In any event, the main thing is not found in the Super Stock chain, but in the Big Stock chain, but even in respect of it there is no well-founded claim of theft of a trade secret or breach of the duty of confidentiality (see: paragraphs 26-31 of his counter-affidavit, paragraphs 24-32 of his affidavit in the Ashdod suit, and also in paragraphs 54-56 of his affidavit in the franchise suit).
- The very existence of the competition is not sufficient to substantiate the claim, since it was found that when the franchise agreements were unlawfully canceled, the defendants in the franchise suit could have continued to operate in the relevant market under a different and new brand, namely the Big Stock chain.
- Thus, the whole is not substantiated, and I reject Max's arguments in this regard.
Max's claim for infringement of its trademarks and the damages claimed in the amount of ILS 2,000,000
- It is now alleged that the defendants infringed the trademarks of the Max-Stock Company, when they used these marks unlawfully, and when they designed a very similar mark for the competing Big Stock chain that they established.
This argument should also be rejected. As explained so far, it was proven that the cancellation of the franchises was unlawful, so that the defendants had no choice but to develop a new brand, so that they could continue in their field of business. As for the period of time during which the franchisees continued to sell the chain's products in 2018, it was found that if it were not for the unlawful cancellation carried out by Max Stock, there would have been no defect in it. This matter, which lasted several months, cannot constitute a compensable component.
- Moreover; in this matter as well, Max did not establish the amount of compensation claimed by it. It claims that the damage caused to it in respect of the defendants' conduct is ILS 2,000,000. However, it did not prove it. It could have submitted an expert opinion to substantiate its claims in this matter, but it did not do so. It also chose not to base an argument on the basis of its financial statements in order to prove a decrease in profits due to the competition of Big Stock with it, and following the theft of its trade secrets by Mr. Shimshon. Against this background, its claims were not proven.
- In addition, Max abandoned the relief of an order for the provision of accounts in its summaries, and therefore it should not be required (Civil Appeal 447/92 Roth v. InterContinental Credit Corporation, IsrSC 49(2) 102, at paragraph 4 (1995)). This neglect of the relief is apparently not accidental. During his testimony, Mr. Max waived the monetary remedies of his claim several times, and although the defendants argued in detail in their summaries on this matter, and quoted a number of quotes from his testimony, this was not answered in Max's reply summaries .
In any event, there is no room for the remedy of providing the accounts, taking into account the fact that the grounds claimed in the matter have not been substantiated.
- In addition, I did not find the statutory compensation in the Commercial Torts Law to be awarded in favor of Max, taking into account that there was no basis for the theft of trade secrets or the illegal use of the plaintiff's trademarks, when it breached the franchise agreements and cancelled them unlawfully.
Does Max have the right to force the sale of the shares held by Top-Team in the Ashdod branch?
- It remains to discuss the Ashdod lawsuit, in which Max Stock petitioned to implement the existing separation mechanism in the Ashdod Agreement, or to order another separation.
The dispute must therefore be clarified on two different levels: one relates to the question of whether one of the cases in the Ashdod Agreement exists, for which the contractual separation mechanism must be activated. And to the extent that the answer is no, the dilemma arises on the second level: whether separation should be ordered by virtue of the general law.