Our course of action will be as follows: Let us begin by drawing the boundaries of judicial review of government decisions regarding appointments in the public service.  Against the background of these boundaries, we will turn to examine the three links that make up the administrative proceeding in our case - The consultation process of the Minister of Communications, the work of the committee to examine appointments and government decisions.  We will then walk the path that leads from the defects found in the proceeding, to the appropriate remedy in the circumstances of the case.

Judicial Review of Government Decisions Regarding Appointment to Public Service Positions

96. The starting point for the discussion is that the decisions of the government that is the subject of the petitions - like any decision of an administrative authority with respect to the appointment of a person to a position in the public service - are subject to judicial review according to the grounds of administrative law (see, among many: High Court of Justice 54321-03-25 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Government of Israel, para.  40 (May 21,2025) (hereinafter: the Bar case); High Court of Justice 8910/22 Petrushka v.  MK Netanyahu, para.  13 (February 21,2024) (hereinafter: the Petrushka case); High Court of Justice 3500/22 Maalot Tarshiha Municipality v.  Minister of the Interior, para.  20 (February 5,2023); High Court of Justice 5562/07 Schussheim v.  Minister of Public Security, para.  8 (July 23,2007) (hereinafter: the Schussheim case)).  In this context, the scope of judicial review of the decisions of the administrative authorities is derived from the status of the relevant body and the characteristics and circumstances of the decision under review (High Court of Justice 5599/11 Tel Aviv Journalists Association v.  Government of Israel, para.  13 (November 24,2011)); High Court of Justice 1993/03 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v.  Prime Minister, IsrSC 57(6) 817,840-841 (2003) (hereinafter: the Hanegbi case)).
97. Thus, on the level of discretion, it was clarified in the case law of this Court that the discretion of the authority in appointing a person to public office is not absolute. The competent authority must operate it in recognition that it acts as the trustee of the public, while maintaining the public's trust in it (High Court of Justice 8134/11 Asher v.  Minister of Finance, para.  10 (January 29,2012) (hereinafter: the Asher case)).  In this context, the words of President   Beinisch are appropriate:

"There is no dispute that when the government exercises its discretion for the purpose of appointing candidates for senior positions in the public service, it acts as a trustee of the public.  It follows from this status that the government, as an authority, must act for the professionalism and proper functioning of the public service, in order to enable the public system to provide the population with its needs in a professional, fair and equal manner.  It must also ensure that the public service will gain the public' s trust, without which it will not be able to fulfill its tasks for long" (HCJ 4646/08 Lavi v.  Head of GovernmentE, para.  9 (October 12,2008) (hereinafter: the Lavi case); See also: High Court of Justice 7074/93 Suissa v.  Attorney General, IsrSC 48(2) 749,776-774 (1994)).

98. This obligation of the administrative authorities to act as a trustee of the public is expressed, inter alia, in the duty of the appointees to exercise their powers for practical considerations, reasonableness and proportionality (the matter of Asher, at paragraph 11). At the same time, the scope of judicial review is affected, as stated, by the status of the government and its ministers, who head the executive branch (Hanegbi, at pp.  840-841).  Accordingly, as a rule, when it comes to examining discretion when exercising judicial review of appointments that are under the authority of the government and its ministers, this court exercises real self-restraint.  This approach expresses the "principle of respect" between the governmental authorities.  By virtue of it, the court does not replace the discretion of the competent authority with its own discretion, but rather leaves it with appropriate room for action to fulfill its functions.  Clearly, this rule does not grant decisions in the plenum immunity from judicial review, but only limits the scope of such review.

