Despite the importance of the right of appeal, it has been emphasized more than once that it is born by virtue of an explicit provision in the law alone, "and in the absence of a provision of the law, the right does not exist" (High Court of Justice 87/85 Arjoub v. Commander of IDF Forces in the Judea and Samaria Region, IsrSC 42(1) 353,361-362 (1988)).
At the same time, it was held that: "In view of the importance of the right of appeal, it was held that an interpretation that grants the right of appeal should be preferred to an interpretation that denies it..." (Criminal Appeal 111/99 Arnold Schwartz v. State of Israel, 55(2) 241,271 (2000), emphasis added - Y. A.; Criminal Appeals Authority 3268/02 Ahmad Mazeid Kozli v. State of Israel, para. 6 [published in Nevo] (March 5,2003); High Court of Justice 5580/98 Eliyahu Sofer v. Minister of Labor and Welfare - Mr. Eli Yishai, 55(4) 319,328 (2000)).
- In our case, section 23A of the search ordinance as aforesaid is silent as to the existence of a right to appeal or the possibility of appealing a decision in an application for a search warrant on a computer, and therefore it is not possible to learn from it about the existence of a right to appeal against these decisions. However, the silence of the Ordinance, in and of itself, does not indicate the denial of the right of appeal due to the civil consequences or the criminality of search warrants, by virtue of the general provisions of the Courts Law, including section 52 of this law mentioned above (the Shukri case, at p. 736). See also Miscellaneous Criminal Applications 658/88 Hassan v. State of Israel, 44(1) 670,693-693 (1991) (hereinafter: the Hassan case); Criminal Appeal 1982/93 Bank Leumi Le-Israel Ltd. v. State of Israel, IsrSC 48(3) 238,247 (1994) (hereinafter: Bank Leumi case)).
Accordingly, the possibility of appealing a decision on a request for a search warrant on a computer depends to a large extent on the question of whether such a decision should be regarded as a "judgment" of a criminal bar for the purpose of section 52 of the Courts Law.
- As has been emphasized more than once, the classification of a decision as a "different decision" or as a "judgment" with regard to the manner in which it is appealed is not subject to the formal title of the decision - but is determined by its substantive characteristics and its impact on the rights of those involved. In the framework of classifying the decision, it is necessary to examine, in essence, whether it is capable of making a final decision regarding the claims of right and the remedies requested in the proceeding, as well as the strength of the connection between the decision and the main issue in dispute (see the decision of President M. Shamgar in SC 521/85 Shirley Teumim v. Menachem Raphael, 39(2) 56 (1985); the Hassan case, at pp. 693-694; see also Miscellaneous Applications Criminal 4804/17 Bramly v. State of Israel, paragraphs 10-13 [published in Nevo] (August 9,2017) and the references appearing therein).
Therefore, in cases where the decision does not conclude the litigation between the parties - even if only in the framework of an additional proceeding that accompanies the main proceeding - it will be a consideration to classify it as a "different decision" for which there is no right of appeal. For this reason, for example, it was held that the victim of an offense has no right to appeal the decision of the criminal court regarding the amount of compensation to be awarded to him - since he can initiate a "dragging" civil action against the perpetrator of the offense (Criminal Appeals Authority 9748/11 Arroyo v. Ben David [published in Nevo] (July 31,2013); see also Regulation 19 of the Civil Procedure Regulations, 5779-2018).