"Hence also the importance of holding a proper discussion in the Appointments Committee, on whose opinion the government relys. It is possible that following a proper discussion - during which the entire picture would have been unfolded before the first Appointments Committee - its opinion would have been different. A different opinion of the Appointments Committee could have led to a different decision in the government. Indeed, the hearing that took place before the first appointments committee was improper. The entire picture was not laid out beforeit. The factual system presented to it was partial. Its recommendation focused on the respondent's qualifications and did not take into account its part in the Bus 300 case and the Nafso case. In these circumstances, if they had insisted on the establishment of this recommendation and the decision of the government that followed it, there would have been no choice but to cancel the recommendation (of the Appointments Committee) and the decision (of the government)" [emphasis in original ] (Eisenberg, at p. 244).
- As stated above, in the framework of the petitions before us and in the Attorney General's response, weighty arguments were raised regarding various data that were not examined by the Committee, mainly claims relating to the candidates' possible bias towards bodies supervised by the Council, as well as alleged political affiliations.
Therefore, in light of the above, we will turn to examine whether these are relevant data that have a real impact on the factual basis on which the committee's work was conducted.
Potential bias as a relevant given
- The prohibition of prejudice or bias is a basic rule of administrative law. Its violation may lead to the invalidation of the administrative or judicial act (High Court of Justice 701/81 Malach v. Chairman of the District Planning and Building Committee, Jerusalem, IsrSC 36(3) 1,8 (1982) (hereinafter: the Malach case) [and to be precise: in situations where there is a personal or institutional interest of the office holder, as opposed to prejudice, It is customary to make use of the terminology of "conflict of interest" (Barak-Erez, at p. 530)]). Being in a situation of closure of opinion or bias negates the exercise of administrative discretion. This is also the case when the competent authority makes a decision due to a personal motive, such as personal grudges (Zamir, Grounds for Judicial Review, at pp. 3446-3447). The significance of the prohibition of impartiality was recently discussed by my colleague Justice Ronen:
"As a rule, a person who is required to make a decision must not be in a situation where there is a real possibility of 'bias' - that is, a biased or locked opinion. Thus, a person will be disqualified if he has formulated for himself in advance a final opinion regarding the decision he is required to make, in a way that makes the discussion in which he is supposed to take part redundant. Therefore, when a person has a prejudice that there is no reasonable chance that it will change during the hearings and he is not open to changing it, it will be determined that he is disqualified from making the decision on the grounds of bias" (High Court of Justice 12220-02-26 Grossman Tamir v. Minister of Religious Services, para. 27 (March 9,2026)); See also: The Army Radio case, in paragraph 11 of the judgment of Justice D. Barak-Erez).
- The existence of a real possibility of bias is examined according to an objective criterion (High Court of Justice 1356/96 Ben David v. Prime Minister of Israel, IsrSC 50(1) 661,667 (1996) (hereinafter: the Ben David case)). The burden of proving inadmissibility on the basis of a fear of bias is on the claimant, he must rely on real evidence, and this is a heavy burden (High Court of Justice 2148/94 Gelbert v. Chairman of the Commission of Inquiry to Investigate the Massacre in Hebron, IsrSC 48(3) 573,592 (1994); The Angel Matter, at p. 9). To be precise: in this context, we are not concerned with the question of whether the candidates are indeed tainted by bias, but rather with the question of whether the Appointments Review Committee examined, on the basis of the full relevant factual basis, whether their circumstances and statements establish a real possibility that they are tainted with bias, which could affect their suitability for the position or justify the imposition of restrictions on their tenure.
- As a rule, the existence of a proper procedure for appointment to a public office requires the relevant authority to collect and require a wide range of data that has implications for the examination of the various candidates. This is also true with respect to the professional committee that submits its recommendation to the appointing body. This includes the fact that it must receive and be required to provide data relating to both the relevant position and the candidate being examined. Thus, with respect to the position, it is expected that the committee will have all the data regarding the nature of the position andits characteristics; the requirements of the position and its vitality; and the nature of the tasks that will be assigned to the candidate to be appointed. Similarly, with respect to the candidate, the committee must receive as complete information as possible regarding his data, including his education, experience, and professional, organizational, and managerial skills. In addition, and taking into account that a person's suitability for public office also depends on his personal qualities and values (see and compare: the Petrushka case, at paragraph 21; the Lavi case, at paragraph 10), it is expected that the committee will be presented, to the extent possible, information relating to the candidate's suitability in this respect.
- This last aspect is reflected, for example, in the Lavi case, where the question of the validity of the Attorney General's opinion, which determined that the petitioner's candidacy for the position of director of the Israel Lands Administration should not be brought to the government's approval, against the background of statements of a racist nature towards the Arab sector. In this regard, President Beinisch stated the following:
"In light of the petitioner's racist and blatant remarks against the Arab public on two different occasions, the petitioner will find it difficult to project an attitude of substantiveness and equality towards all sectors of Israeli society - including the Arab sector [...] The appointment of the petitioner to the position in question is liable to create a gap between the image of fairness and equality required by the public service and the image of those who head it. This gap is liable to severely and profoundly harm the public' s trust, in its various sectors, in the public system in general, and in the Israel Lands Administration in particular" (ibid., at paragraph 26).