I will now turn to an examination of these links.

First link: the consultation process

102. As stated above, we heard arguments according to which no infrastructure was laid to show that the Minister of Communications held a substantive consultation as required by section 7(a) of the Second Authority Law. It was argued that in the decision makers' proposal and the committee's decisions, only the Minister's inquiries to the advisory bodies were mentioned in general, but the statements themselves, the responses received from the various bodies, or other documentation of the consultations were not attached.  Therefore, according to the petitioners, it is not possible to determine the identity of the bodies thatthe Minister consulted, the candidates that were proposed by them, and their position in relation to each of them.  It was further argued that it was not proven that the final list that was brought to the government for approval was fully before the advisory bodies.

In the circumstances of the case, I did not find it acceptable to accept the petitioners' arguments in this matter.

103. Indeed, with regard to the obligation to consult as set forth in the Second Authority Law, it was clarified in the past that the Minister must consult with the various advisory bodies regarding any candidate and personof religion whom he intends to recommend to the government (High Court of Justice 3073/99, at pp. 538-539; see also: Guideline 1.  1550)).  In this context, as is well known, the manner in which the duty to consult is exercised may vary according to the circumstances of the case and the nature of the relevant decision (High Court of Justice 5933/98 Documentary Filmmakers Forum v.  President of the State, IsrSC 55(3) 496,517-518 (2000) (hereinafter: the Filmmakers Forum case)).  Accordingly, the concrete expression of the duty to consult will be determined in accordance with common sense, common practice and case law (High Court of Justice 3073/99, at p.  538).  Against this background, and concretely for our purposes, with regard to the appointment of council members, it was determined that consultation should be done, usually, with bodies with an affinity for broadcasting matters, and that consultation with bodies that have no connection to the field may give rise to a concern that extraneous considerations will be considered in the course of the proceeding (High Court of Justice 8404/00 The Association for the Public Right to Opinion v.  Minister of Communications, P.D.  55(3) 547,561 (2001)).
104. The guiding principle in the implementation of a lawful consultation procedure is that the consultation must be a genuine consultation, in the sense that it must be real, with an open heart and with a willing mind - that is, the consultation must be consultation in good faith (The Creators' Forum case, at 518).  Indeed, it is difficult to prove that the administrative authority did not conduct the process of consultation with a receptive mind, when this is a subjective fact, especially given the presumption of proper administration, according to which "as long as it is not clear that the minister has any other intention, he should be held accountable for carrying out the processes of consultation as he conducts." High Court of Justice 1934/95 Tea Wissotzky (Israel) Ltd.  v.  Minister of Health, IsrSC 49(5) 625,644 (1996); See also: Yitzhak Zamir, Administrative Authority, Vol.  2 - The Administrative Procedure 1215 (2nd Expanded Edition, 2011) (hereinafter: Zamir, The Administrative Procedure)).
105. Against the background of this presumption, and in the absence of concrete evidence to the contrary, the fact that the petitioners were not exposed to the various answers given to the Minister of Communications does not in itself lead to the conclusion that there was a flaw in the consultation process conducted by the Minister. Admittedly, the Journalists' Association's response was attached only to the list of candidates formulated by the Minister of Communications as part of the consultation process, in which the Journalists' Association's reservation was raised to some of the proposed names, including Dr.  Ben Hai-Segev, Dr.  Shine, Mr. Shimoni, Ms. Kedem Maktovi and Adv. Barashi (Appendix 3 to the Government's Affidavit of Response).  In this context, I am prepared to assume that at times, the disclosure of the full content of the consultation process in relation to the appointment of a particular candidate to the eyes of the petitioners (although not its disclosure to the eyes of the court) is liable to violate the candidate's privacy and good name, and in some cases it may even deter relevant advisory bodies from providing full information in future consultation proceedings [cf.  the provision of section 30(b)(7) of the Administrative Courts Law, 5752-1992; AAA 414/18 Movement for Governance and Democracy v.  Commissioner for the Implementation of the Freedom of Information Law in the Administration of the Courts, paragraphs 1,7-1,6 (December 13,2018); High Court of Justice 7793/05 Bar-Ilan University v.  National Labor Court, IsrSC 66(3) 1,52-1,53 (2011); See also: Dafna Barak-Erez, Administrative Law, Vol.  1,508-509 (2010) (hereinafter: Barak-Erez); however, it should be emphasized that this does not presuppose that these materials are confidential or confidential (see, for example, section 9(b)(4) of the Freedom of Information Law, 5758-1998; Yitzhak Amit, Privileges and Protected Interests - Discovery and Review Proceedings in Civil and Criminal Law 1123-1126 (2021)].  In other cases, there may certainly be justification for disclosing the full information either to the plaintiffs' eyes or at least to the court's eyes only.  Indeed, in our case, in light of the arguments raised by the petitioners, it would have been better if the Minister of Communications or the Legal Advisor to the Government had presented, at the very least, for the court's review only the answers of the advisory bodies.
106. Notwithstanding the aforesaid, in the absence of real evidence on behalf of the Petitioners in this context, and taking into account the fact that the Appointments Review Committee explicitly stated in its decisions that it had reviewed the responses received from the advisory bodies (paragraph 5 of the Appointments Review Committee's decision; paragraph 6 of the Committee's decision of March 8,2026; paragraph 6 of the Committee's decision of March 16,2026); and given that the Advisor also did not claim that there was a flaw in the consultation process conducted by the Minister, I did not find it appropriate to accept the Petitioners' arguments regarding alleged flaws in the consultation process or to give additional instructions regarding the disclosure of the information for our review. Added to this is the fact that, on the face of it, from the material presented to us, it appears that the Minister of Communications conducted an orderly consultation process in which he contacted dozens of various organizations for the purpose of locating relevant candidates for the position of council member, while providing appropriate time to formulate their views (see: Appendix 1 to the government's response affidavit and footnote 3 to the Advisor's response).  This request was responded to by some 30 different organizations, some of them with an affinity for broadcasting matters (footnote 4 to the Advisor's response).  Following the requests, the Minister of Communications formulated a list of 33 candidates and then again contacted the advisory bodies in order to give their opinion on the various candidates.  Subsequently, additional rounds of consultations were held in relation to new candidates proposed following the committee's decisions (Appendices 4 and 6 to the government's response affidavit).

