Administrative Appeal Request 3222-05-25 Attorney General v. Anonymous - part 8

As far as can be understood, this is the end of the respondents' relationship with the mothers.

31. At this stage, the genetic tests were conducted for the respondents and the minors. After completing them and based on their results, on September 8,2022, the Family Court issued a joint declaratory judgment in which each of the respondents was declared the biological father of the minor born from his own seed.  For the sake of good order, it should be noted that the judgment was amended after clerical errors were made in it.

Adoption Procedures

32. On January 5,2023, the respondents filed a joint application with the Family Court for the issuance of an adoption order in relation to each of the minors against the spouse of his genetic father - is the application that is the subject of this proceeding (Adoption 14180-01-23).
33. At the outset, the respondents emphasized that they raise the minors together as one family, and that they both function as common fathers to the two minors equally. The respondents added that in view of the registration of the mothers giving birth on the birth certificates, they wish to complete the adoption process in Israel so that each of them will adopt his or her spouse's genetic child - in a manner that will reflect the reality of life, for the benefit of the minors.  The application noted that as a rule, adoption is not required following a surrogacy procedure conducted abroad"and that this is necessary in this case, since according to the law in Northern Cyprus, the name and identity of the giving mother are indicated in the official documents and there is no procedure for severing the relationship.  The respondents further argued that the minors had no acquaintance with the women registered as their mothers, who agreed to sever their relationship with them in the framework of the waiver affidavits signed before a consular representative of the State of Israel.  This included arguing that the mothers gave full consent in their affidavits to the adoption of the minors by the spouse of the genetic father, and that all the conditions under the Adoption Law were met.  More specifically, the respondents argued that the aforementioned in the waiver affidavits should be regarded as a parent's consent to the delivery of his child for adoption, which was given accordingly Sections 8 and9a to the Adoption Law.
34. On January 10,2023, the Family Court ruled that a hearing on the application would be set for April 2,2023, and ordered that a social worker's report be submitted to the Adoption Law within 60 days. Subsequently, the Family Court postponed the hearing, thus acceding to requests submitted by the Attorney General.  Meanwhile, on May 7,2023, the respondents filed a notice in which they expressed their objection to the prolonged postponement, emphasizing that the current situation entails great difficulty for them.  Among other things, the respondents argued that the failure to register the parenthood of each of the spouses affects their lives in many ways, including preventing them from receiving the benefits to which they are entitled by virtue of being fathers of two children, and also does not allow someone who is not registered as the parent of that minor to take him to the health fund and to Tipat Halav or to make other decisions regarding him.  It was also noted that as long as such registration is not made, then it is not possible to begin the process of conversion of the minors.
35. Ultimately, on December 25,2023, reports were submitted to the Family Court on behalf of a social worker for the Adoption Law. In the reports, it was argued, inter alia, that each of the respondents serves as a parental figure for the minors, and that both are full partners in their upbringing.  At the same time, it was noted that the minors are not "Available" adoption, an expression aimed at the fact that the mothers who give birth to them have not been severed.
36. On January 17,2024, the Attorney General submitted a response on her behalf to the report, which focused on the legal aspect of the issue. The Attorney GeneralA The government argued that Israeli law does not apply to the mothers' waiver of their parental rights with respect to minors.  She further argued that since the minors' birth certificates are listed as their mothers, they are not "Released" For adoption by the mother and Section 8 The Adoption Law does not apply to them.
37. In their response, which was filed on January 31,2024, the respondents clarified that "This case was opened as an adoption case since it is a fact that Criminal Appeal Law in Northern Cyprus It is not possible to sever the relationship between the surrogate mother and the minors. Therefore, the surrogate mother is registered on the minors' birth certificate as their mother".  Alongside the aforesaid, it was claimed that the name of the mothers giving birth on the birth certificates is "Technical only".  The respondents added that their request is based on the consent of the mothers who give birth to the minors for adoption and on their best interests.