This rule applies even more strongly when it comes to appointments made in accordance with the recommendation of the designated professional body, such as the committee for examining appointments, or a professional search committee (High Court of Justice 5769/18 Amitai N' Minister of Science and TechnologyVegia, Paragraph 10 To the judge's judgment v.  Hendel ‏(4.3.2019‏)).  The composition of the committee and the qualifications required of its members grant it the status of a professional body, Skilled and independent.  Therefore, It is not easy to accept a claim that there was a defect at the discretion of the committee or by the appointing body that saw fit to adopt its recommendations (High Court of Justice 6212/18 Adam, Nature and Judgment - Israeli Society for Environmental Protection v.' Minister of Environmental Protection, paragraph 12 ‏(‏7.1.2019‏); High Court of Justice 43/16 Om Movement"Citizens for Good Administration and Social and Legal Justice v' Government of Israel, paragraph 39 ‏(‏1.3.2016‏) (hereinafter: Matter Mandelblit)).

99. Thus, the rule is that this court will rarely interfere with the government's discretion in decisions relating to the appointment of a person to public office. Each case must be examined on its own merits, with reference to the nature of the role at hand, the position of the relevant professionals, and the mechanism for the appointment.  However, it is important to clarify that the restraint and judicial restraint that the court assumes upon itself is reserved for examining the manner in which administrative discretion is exercised.  In this sense, even in a situation where the court is accustomed to exercising limited review, it still exercises "regular" review on grounds that do not relate to the discretion of the authority - such as deviation from authority or a defect in the level of procedural procedures (Yitzhak Zamir, Administrative Authority, Vol.  5 - Grounds for Judicial Review 3424 (2020) (hereinafter: Zamir, Grounds for Judicial Review); See also: Gershon Gontovnik, "Judicial Review of the Discretion of Public Authorities: Different Criteria of 'Judicial Retreat' (Deference), " Edna Arbel 489,532 (Shelly Aviv Yeini, Dorit Beinisch, Ariel Bendor, Hadar Danzig-Rosenberg, and Keren Miller, eds., 2022)).
100. Accordingly, the court will not hesitate to intervene in an administrative decision due to a defect in the procedure that preceded its adoption. There are two main justifications for this: First, such an intervention does not obligate the court to decide whether the decision is correct, or proper on its merits - this decision is still up to the competent authority (High Court of Justice 5853/07 Emunah - National Religious Women's Movement v.  Head of Government5, IsrSC 62(3) 445,520 (2007) (hereinafter: the Emunah Case)).  Therefore, by its very nature, such a decision involves less intervention, and is consistent with the principle of respect between government authorities.  Second, the court has institutional expertise in locating "procedural failures" (compare and see: High Court of Justice 12634-06-26 Ressler v.  Knesset, para.  56 (July 2,2026); Emunah case, at p.  520).  In the background of the aforesaid two justifications is the principle of the rule of law, which obligates the administrative authority to carry out the procedure prescribed for it by law.  Justice A.  Grunis described this well in the Emunah case, noting that while we will not be careful with the authority in the case of Judea and Samaria, but:

"When the court disqualifies an administrative decision due to a procedural failure, it imposes, in effect, the law on the authority.  It tells the authority that it must comply with the provisions of the law with regard to a proceeding that has come to an end upon the issuance of a decision.  Hence, there is a great deal of justification for judicial intervention when a decision is made not in accordance with the correct procedure" (ibid., at p.  520).

101. In our case, as stated, arguments were raised both with respect to the manner in which administrative discretion was exercised, and with respect to the correctness of the decision-making process. As explained below, and taking into account the criteria for judicial intervention detailed above, in this case I found that the arguments relating to flaws in the level of the proceeding were sufficient to decide the fate of the petitions.  In these circumstances, I did not find it necessary to continue to examine the arguments concerning the manner in which the discretion of the competent bodies was exercised on its merits.

Subsequently, for the sake of convenience, and in accordance with the outline set forth in the Second Authority Law and the Government Companies Law, I will divide our examination into three links: The first link is concerned withFormulating the list of candidates in accordance with the required consultation process Minister of Communications Maintain; The Second Squad Its Concern is Examining Their Eligibility and their adaptation of the candidates proposed by the Minister In the hands of the Appointments Review Committee; and the third link is concerned with bringing the minister's proposal before the government, the decision makers' proposal, and the government's decisions regarding the appointment of council members and appointment Chairperson from among them.