Estate Case (Tel Aviv) 27701-09-24 R.B.S. v. Y.Z. - part 5

It was proven that there was an error in the will

22. After examining the arguments and evidence of the parties, I have reached the conclusion that the deceased did not want and did not intend to harm the inheritance to the defendant in the earlier will by means of the late will. The conclusion is learned from the sum of the following evidence.
23. The deceased and the defendant had a close relationship, "like a father and a son" (A, paragraph 9 of the affidavit), with mutual help and support: "And it was known that David D. helped me, more than once and not three" (D.  - p.  33, s.  16), and the relationship remained good and proper until the death of the deceased (the defendant - paragraph 13 of the affidavit, p.  19, paras.  11-20,31-34; M.  Section 7 of the affidavit; A.  Section 13 of the affidavit; A.  Section 11 of the affidavit; J.    Section 7 of the affidavit).

As evidence, the deceased allowed the defendant to connect subplots 1 and 2 and to use the two buildings as a single house, as opposed to paying rent (the defendant - paragraphs 24-26 of the affidavit; paragraphs 6 and pp.  26 n/8; paragraph 9 of affidavit A; N.  - p.  25, paras.  1-3); the deceased and the defendant reached an agreement regarding economic support in the amount of $200 per month linked to the representative dollar rate (hereinafter also - the economic support agreement or agreement) (paragraphs 2-3 N/8), and the deceased ")f) needed income" (defendant - p.  18, paras.  28-29; M.  - p.  17, s.  3), and according to the plaintiffs, he even complained constantly about the amount of money: "It's pennies of what I receive" (N.  - p.  25, paras.  10-11,31-33; See also S.  - p.  23, s.  3; D.  - p.  33, s.  15) and about the defendant not paying him: "Q: Did Y.  complain to you that he didn't give him money? A: Yes.  Q: ...  Does S.  take advantage of him financially? A: Correct" (see p.  37, paras.  11,21-24), did not change his conduct with respect to the property and did not retract his agreement to allow the defendant to live in it.  It should be noted that none of the family members acted to assist the deceased in increasing the "rent" (according to the plaintiffs) or to protect him from exploitation by the defendant despite the alleged complaints made by the deceased (N.  - p.  25, s.  11, p.  26, s.  12-14; s.  - p.  3, s.  4-5,11; see - p.  37, s.  25-28,33-34); Despite the deceased's alleged complaints regarding his disappointment with the change in the defendant's attitude towards him: "He was not only disappointed, he had a cold and distant relationship.  He was terribly harmed by the attitude and the lack of attention" (A.  - p.  31, paras.  19,30), the deceased acted to appoint the defendant to handle his affairs and even continued to consult and assist him (N.  - p.  26, paras.  9,17,19; A.  - p.  29, s.  31; see p.  37, s.  12).  For example, the deceased considered drafting a power of attorney and designating the defendant as a power of attorney because: "They (the defendant and R.S.A.'s husband) are helping me today and taking care of everything I need" (doctor's certificate dated November 6,2019 N/4; see p.  38, s.  5).  Or, for example, the deceased authorized the defendant to act in his banking affairs (power of attorney dated February 20,2020 N/5; defendant - p.  19, paras.  25-27; Y.M.  - section 7).  Or, for example, the deceased was assisted by the defendant in connection with a TAMA project in a property in Tel Aviv (Q - p.  23, paras.  26-31).

24. 00In our case, the plaintiffs' procedural conduct casts a heavy shadow on the weight of their claims regarding the deterioration of the relationship and the disgraceful treatment of the deceased. For example, the plaintiffs refrained from summoning the contractor to testify in order to testify about aggressive behavior on the part of the defendant towards the deceased (S.  - p.  24, paras.  1-3), and their failure to do so is in accordance with their duty [Civil Appeal 2275/90 Lima Israeli Chemical Industries Ltd.    Rosenberg, IsrSC 47(2) 605 (1993)].  Or, for example, the plaintiffs chose to skip the interrogation of A.  and A.  on the grounds that it was hearsay testimony (p.  18, paras.  13,18), but the claim is inconsistent with the nature of the testimony, which was based, at least on specific matters, on personal knowledge.  Therefore, there is no reasonable explanation for the plaintiffs' refusal to cross-examine the testimony.  Therefore, the plaintiffs' duty should be attributed to their refusal to cross-examine the testimony [Civil Appeal 4584/10 State of Israel v.  Regev Shober [Nevo] (December 4,2012); Labor Appeal 4510-03-20 Nissan v.  Mivtachim Workers' Social Insurance Institute Ltd.  [Nevo] (November 26,2020)].  Or, for example, the plaintiffs tried to base their claim on disgraceful treatment of hearing testimonies (A.  - p.  29, paras.  31-34; A-p.  32, paras.  3).  Or, for example, the plaintiffs tried to minimize the weight of the doctor's certificate without summoning the author of the document to testify (N.  - p.  26, paras.  22-24).

