entire decision, regardless of the number or status of the other members.
I cannot accept this argument, certainly not in the sweeping manner in which it was argued.
- At the outset, I will note that it is doubtful in my opinion whether this is indeed the rule established in the Ilan case, even with respect to the cause of the conflict of interest discussed there. Thus, in the Ilan case, immediately after the words quoted above, Justice Cheshin went on to note that in the circumstances of that matter it was correct and proper to return the hearing to the Regional Labor Court, in order for it to establish clear factual findings as to the actual effect of the committee members who were tainted by a conflict of interest on the discretion of the other committee members (ibid., at pp. 843-845; even though in that matter the court refrained from doing so, This was due only to the passage of time since the committee's deliberations). It seems, therefore, that Justice M. Cheshin also did not see his ruling as a sweeping and categorical rule, according to which a conflict of interest in one member necessarily "infects" the other members of the body, but ultimately sought to examine whether the said influence was indeed realized.
Moreover, even if I assume, without setting any precedent on the matter, that this is indeed the rule established in the Ilan case with respect to the cause of conflict of interest, I do not believe that there is room to apply a similar rule, in a sweeping manner, to the ground for extraneous considerations as well. This is because, at the basis of the cause of conflict of interest lies a special reason, which is equally irrelevant to our case: the preservation of the appearance of justice and the public's trust in the authorities (see, for example: High Court of Justice 8467/10 Zik Dinur Ltd. v. Minister of Industry, Trade and Labor, paragraph 44 of the judgment of Justice A. Vogelman and the references there [Nevo] (November 29,2011)). This reason may justify taking a strict approach and preventing the tenure of even one member who is tainted by a conflict of interest, in the sense of "preventing evil before it happens" (High Court of Justice 531/79 "Likud" faction in the Petah Tikva Municipality v. Petah Tikva Municipal Council, IsrSC 34(2) 566,572 (1980)). However, once we wish to examine retroactively, after the fact, whether a decision that has already been made is tainted by an extraneous consideration, the consideration of the appearance of justice loses some of its weight, and it must be weighed against the significance and consequences of annulling a decision that has already been given. Therefore, in my opinion, the question of whether the foreign consideration was indeed dominant in the decision that was actually made should be placed at the center (for this difference between the ground of foreign considerations and the cause of conflict of interest, see: High Court of Justice 427-10-25 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel (NPO) v. Government of Israel, paragraph 49 of the judgment of the Vice-President v. Sohlberg [Nevo] (December 28,2025); High Court of Justice 415/19 Levy v. Minister of the Interior, paragraph 19 of the judgment of Justice M. Mazuz [Nevo] (April 21,2020)).