[As noted, the Advisor's response lists the bodies to which the Minister of Communications contacted in writing for consultation and the bodies that recommended candidates following his request.  The Minister contacted all the universities, but only Bar Ilan University, Reichman University, and the Open University bothered to recommend candidates following the Minister's request.  This is in addition to a number of colleges and bodies such as the Association for the Public Right to Know, the Kohelet Forum, the Manufacturers Association of Israel, Hashomer Hadash, and the Yesh Council"A, the Shalem Academic Center, the Association of Media Consultants, the Film Associations, and more.  In my opinion, it is a wonder why the universities did not bother to recommend candidates, since it can be assumed that it is possible to find a natural pool of recommended candidates in academia, given that most universities in Israel have a department or department of communication, a theater department or a film department.  Needless to say, the purpose of the consultation process is to improve and improve the administrative decision (see also: Barak-Erez, at p.  291).  Accordingly, it would have been better if the party to whom the Minister turns for consultation should reply to him and reflect his position with respect to the issue brought before him.]

107. Therefore, and taking into account the presumption of propriety that I discussed above, I do not believe that in the circumstances of the case, the petitioners were able to show that there was a defect in the first link that led to the government's decisions.

This is not the case with regard to the two additional links, as I will detail below.

Second Link: The Committee for the Review of Appointments

108. With regard to the second link in the administrative process that led to the government's decisions - the examination of the candidates by the Committee for the Examination of Appointments - it was claimed that the committee's decisions were made on the basis of a lack of infrastructure. According to the claim, a significant part of the relevant data relating to Dr.  Ben-Hai-Segev, Adv. Barashi and Dr.  Shine were not before the committee, and therefore it did not examine their impact on the suitability of the candidates.  Hence, it was argued, the government's decisions, which are based on the committee's decisions, were also made on the basis of missing data.
109. The starting point for the discussion of this issue is that a minimum and preliminary condition for an administrative decision is that the factual basis underlying it be solid and appropriate (see among many: High Court of Justice 18225-06-25 Gilon v. Government of Israel, para.  47 (December 14,2025); Israel Post case, at paragraph 32 of the judgment of Justice Mintz and paragraph 65 of the judgment of Justice Kabub; see also: Barak-Erez, at pp.  439-443).  Among other things, the administrative authority is obligated to collect the data required for the purpose of making its decision; to distinguish between data relating to the matter at issue and data that does not relate to it; to examine the reliability of the data collected; and to determine that the totality of the data creates a sufficient factual basis for making a decision (High Court of Justice 1637/06 Armon v.  Minister of Finance, paragraphs 11 of the judgment of Justice   Danziger (January 3,2010); High Court of Justice 8569/96 Histadrut Hanoar HaOved VeHalomed v.  Minister of Education, Culture and Sport, IsrSC 52(1) 597,620-621 (1998); High Court of Justice 987/94 Euronet Golden Lines (1992) Ltd.  v.  Minister of Communications, IsrSC 48(5) 412,423-425 (1994); High Court of Justice 297/82 Berger v.  Minister of the Interior, IsrSC 37(3) 29,49 (1983); see also: Jerbi case, at para.  39; For more information, see: Zamir, The Administrative Procedure, at pp.  1126-1139).  At the same time, the case law held that the scope of the required factual basis is derived, inter alia, from the essence of the decision that the administrative authority is required to make (High Court of Justice 58681-11-25 Israel Bar Association v.  Minister of Justice, paragraph 7 of my judgment (December 3,2025) (hereinafter: the Ben Hamo case); AAA 3602/22 Ramat Hasharon Municipality v.  Appeals Subcommittee of the National Council for Planning and Building, para.  53 (December 17,2024)).