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25. Despite the deceased's alleged statements, "that he intends to remove Y. from his will...  he does not want to give him anything" (see paragraphs 16,17 of the affidavit; A.  - p.  31, s.  32), in the later will, the deceased bequeathed his rights to his nephews, including the defendant, in equal parts between them, while clarifying that the box "all my rights and property of any kind and type" refers to certain assets: "This is an apartment that I own and that is registered in my name on XX Street in Tel Aviv...  as well as all the funds and/or financial rights" (p.  7 N/2).
26. filed the application for a late probate order but withdrew the request: "I do not insist on the application for a late probate order, I will be a witness and whatever the results of the proceeding may be, I will accept" (Prov.  7.1.2025, p.  5, paras.  27-28).
27. As noted, the late will includes the box: "This will of mine is the last and it cancels any previous will that was made" (p. 8, N/2).  Therefore, the mere retraction of M.'s application is not a trivial matter, and this has an impact on the weight that must be attributed to the defendant's claims in the framework of the statement of objection to the late will and/or the reply to the objection to the earlier will, especially in view of the fact that the withdrawal of the application is inconsistent with M.'s direct economic interest and even ostensibly contradicts it.
28. In our case, the plaintiffs made a mere claim that evidence would be brought that " took the brothers to him and that they work together" (Pro.  January 7,2025, p.  3, para.  12), without presenting any basis to support the claim, which was even abandoned and was no longer raised later in the proceeding.
29. Asher's position that she stands behind the application for the execution of the late will and opposes the execution of the early will, is inconsistent with her agreement to the agreement for the division of the estate prepared by Adv. G.  (see Prov.  7.1.2025, p.  5, s.  31; p.  36, s.  1, paragraph 3 of the letter of objection submitted to the Registrar of Inheritance, p.  6 of the letter of objection, Estates file 49319-09-24).
30. In our case, G., whose services were hired by the heirs "to handle the name of the heirs and to represent us" (see Letter of Objection of the Estate Case 49319-09-24), testified that in his meetings with the heirs, the difficulty in the late will and the solution was presented (p. 9, paras.  1,6), and that at first there was a sweeping agreement that "there is no problem with the apartment in Nes Ziona, the apartment in Nes Ziona belongs to Y.Z.  only" (p.  9, s.  2); Moving on to the date set for the purpose of signing the estate division agreement, everything was clear to everyone: "From what I remember, there were no calls to me from R.  and N.  with any questions" (p.  11, paras.  29-30); N.  "blew up" the estate division agreement because "she had unclosed matters from the past between her and M...  which were related to their inheritance from their father...  The matter had nothing to do with the deceased's issue at all.  and not to his estate" (p.  9, paras.  13-19; p.  12, s.  34, p.  13, s.  2; see also n.  p.  28, s.  32, p.  29, s.  2).  Despite this, the other heirs signed the agreement: "They decided that the three of them would sign in any case...  Later they would try to approach N.  and persuade her to retract it and come and sign.  ...  The three of them signed the agreement for the division of the estate.  The other heir, Y.M.  arrived at a different time...  and signed the agreement" (p.  9, paras.  22-26; p.  11, paras.  30-31).
31. Indeed, at the end of the day, the agreement for the division of the estate was not signed. However, this fact does not negate the evidentiary weight that should be attributed to the draft agreement, which reflects the agreements and positions that were formulated between the parties at that time.  This is evident from the totality of the data as follows: The plaintiffs claim the existence of a recording, which they claim contradicts the testimony regarding the unanimity between the potential heirs to sign the agreement for the division of the estate (p.  10, paras.  19-23), but this recording was not submitted at any stage with all that it entails [p.  11, paras.  9-11] [Civil Appeal 8151/98 Sternberg v.  Chetzik, IsrSC 56(1) 539,549 (2001)]; The plaintiffs knew about the early will (Adv. C.  - p.  12, paras.  24-25; see - paragraph 17 of the affidavit; p.  38, s.  26 - p.  39, s.  6), and nevertheless they were willing to sign the agreement for the division of the estate, being well aware of the difficulty posed by the late will; A., the daughter of plaintiff No. 1, who is a lawyer and participated in the meeting with Adv. G.: "She insisted that the agreement for the division of the estate be signed even before the probate order was issued" (Adv. C.  - p.  8, s.  26; p.  9, s.  1-8; A.  - p.  30, s.  15); Messages were exchanged between N.  and the defendant in real time, where it was written: "I transferred it to S.'s phone and it was opened with him, agreeing to everything, please let me know when it is time to sign...  The paperwork of the house in Tel Aviv was also arranged?...  Good" (p.  40 N/13) and between R.  and the defendant (via A.'s mobile phone - paragraph 20 of A's affidavit) where it was written: "I understand that you are under pressure on your house, but no one will hurt you, so make an individual agreement, I don't intend to be a prisoner of this crazy woman after what she did in the last meeting...  It's all lust out (the mistake in the original - S.A.) ...  I want to settle a score of years at the expense of others" (pp.  55-56 N/16; P/2 of affidavit A).
32. In light of all of the above, I am convinced that the deceased did not change his taste towards the defendant. Therefore, I determine that there was an error in the box in the later will because "this will of mine is the last and it cancels any previous will that was made".

