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Serious Crimes Case (Be’er Sheva) 33815-10-23 State of Israel v. Ahmad Abu al-Qi’an - part 68

September 6, 2026
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He did not read Jawdat's version, nor did he read the defendant's version and asked to examine its compatibility (or incompatibility) with the forensic findings.  Moreover, even if the witness's conclusion was based only on forensic findings (as he said), it was expected that after he reached his conclusions, he would compare them with the testimonies and, if necessary, deal with discrepancies between the conclusions he reached and the testimonies, or alternatively, indicate that the forensic evidence was combined with the various testimonies in support of them.  In fact, this is consistent with the description given by the defense expert in his testimony regarding how a motion examiner is supposed to work: "Although with all the findings the examiner needs only a second, sir, the examiner must first refer to the forensic findings, and this is also what the examiner's book teaches him, and only after that to examine eyewitnesses who will complete the picture.  .." (p.  418).

In any case, the defense expert chose to rely only on forensic findings when they are sufficient, and he is expected to use the various testimonies when they are insufficient, at the very least, to make up for those missing data.  In practice, the defense expert preferred to rely on assumptions, some of which are devoid of any anchoring, and some of which stand in direct contradiction to the testimonies in the case.

Thus, for example, when asked how the deceased's crossing rate of 1.37 meters per second was determined, he explained that he relied on the examiner's book and that it was a speed that represented "normal walking" (pp.  417-418).  Similarly, the witness confirmed that he was unable to know whether the deceased crossed the road diagonally, when he said that in this situation "we take the middle, precisely for the same reason that we use an average speed of walking when we do not know what the real speed is" (p.  419).

Similarly, according to the witness, the route that appears in Picture 8 in his opinion as the route taken by the defendant is a presumed route in which he drove "...  because no one has any real knowledge of what the real route of the car is, I have proposed a presumed route that is a reasonable route" (p.  429).  Again, the information about the route taken by the Dodge vehicle during the turn can be derived from Jaudat or from the defendant.  In any event, it cannot be said that no one has the knowledge of the route.  Indeed, it is not the role of the expert to determine the reliability of versions and therefore he can present his conclusion, under a number of different assumptions or a number of scenarios.

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