38. The hearing in the Family Court was ultimately held on March 3,2024. Counsel for the Attorney General reiterated the position that the minors are not "Released" for adoption by their mothers.  It was further argued that the waiver affidavits were not prepared in accordance with the binding format of the letter of consent anchored in the Adoption Regulations.  In response to the court's question, it was explained that to the extent that the mothers of birth sign the letter of consent in its binding form before an Israeli consular representative, the respondents' case would be reconsidered.  On the other hand, counsel for the respondents argued that there is no room for such strictness.  Counsel for the respondents also argued that it is possible to learn for our purposes from the ruling of this court inLA 8236/21 Anonymous' Attorney General [Nevo] (December 6,2022) (hereinafter: עניין Consensual Parenting).  According to the claim, in that case, the consent given by a mother giving birth to sever the relationship with the newborn was also considered to be an agreement for adoption in accordance with the requirements of the Adoption Law, even though it was not drawn up in accordance with the wording of the letter of consent in the regulations.  It was further argued that locating the mothers who gave birth entailed high costs.  At the end of the hearing, the Family Court ruled that since the issue to be decided is legal, and taking into account the fact that, according to the reports that were submitted, from the perspective of the best interests of the minors, there is no impediment to acceding to the requested adoption order, the parties will submit summaries on their behalf.
39. Subsequently, per day 1.8.2024 The Attorney General submitted an application to the Court for A family took a detailed position in relation to the respondents' request. In doing so, it was argued that the proceeding raises three main difficulties - the question of the legality of the surrogacy procedure in Northern Cyprus and the awareness of the authorities thereof; the non-recognition of Northern Cyprus by most of the countries of the world as a state, and as a result, the absence of consular relations between Israel and Northern Cyprus and the ability to clarify the law that applies there on the matter; and the strict stipulations that obligate mothers of birth to such procedures, in a manner that raises concerns about their exploitation and even indications that may indicate the commission of criminal offenses, including human trafficking.  In this context, it was noted that even in the circumstances of the concrete case, surrogacy agreements raise concerns about the alleged exploitation of the mothers who give birth and the inferiority of their status - in a manner that requires careful examination in order to ensure that the aforementioned indications (detailed in paragraph 25 above) do not amount to criminal acts.  It was also emphasized that over the years, travel warnings have been issued regarding such proceedings.
40. At the same time, and beyond the letter of the law, the Attorney General noted that she was willing to examine the best interests of the minors and promote adoption proceedings, in light of the fact that the minors were born to Israeli citizens who had begun the surrogacy process before the decisive travel warning was published. The Attorney General argued that it is not possible to declare minors adoptive without trying to obtain consent for adoption in accordance with the provisions of the law on the part of the giving mothers.  According to her, the way to do this is by having the mothers sign the letter of consent anchored in the Adoption Regulations before a consular or diplomatic representative of the State of Israel where they are located, subject to the requirements of the law applicable there.  It was further explained that at this time, a thorough examination of their informed consent will be conducted.  The Attorney General reiterated that this position is limited to the circumstances of the case at hand only.
41. On August 5,2024, the respondents submitted a short response on their behalf, in which they objected to the Attorney General's proposal and insisted on their request for an adoption order at this time, on the basis of the existing material. The respondents claimed that they had no connection with the mothers giving birth or an effective way to locate them about two years after the birth.  The next day, the respondents submitted an additional response, at the request of the Family Court, which included additional details regarding their position.
42. On August 8,2024, the Family Court issued a judgment in which the respondents' request was granted (and to complete the picture, it should be noted that on August 13,2024, a clerical error was corrected in the judgment that does not relate to the dispute between the parties). The Family Court declared the minors to be adoptive children vis-à-vis the mothers giving birth and issued an adoption order in relation to each minor against the spouse of his genetic parent.  The Family Court ruled that the Attorney General's argument that the adoption of minors cannot be promoted because the mothers are registered as their mothers on the birth certificates, Can't be accepted.  This, Because it is not possible to give binding meaning to documents given by an entity that the State of Israel does not recognize.  It was further determined that the various documents submitted and signed by the mothers of the birth - the affidavits of waiver, the agreements between them and the Agency and the surrogacy agreements with the respondents - show that informed consent was given on their part to the adoption process as required In section 8 to the law.
43. The Family Court further ruled that the burden of locating the mothers who give birth two years after the birth - As demanded by the Attorney General - It is heavy and unreasonable in the circumstances of the case. This, inter alia, in view of the fact that the place of residence of the mothers who gave birth, who arrived in Northern Cyprus solely for the purpose of the surrogacy process, is unknown.  It was further held that even if we assume, for the purposes of the hearing, that the surrogacy proceedings give rise to a concern of human trafficking, the signature of the mothers who re-give birth at this time cannot cure the alleged defects in the procedure.  It was also noted that the decisive travel warning was published a year after the birth of the minors.  Against this background, it was determined that there is no justification for actually harming couples who had previously applied for these proceedings, by way of transferring the full burden and weight to prove the intentions of the mother giving birth and to safeguarding her rights to the respondents.
44. On September 29,2024, the Attorney General's counsel filed an appeal with the Haifa District Court, along with a request for a stay of execution (Appeal 74097-09-24[Nevo]. The Attorney General reiterated her arguments as they were raised before the Family Court.  In summary, the appeal argues that the judgment was given in contravention of the provisions of the Adoption Law, given that neither of the two possible alternatives to granting an adoption order existed: on the one hand, the mothers did not give consent to the adoption in the format prescribed by the legislation; and on the other hand, the Attorney General did not file a request to declare the minors adopted, even though she has the exclusive authority to initiate such a proceeding.
45. The Attorney General further argued that surrogacy proceedings in Northern Cyprus raise a real concern of human trafficking, and that recognizing them while waiving or easing the requirements of the law is liable to encourage her to turn to this problematic track. It was further argued that the Family Court erred in determining that the requirement to locate the mothers who give birth in order to promote the adoption proceedings would impose a heavy burden on the respondents, taking into account that no attempt was made on their part to do so.  According to the Attorney General, the Family Court's rulings in this context ignore the rights of mothers who give birth in the framework of surrogacy proceedings, and even deprive them of their rights as part of the adoption law in Israel.  The Attorney General further noted that precisely in light of the difficulties that arise from the surrogacy procedures in the circumstances of the case, and taking into account the State of Israel's international obligations in aspects relating to human trafficking, the court must adhere even more strongly to all the relevant conditions set forth in the law.
46. On the same day, the District Court ordered a stay of the execution of the Family Court's judgment until a different decision is rendered (Judge S' Jayoussi).
47. In the reply submitted on their behalf, the respondents also reiterated their arguments, and emphasized that the argument regarding the broad implications raised by the Attorney General is in fact an expansion of the front. According to the respondents, the dispute between the parties in the framework of the litigation focused solely on the question of the"Procedural" Next: Is it necessary for the mothers to sign additional documents regarding their consent to adoption, or are the existing documents sufficient for the purpose of meeting the requirements of the law? In this context, the respondents relied on the Family Court's determination that the existing material is sufficient to indicate the existence of consent to the delivery of the minors for adoption in accordance with the law.
48. The respondents further emphasized that in the circumstances of the case, it is necessary to act in the best interests of the concrete minors, and not to manage "On their backs" Proceedings due to the Attorney General's general reservations about surrogacy procedures taking place in Northern Cyprus. It was further argued that in practice, the Attorney General does not allow mothers to sign the letter of consent anchored in the adoption regulations before Israeli missions abroad"The respondents reiterated their claims, on the legal level, that in the Consensual Parenting The consent of the mother giving birth to the severance of legal contact with the newborn was considered sufficient even for the purposes of the Adoption Law.  The respondents also claimed that they had no contact with the mothers, that they undertook not to contact them, and that the demand to locate them and sign the letter of consent entailed considerable costs and even the possible risk of financial extortion.
49. After two hearings were held before him, on March 30,2025 The District Court unanimously rejected the appeal and left in place the adoption order given to each of the minors against the spouse of his genetic father (the judge). III'Yossi, the judge A.  Attias And the Judge v.  Silman).  In the main opinion, written by the judge Jayoussi, it was argued that, as a rule, surrogacy proceedings and adoption proceedings require adherence to the rules and conditions required by the legislation.  In addition, the District Court noted the broad implications that its judgment may have, including - There is a real concern about human trafficking, the encouragement of additional Israelis to conduct surrogacy procedures in Northern Cyprus, as well as the impact on adoption procedures that are carried out following surrogacy procedures in other parts of the world.  Against this background, it was explained, the problem that arises from the surrogacy procedures taking place in Northern Cyprus requires an increase in the standard of examinations and conditions that respondents are required to meet.
50. Subsequently, the District Court ruled that the requirements set forth in theAdditional Civil Hearing 1297/20 [Nevo] For the purpose of granting a parenting order, a ruling is also applicable to the present case, even though our case deals with an adoption proceeding. Against this background, it was noted that it was necessary to examine whether the surrogacy process was carried out legally under foreign law, whether the relationship between the mothers giving birth and the minors was severed under foreign law, and whether their signature on the waiver affidavits can be considered as an agreement to hand over the minors for adoption.
51. As to the legality of the surrogacy procedure, it was determined that this "Left with a big question mark". With regard to the examination of the severance of the relationship, it was determined that this is impossible, and is not even relevant in the present case.  With regard to the requirement of consent for adoption, the District Court ruled that although the waiver affidavits do not meet the formal requirement set forth in the law, they show consent on the part of the mothers who give birth as well as discretion with regard to the submission of the minors for adoption.  In this context, it was noted that the affidavits were signed in front of a consular representative of the State of Israel, also in the language of the giving mothers.  It was also argued that a similar conclusion arises from the perspective of the surrogacy agreements and the agreements signed by the mothers of the birth with the clinic.  It was also noted that this conclusion is becoming stronger in view of the passage of time since the birth without the voice of the mothers being heard.  The District Court further ruled that the requirement to locate the mothers who gave birth and to have them sign the letter of consent imposes on the respondents a burden that is unbearable and unfeasible, and that at this stage it is possible to suffice with the documents that have been signed.  It was also noted that at an earlier stage, the respondents agreed to have the mothers sign the letter of consent set out in the Adoption Regulations, but the state did not allow this until it became clear that the minors were born to a parent who was an Israeli citizen.
52. With regard to the travel warnings that have been published over the years, the District Court ruled that the warning of June 21,2023, referred to above "The decisive travel warning" was different from its predecessors and should be considered "The watershed". Against this background, emphasis was placed on the fact that the respondents carried out the surrogacy procedures prior to the publication of that travel warning.  Finally, it was argued that weight should also be given to the principle of the best interests of the child, and that in view of the fact that each of the respondents serves as a parental figure for the minors, as well as in the positive report that was submitted, it is clear that the best interests of the minors are in the granting of an adoption order.
53. The two additional judges of the District Court agreed, as stated, to this judgment. It is worth further referring to the judge's opinion Silman who emphasized that compliance with the conditions of supervision in the circumstances of surrogacy"and the responsibility for preventing human trafficking or the deprivation of mothers who give birth cannot fully fall on the shoulders of those who wish to be parents, and certainly not on the shoulders of minors.  The Judge Silman He added that the state was aware of the existence of such proceedings and was even involved in them, inter alia, in the sense that the mothers of the birth signed documents before consular representatives.  Therefore, the judge Silman He emphasized that if according to the state's approach, the surrogacy procedures involved a violation of the terms of the law - Action should be taken on this issue vis-à-vis the brokerage agencies and the professionals involved in the process.  The Judge Atias Joined these comments.

The Proceedings in This Court

54. The application for leave to appeal before us was filed by the Attorney General on May 4,2025, and alongside it a motion for a stay of execution was filed. In the application for leave to appeal, the Attorney General reiterated her main arguments.  According to her, the justification for granting leave to appeal in this case stems from the broad implications of the decision on the situation of other couples in the Respondents' situation.  On the merits, it was argued, inter alia, that the District Court erred in its inference from the customary arrangement in relation to a judicial parenting order to a situation in which adoption is required, as well as in the manner in which the precedent in this matter is applied.  The Attorney General emphasized that the requirement to sign the letter of consent is not "Insistence on 'technical' details" and noted the differences that exist between it and the waiver affidavits that were signed in the circumstances of the case.  In this context, it was noted that the letter of consent requires the parent who gives his child for adoption to be informed of essential details, such as the right to leave a letter or souvenir for the minor, the denial of the right to receive information regarding the minor, the clarification that the adoption does not terminate the minor's rights as the heir of his parents, the finality of the decision to give the child for adoption, and the minor's right to review the adoption file when he reaches the age of 18 (including receiving details about the parent).  It was further argued that the circumstances surrounding the surrogacy proceedings in this case also sharpen the need to adhere to all the conditions of the law.  The Attorney General further argued that there is no factual basis for the District Court's determination that at a certain stage the respondents were willing to have the mothers sign the letter of consent but were met with refusal by the state.
55. On May 18,2025, a reply was submitted on behalf of the respondents, who also reiterated their arguments. They further added that there was no justification for hearing the application in"Third incarnation" Since this court has already discussed several times the possibility of flexing the provisions of the Adoption Law (with reference toעניין Consensual Parenting).  On the merits, the respondents argued that the Attorney General's reservation about the surrogacy proceedings taking place in Northern Cyprus has no relevance to the question of adoption under discussion, which must be decided according to the best interests of the minors.  The respondents further argued that there is no basis for the Attorney General's concerns regarding the rights of the mothers giving birth in the circumstances of the case, and that in any case the process was carried out prior to the travel warning regarding Northern Cyprus.  Therefore, according to the respondents, the only question that remains is procedural and relates to the possibility of recognizing the consent of the mothers giving birth on the basis of the existing documents, without being required to re-sign the letter of consent.
56. On May 27,2025, I ordered a stay of the execution of the District Court's judgment until a different decision was issued. Subsequently, on June 17,2025, I ordered that in view of the subject matter of the hearing, the case would be transferred to the panel for hearing as soon as possible.  The case was set for a hearing on July 31,2025, but this was postponed following a request filed by the respondents.
57. The hearing before us ultimately took place on September 17,2025. At the beginning of the hearing, we addressed the Attorney General's counsel questions regarding the manner in which the travel warnings are published to the public and the scope of the cases that are known to her that the decision in the case will affect them.  In response to these questions, it was clarified that as of the date of filing the current application, there were about ten cases in which surrogacy procedures were carried out in Northern Cyprus between 2021 and 2023 (i.e., moving on to the decisive travel warning).  It was also noted that the travel warnings were made public, and that in any event, the legal responsibility in the matter rested with the applicants to enter the proceeding.  Counsel for the State further argued that the waiver affidavits signed by the mothers did not replace their signature on the letter of consent - Both because it is precisely against the background of the fear of exploitation that more strict care must be taken to comply with the provisions of the Adoption Law, and because in the concrete case, the waiver affidavits were signed before the genetic parenting of one of the spouses was determined.  In this context, it was argued that the letter of consent can only be signed after the Adoption Law begins to apply to the relationship - That is, when the parenthood of the Israeli genetic parent is determined, and that is why earlier requests to sign the letter of consent before an Israeli consular representative were rejected.  In these circumstances, it was argued, the respondents must make an effort to locate the mothers who give birth and have them sign the letter of consent.
58. On the other hand, counsel for the respondents argued that there is difficulty in acting on the basis of the travel warnings that were published in a format that is not sufficiently clear. Counsel for the respondents further argued that the Attorney General's insistence on the re-signing of the letter of consent by the mothers of the mother is strict and unnecessary.  In any event, it was argued, the wording of the waiver affidavits that were signed is based on the letter of consent, some of the clauses of which are in any case irrelevant when it comes to a mother who is giving birth who has no genetic connection to the minor.
59. At the end of the hearing, the Attorney General's counsel announced that she was willing to examine whether it was possible to follow the usual route in this case In section 13(a)1 to the Adoption Law, which deals with the declaration of minors as adoptees (without signing a letter of consent). For this purpose, a time was requested for consultation with the relevant parties.
60. On September 21,2025, we instructed the Attorney General to submit a supplementary notice in which she will relate to the possibility of providing an individual response in this case, as well as clarify, in her opinion, the guidelines according to which future cases with similar characteristics should be examined. Clarification was also requested regarding the format of publication that will be made with regard to notices regarding surrogacy procedures in foreign countries.
61. After a number of requests for extensions, the supplementary notice was ultimately submitted on January 11,2026. In this supplementary notice, the Attorney General stated that her position is that it is not possible to provide the respondents with an individual response without having an impact on similar cases of other people in their situation.  For this reason, and in view of the question marks regarding the legality of the surrogacy procedure, it was argued that there is no room to formulate a specific solution that involves deviating from the provisions of the Adoption Law.  The Attorney General further argued that there is an inherent difficulty in formulating guidelines for future cases in general.  In this context, it was explained that there may be other countries in which there is concern regarding the legality of surrogacy procedures, and for which a travel warning has not yet been issued.  At the same time, it was noted that the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Justice publish updates on the matter from time to time, and that in the near future an effort will be made to gather all the relevant information on each of the websites of the government ministries.
62. After we had instructed to do so, on January 25,2026, a response was submitted on behalf of the respondents, in which it was argued, inter alia, that the broad question relating to future cases is a theoretical question that should not be discussed. It was further argued that the arguments included in the notice submitted on behalf of the Attorney General with respect to the question of the date on which the waiver affidavits were signed constitute an extension of the front, since they were not raised in the previous courts.  In addition, the respondents reiterated that the requirement to sign a letter of consent, which does not contain any material addition in relation to the waiver affidavits is a purely formal requirement.  Finally, the respondents complained that the Attorney General's announcement did not present a response to the court's questions - Neither an individual solution nor guidelines regarding future cases.
63. On February 12,2026, we instructed the Attorney General to submit an additional notice on her behalf, in which she would clarify what she believes are the practical steps that respondents must take at this time in order to have the mothers sign the letter of consent. She was also asked to detail the circumstances in which she would file an application under Section 13(a) of the Adoption Law, including the circumstances in which it will be possible to determine, both in the circumstances of the case and in similar cases, that "There is no reasonable possibility of identifying, finding or clarifying the parent's opinion".
64. On April 12,2026, the additional supplementary notice was submitted. The Attorney General insisted that in the usual case there should be no special difficulty in locating the mothers, and added that it was uncomfortable with the respondents' refusal to take any step in an attempt to do so.  In this context, it was even argued that in the framework of the agreements made with the mothers giving birth, they undertook to appear in legal proceedings if necessary.  On the concrete level, it was noted that -

"Among other things, it could have been expected that [the respondents] would contact the relevant agencies and all the parties that assisted them and with whom they were in contact during the surrogacy process, including, inter alia, clinics and hospitals; that they would contact officials in the country of origin of the mothers giving birth, Georgia, including, for example, the Georgian Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Interior; and that they would also try to act through various social networks in order to locate them, and through local sources, and so on...