Proof of "clear" knowledge of the deceased's realistic wishes

33. After examining the arguments and evidence of the parties, I have reached the conclusion that the purpose for which the deceased wrote the will relates only to rights in an apartment in Tel Aviv, and that his intention and desire was and remains for the defendant to inherit the property in Nes Ziona.
34. In our case, an evidentiary fabric was laid which relied on various and diagnostic evidentiary foundations that are consistent and support the fact that the deceased chose to command the rights in the Tel Aviv apartment. I will detail below.
35. The deceased informed the nephews and the nephew's son of his intention to make a will in which he would make a will For them his rights in the property in Tel Aviv: "He picked up the phone and told me that he wanted to make a will and divide it among 5 heirs. He talked about the apartment in Tel Aviv unequivocally" (M)'- p.  16, paras.  23-24, paragraphs 4 of the affidavit; The defendant - paragraphs 35 and 37 of the affidavit; 10.paragraph 6 of the affidavit).  The matter was brought to the attention of the plaintiffs, otherwise there is no explanation as to how', who was apparently surprised and did not know the contents of the will, knew the identity of the heirs? (N'- Sections 20-21 of the affidavit, p.  27, paras.  15,29).  There is also no explanation as to why R.' who heard from the deceased about his desire to bequeath his entire property to five heirs:in equal parts and certainly not let me' The house in Nes Ziona.  He never wanted to do that, certainly not in his last years, because he was very disappointed in him(paragraph 21 of the affidavit), agreed and even signed the agreement for the division of the estate, without demanding to receive "compensation" from another property that arose Only at a later stage and did not mature (Adv. Gamliel - p.  9, paras.  29-34; paragraphs 30-31 of R's affidavit').
36. J.M. He testified that: "The deceased only talked about the house in Tel Aviv, and told me that he would bequeath the house to me, to me', Len', why' Weller'.  He didn't mention the house in Nes Ziona(paragraph 6 of the affidavit).  The plaintiffs refrained from interrogating the The Witness for his testimony on this substantive matter.  The case law states that the refusal of a party to make use of this important tool of cross-examination leaves the version of the witness who was not interrogated as a true version that has not been refuted, and is interpreted as the consent of the person who refrained from interrogation to the state of affairs as presented in this version [Labor Appeal 36316-06-12 Ramat Hasharon Municipality v.  Ayelet Shoshani Gino, paragraph 41 and references there [Nevo] (February 24,2015)].

III.     The purpose of the later will was to regulate the distribution of the remainder of the estate among specific heirs - Nephews and niece (40)M.  , Deceased), since the deceased He didn't want his estate to go into her hands because she had "A lot of possessions and he wanted to take care of me' whom he loved very much(paragraph 35 of the defendant's affidavit).  It should be noted that the defendant was not questioned about his testimony on this matter and his version was not concealed.

1. The defendant acted to receive Building Permit (P/9), renovations that led to the consolidation of subplots 1-2 into one house, while investing funds in the amount of "Over ILS 1 million(paragraph 7 of affidavit A'; Sections 10-11 of Affidavit A'; Paragraph 32 of the defendant's affidavit). Renovations to the property In Nes Ziona were conducted with the knowledge and consent of the deceased, at least with the implicit (P/9;'- p.  36, s.  17, p.  38, paras.  24-25).  In other words, the deceased knew that the defendant was investing money in reliance on the prior will.  In these circumstances, it is inconceivable that the defendant would bother to assist the deceased in drafting an additional will that would harm the provisions of the prior will that benefit him and have been in his knowledge for many years (the defendant - paragraphs 40-38 of the affidavit;'- p.  15, paras.  27-29; P/12; A.  - p.  31, paras.  23-26).  Also It is unlikely that the deceased would seek help In the defendant In the drafting of a will, when he ostensibly sought to exclude the defendant from the inheritance: "Delete Y' From the Will" (paragraph 10 of plaintiff's affidavit 1; paragraph 3 of plaintiff's affidavit 2).
2. The defendant stated on his own initiative that he had told the executor of the will: "The deceased has a home in Tel Aviv ... And I told him that this was the house he wanted to bequeath to these 5 people and I gave him the list" (Pro.  of January 7,2025, p.  4, s.  17).  Indeed, Mr. Y.' He testified that the apartment in Tel Aviv was the matter that was at the heart of the will: "That's also what Shay' Prepare me before coming to witness this" (p.  15, s.  32).  In addition, Adv. B.' He testified that the deceased contacted him for the purpose of preparing the will (p.  13, s.  23) And he told him about his desire to bequeath a certain apartment in Tel Aviv to specific heirs: "Five nephews or cousins, what is written in the will" (p.  13, paras.  26-27,30-31) and further testified that the words "All my rights and property of any kind" appear in the later will as part of a fixed wording: "I still think it's a format that appears in all wills, at least from what I know(p.  14, s.  32), otherwise if the deceased had wanted and intended to bequeath to all the heirs the property in Nes Ziona, in addition to the property in Tel Aviv, there would have been no need for details Given In a Will The Late: "This is an apartment that I own...  On the street XX in Tel Aviv...  and all the finances" (N/2) or the details of the property in Nes Ziona would also appear explicitly in the later will.
3. In light of all of the above, I am convinced that the deceased's realistic desire was to bequeath to five heirs the apartment in Tel Aviv only, and the alternative provision that the deceased would have made had it not been for the alleged mistake is to cancel or reduce the provision in dispute.

A causal connection between the mistake and the making of the provision in dispute has been proven.

36. After examining the arguments and evidence of the parties, I found that the defendant was able to prove the existence of a causal connection between the mistake and the making of the nullifying
37. In our case, the executor of the will testified about his experience and the manner in which he conducted himself in all matters relating to the drafting of the will and the deceased's signature on it.

Adv. B.'s investigation reveals that: no record was made in real time (p.  15, s.  6); At the relevant time, the drafter of the will had little experience in drafting wills: "It is possible to count on the palm of my hand the number of wills I made at that time" (p.  13, paras.  18-20); The executor of the will received information from the deceased about the property in Tel Aviv only: "He told me that he wanted to make a will, he told me that he had no children as far as I can remember and that he wanted to bequeath an apartment in Tel Aviv to 5 beneficiaries.  That's it.  ...  He gave me the details and the address of the property listed in the will.  Q: Did the deceased come with a title deed or did he mention the block of plot himself? A: I assume that he mentioned the information to me, I don't remember if he came to me with a title deed or with a note.  Q: What else did the deceased tell you? A: I don't remember, I can only estimate that I would have asked him if there were other things.  It was specifically about a particular property that was mentioned and talked about.  ...  Q: What did the testator tell you if he said about documents he had signed in the past? A: I don't remember him saying about documents he signed" (p.  13, paras.  25-27,33-34, p.  14, paras.  4-2,7-12); The drafter of the will asked the deceased only about the marital situation: "I estimate that I asked him if there were no children in the picture and he said no.  ...  It is not every day that we encounter many cases where people do not bequeath to their children, so this is also what I remember from the case" (p.  13, paras.  29-32); The drafter of the will used the format of a will: "I focused on the essence.  The essence there was a specific apartment.  Q: But it also says: "All my property"? A: Well, look at "all my property", I assume it is written in every will.  Q: I also make many wills, I also write "all my property" and go on and write who will inherit the rest of the property, and here it says that the nephews inherit all the property? A: ...  It is true that on the one hand it is written "all my property", I still think that this is a format that exists in all wills, at least from what I know, but in line three I emphasized later in the sentence "This is an apartment on XX Street" specifically.  Again, not a memory but an estimate, I estimate that if there were other assets and other things I would write them down as well...  I would not leave it in the air" (p.  14, s.  25 - p.  15, s.  2).

38. Indeed, the assumption is that the testator knows what he wants, and his true will is expressed in his will, otherwise he would not have bothered to prepare a will at all [Family Appeal 47916-03-23, supra [Nevo], paragraph 27]. However, in this case, Attorney B.  testified: "On the one hand, I remember that he was an elderly person who had to explain to him" (p.  13, para.  29), but he does not remember that he read and explained the clauses in the will to the deceased: "Q: So it is reasonable to assume that you read to him and went over a few clauses in the will with him, as you do with all the clients? A: I don't remember" (p.  14, paras.  23-25) and even the witness to the will only remembers that the drafter of the will: "He talked to him about the part of the house in Tel Aviv.  ...  He did call him, but I don't remember telling you about the house in Nes Ziona" (p.  15, paras.  30-34).
39. In light of the above, it is reasonable to assume that the revocating provision appears in the late will as a template or default structured in the format of a will, all the more so when the deceased was not asked and did not inform Adv. B. that an early will had been made (Adv. B.  - p.  14, S.  12), the son of the deceased, all the more so when it is not clear from doubt that the deceased received from the testator an explanation of the implications of the provisions in dispute on the property in Nes Ziona and in any case on the defendant.
40. In light of all of the above, I have reached the conclusion that there is a causal connection between the mistake and the provisions in dispute. In other words, that the provisions in dispute were written due to an error - the deceased erred in thinking that the late will does not cancel the earlier will but relates only to an apartment in Tel Aviv.
41. In our case, the deceased did not disclose and could not discover the fact of the mistake while he was still alive, so the deceased did not have the opportunity to correct it himself. It should be noted that in this case, the deceased does not read Hebrew (p.  5 N/1; p.  8 N/2; p.  13 N/4), whereas the defendant who accompanied the deceased did not read the later will: "I did not see what was written in the will that my uncle made with Attorney B.  I did not look at it.  I knew why my uncle came to Attorney B.  ...  I had no reason to look", he was not questioned about his testimony and in any case his version on this matter was not contradicted (paragraph 44 of the affidavit).  In addition, in 2021 or 2022, the defendant contacted Attorney B.  following a request from Plaintiff 1, without any of them attributing importance to the content of the will.  In this regard, the defendant stated on his own initiative in pre-trial on January 7,2025: "After that, R.'s husband called me and told me that the attorney had not registered the identity cards of the people that D.  wanted to bequeath to them.  So I called B.  and told him that an ID card should be registered in the will and he told me that there is only one Y.Z.  in Ness Ziona and also R.B.S.  in Bat Yam, so there is no need for an ID card and I did not attribute importance to the fact that at the end of the will it is written 'all my property' is written in the will that it is only for the house in Tel Aviv and that is what the deceased meant" (p.  4, paras.  19-23).  , a witness on behalf of the plaintiffs, also testified in cross-examination that: "Before he died in a certain year, one day R.  issued an inheritance order.  It was about two years ago, before he passed away...  D.  was present in the living room and R.  said that they had made an inheritance order and I see that R.B.S.  was written there, her address was not recorded, and her identity card was not listed...  I told D.  that it did not look like an inheritance order (i.e., the will) and I draw her attention to D...  And he told me that R.  must have deserved it, I wrote it all down" (p.  21, paras.  1-11).  It follows from the aforesaid that the mistake was not apparent to the deceased and he did not know and could not have known about the mistake, so he did not have the opportunity to change the later will.
42. All of the above shows that the plaintiffs knew, very well, that there had been a mistake in the late will, and that the wills lived in one place, and that the objection to the early will came into the world in view of the difficulty that arose in the late will and the attempt to derive a secondary profit in the situation that was created.
43. In light of all of the above, I accept the defendant's argument about the mistake in the late will.
44. The claim of a future inheritance transaction - The plaintiffs claimed that the economic support agreement constitutes a future inheritance transaction under section 8(a) of the law.
