The problem with this approach of the defense expert is learned from the fact that even if there were theoretically ten witnesses who would describe crossing from left to right, nothing would change his mind, as long as the deceased had a fracture in his left thigh. Similarly, even if ten witnesses describe that the deceased crossed the road running, the witness, according to his approach, would prefer to go to the charts, look for the typical walking speed of a person of the deceased's age, and use this figure in his formulas. In fact, the defense expert considered himself exempt from examining the feasibility of Judat's version (regarding the deceased's attempt to escape before he was injured), nor as a possible alternative scenario, to cause the fracture in his left thigh.
It therefore follows that the defense expert examined the case as a "regular" road accident case in which a "reasonable" pedestrian crosses the road at normal speed, in a straight line, without any pressure, and the surrounding drivers and the other road users act in a similar manner. The defense expert did so, even though one of the two questions that he was required to answer relates to the existence of forensic evidence of the murder (see 4 of the opinion).
In this last matter, from the outset, there is a great deal of problem in the mandate that the defense expert took upon himself to examine "whether there is forensic evidence of murder by vehicular homicide." In this context, there is no need to be a legal expert to understand that on the basis of the "silent film" that documents the running over of a person (the factual element), it is possible to establish the offense of causing death by negligence, to negligent homicide, to the offense of murder in aggravated circumstances, when the entire difference lies in the mental element that accompanies the acts.
It is important to note that unlike a situation in which the cause of death is done by means of an object whose nature can indicate the mental element that accompanies the factual element (for example, in a situation in which a person is seen in a "silent film" stabs another person a large number of times in vital organs or fires several shots at him with a firearm), this is not the case with regard to causing death while driving, in which even a "routine" situation of driving in a straight lane that is not at high speed, towards a person, can, given the appropriate mental element, constitute the offense of murder. On the other hand, a situation in which a person drives at high speed, while losing control, can be reconciled with the offense of causing death by negligence.