Hence, it is important to interpret the dates found in the statutory arrangement. As the Honorable Justice Stein noted, "I would add and emphasize that in the world of patents in general - and of medical and pharmaceutical patents in particular - verbal accuracy is of great importance due to the interest of reliance of third parties, such as companies that develop generic drugs, on the content of the patent and its lifetime" (Civil Appeal Authority 7556/22 MERCK SHARP & DOHM B.V. REGISTRAR OF PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND DESIGNS (PUBLISHED IN THE DATABASES; 2023; in paragraph 42 of the decision).
- Against this background, it is necessary to understand why section 164 of the law denies the authority to extend the deadline set out in section 64To(a), which states that "an application for an extension order shall be submitted in the prescribed manner, after payment of a fee, no later than 90 days from the date of registration of the medical product under the Pharmacists Ordinance". This illustrates the great importance that the legislature sees in meeting a deadline, in a manner that increases certainty in the pharmaceutical market.
The legislature's choice to balance the purposes by creating a clear and simple "rule" arrangement for implementation
- In order to balance the different purposes, the legislature could have adopted various legislative arrangements. An examination of the provisions of the law reveals that the legislature chose to adopt in our case a norm of the type of "rule", as opposed to a "standard".
- As we know, legal norms are not made of one skin. A norm of the type "Rule" Conditions the legal outcome on the fulfillment of certain preconditions that can be decided on the question of their existence with relative ease; and this is in contrast to a norm of the type "Standard", contingent the legal result on the application of a certain criterion or value (for more information, see Menachem's Mautner: "Rules and Standards in Civil Legislation The new one - to the question of the legal theory of legislation" Law 17 321,325 (1988) (hereinafter: Mautner)). The difference between these norms is fertile ground for poignant legal debates, but this is not the place to dwell on them (see the review of LLOD'S INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 346-353 (2001)).
The choice between the types of norms is not technical and reflects an informed choice made by the legislature. Thus, when the legislature wants to establish a norm that is easy to apply, which does not require the use of extensive discretion, it will prefer to establish a "rule" and define the norm with a high level of precision. In this way, it will settle the issue in advance, while creating certainty about the legal state of things. Choosing standards means choosing a flexible format that allows dealing with a wide range of cases, while reaching different balances in individual cases. In such a case, the level of legal certainty is significantly reduced.
53. However, the choice of the rule involves a price. "More often than not, the decision embodied in the rule may be found arbitrary in terms of the degree to which it is compatible with the purpose of the rule: while a rule is invoked, there may be cases in which a certain result will be created that is contrary to the result that would have been required according to the rationale underlying the existence of the rule. In such cases, a court that applies the rule in its literal sense will not be able to update the content of the rule in such a way that its operation will serve the rationale underlying the rule. In this way, the continued validity of the rule will be given to future cases that fall within the scope of its applicability, but the concrete case before the court will be decided in a manner that does not fulfill the purpose of the rule" (Mautner, at pp. 326-327).
This price was paid by the ancients. Dr. Yaakov Weinroth referred to Plato, who wrote, thousands of years ago, that "the law can never include in it in detail the best and most just instruction for every person and every matter, and bring blessing in its instructions, " in view of the differences between the various details. These differences "do not permit any art to establish in any of the fields simple rules that will be valid for every detail and at all times" (quoted in Yaakov Weinroth: "And Moses sat down to judge the people... From Morning to Evening': The Limitations of the Law - Man, the Rule, and the Case" (Yaakov Weinroth's book, 607-609 (Gershon Gontovnik, Avi Weinroth, and Chaim Zicherman, eds., 2021)). This price is intensified, of course, when we are dealing with a statutory provision of the type of legal rule.