45. The claim of expanding a front is prohibited - as is well known, the prohibition on widening a front means that a party may not deviate from the scope of the dispute as defined in the pleadings - unless the opposing party expressly or implicitly agrees to it, or if the court grants the request to amend the pleadings. The purpose of this prohibition is first and foremost to protect the parties from miscarriage of justice, since it allows them to properly prepare and establish their factual and legal position and in accordance with the definition of the dispute that they have determined in advance; In addition, the prohibition on widening a front reflects principles of the efficiency and finality of the hearing [LA 6251/15 Hoffa v.  Cassuto, para.  40 [Nevo] (August 7,2016)].
46. In our case, the legal argument raised in the summaries stems from the factual argument raised on behalf of the objector, according to which "an agreement was signed between the deceased and the applicant. The granting of the property in Nes Ziona to the applicant in the framework of a will to be drawn up by the deceased was not recorded in the written agreement, in light of the provisions of section 8 of the Inheritance Law, which prohibits future inheritance transactions" (section 42 of the letter of objection, Estate File 3033-10-24).  In other words, this is a matter of fact that is found in the evidence that was brought before the party who opposed it even at the stage when the front of the dispute was formulated.  In such a situation, there is no room for the objectionor's argument regarding the expansion of a prohibited front [Civil Appeal 750/16 Sa'adtmand v.  Rehovot Assessor, paragraph 16 [Nevo] (February 28,2019)].
47. On the merits of the matter, section 8(a) of the Inheritance Law states that: "An agreement regarding a person's inheritance and relinquishment of his inheritance made during that person's lifetime is null and void." The case law states that: "All the legislature sought was to prevent the obstruction of a testator from changing the identity of the beneficiary of his estate from time to time. Therefore, the invalidator dealt with the right of a testator to change the beneficiary of his estate as invalid and null and void, as opposed to a testator that determined the beneficiary of his estate by way of making a will, since by its very nature it can always be changed, and there is no reason to invalidate the will even if it is claimed that its contents were instructed in an agreement made prior to its drafting.  To be precise, the agreement itself may be invalid and null and void because it constitutes an inheritance transaction, not the will that was made in its wake, as long as the court believes that it was made of the testator's free will" [Estate Case (K.S.) Dayan v.  Sabag [Nevo] (December 27,2012)].  The case law emphasized that from the moment a person prepared a will of his own free will, there is no defect in this will, even if it is given in exchange for a benefit or consideration of one kind or another, since the testator can change at any time.  Only a transaction that prevents the testator from changing the beneficiary of his estate as he pleases is a transaction that the legislature sought to cancel and nullify [LA 7468/11 Anonymous v.  Anonymous [Nevo] (July 3,2012)].
48. According to the defendant's version, he makes use of subplots 1-2 from 1988, pays the deceased without an agreement from 1999; an agreement was made between the defendant and the deceased according to which "I will renovate the house on the two subplots, including by means of building additions, ... while my uncle will make a will in the framework of which he will bequeath to me his rights in sub-plot 2" (paragraphs 24-28 of the affidavit); The deceased and the defendant received legal advice not to include the consent in the written agreement in light of the provision of section 8(a) of the Inheritance Law (ibid., section 29).
49. In this case, in the economic support agreement, the defendant undertook to "return to God as his reward", without the agreement imposing on the deceased a legal obligation in relation to sub-plot 2; In the preliminary will, the deceased retained his right to change his will: "As long as I am alive, I will be entitled to do with my property and assets as I see fit, for I will be entitled at any time to change this will and subtract from it, to add to it or to revoke it" (section F N/1); The preliminary will was drawn up of the deceased's free will, so it is written in the will, and there is no reason to assume otherwise, especially when the witness of the will was not summoned to testify (p. 5 N/1).

In these circumstances, when the deceased retained his right to withdraw his will as he wished until the day of his death, and on the other hand, the risk was that of the defendant alone, who undertook to pay the deceased a monthly payment and even paid the deceased money even before the preliminary will was made, and also invested money in renovations to the property in Nes Ziona.  Therefore, this is not a transaction of future inheritance.  Therefore, the plaintiffs' argument in this matter is rejected.