110. Against this background, the case law held that a decision made in the absence of a sufficient factual basis may establish an independent ground for judicial intervention (High Court of Justice 8647/22 Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Ministry of Social Affairs and Social Security, para.  81 (September 18,2025)).  This, as already noted, is even more so when we are dealing with issues where, as a rule, the degree of judicial intervention is very limited in relation to the discretion of the administrative authority (High Court of Justice 5309/18 Israel Hotel Association v.  Ministry of Interior, para.  73 (January 6,2021)); Authority to Appeal Arbitration Award 5754/15 Khatib v.  Israel Prison Service, para.  39 (July 2,2017)); and since, as stated, this is a procedural defect and not a material defect.
111. Naturally, this requirement - which underlies every administrative decision - also applies to the work of the committee for examining appointments when it comes to examining candidates brought before it. This is all the more reinforced in view of the importance of the committee's role - examining the competence and suitability of candidates for senior positions in the public service.  All this, even taking into account the professional nature of the committee.  In this context (and with the necessary changes), the words of Justice A.  Procaccia in one of the cases dealing with the work of the Appointments Committee in the Commission are appropriate.  This committee operates by virtue of a government decision on the matter and in accordance with section 12 of the Civil Service (Appointments) Law, 5719-1959, and it examined a candidate for the position of director general of a government ministry in the same case:

"The strength and strength of the public service depend on the personal and professional level of its employees.  This level is built on two main pillars: the professional ability to meet the tasks of the job, and the moral-moral level, which is intended to ensure proper protection of the norms and values required in the public service.  The strength and resilience of the public service depends on the human and professional factor that personnel the public service, and especially on the people elected to the leadership positions of this service.  A proper appointment process that will ensure the qualifications of the candidate is an essential condition for maintaining the level of public service, and it is his soul.  Without him, his status and ability to bear the responsibilities imposed on him will not be guaranteed" (emphasis added ) (Jerbi, at paragraph 67).

112. In view of the role of the Committee for the Examination of Appointments as an advising administrative body regarding the suitability of candidates for a senior position in government companies (section 18b(c)(3) of the Government Companies Law), its products have a direct impact on the correctness of the decisions of the appointing body that are given following its opinion. Thus, where there is a defect in the formulation of a sufficient factual basis for formulating the committee's recommendation, this may lead to the disqualification of the appointment decision made on the basis of this recommendation, for the reason that "in such a case, the decision-making body cannot rely on the fact that the recommendation made on the basis of partial information is the appropriate recommendation in the circumstances of the case, and in such a situation it is not even possible to determine that the final decision made is the correct one.  It did not rely on a proper consultation process" (High Court of Justice 23426-04-26 Almakais v.  Prime Minister, paragraph 61 of the judgment of Justice   Grosskopf (June 1,2026) (hereinafter: the Almakais case)).

So, for example, In a High Court of Justice case 6163/92 Eisenberg v.' Minister of Construction and Housing, פ"IV 47(‏2‏)‏ 229 ‏(‏1993‏) (hereinafter: Matter Eisenberg), it was determined that the work of the Appointments Committee of the Civil Service Commission was improper, since theThe committee did not examine key issues in the candidate's past - who was formerly the head of the General Security Service and was involved in two affairs known as"The Bus 300 Affair" and"The Nafsu Affair" - And she did not pay attention to them.  Laxative Interest of the candidate Returned for further examination by the committee, and then to a new decision in the government.  This is how the judge summed it up A.  Barak: