This is not the case with regard to the meeting that took place at Barkai's home on December 27,2018. This meeting was not intended to examine the veracity of the information and whether it could be published, but rather was an operative preparatory meeting for the purpose of studying the material and preparing it for broadcast. As such, it cannot be protected under the protection of Section 15(11) of the Prohibition of Defamation Law.
- In conclusion so far:
Barkai is protected under the protection set forth in section 18(2)(a) and section 18(2)(b) of the law.
Canetti, Shachar and Galei Tzahal are protected under the protection set forth in section 18(2)(b) of the law, as well as under the protection set forth in section 18(2)(f) in the context of section 15(11) of the Prohibition of Defamation Law regarding the meeting at the offices of Army Radio. This is also true of Elkabetz, if the prosecution against him had remained intact.
As for Steif - in the absence of good faith, it cannot be protected under any of the protections set forth in section 18(2) of the Law. However, since Steif also raised an argument for the existence of the protection set forth in section 18(3) of the Law, it is necessary to examine the applicability of this defense.
Protection of Section 18(3) of the Law
- Section 18(3) enumerates two conditions for its existence: the infringement had a "public interest" justifying it in the circumstances of the case; and insofar as the infringement involved publication, it was not false. This defense Does not include an independent requirement of good faith, except for the caveat that the publication must not be false (Protecting Privacy in Israel p. 512). The explanatory notes to the bill state that this protection is "necessary for the media" (H.H. Protection of Privacy, Bills 1453, p. 209). On the basis of the above, I will examine the fulfillment of the conditions listed in this section.
- Public interest has been defined in case law as follows:
"A 'public interest' will be considered a matter whose public knowledge is relevant to the realization of a public purpose or that the public has a benefit in knowing about it - whether for the purpose of forming its opinion on public matters or for the purpose of improving its way of life (see: Civil Appeal 439/88 Registrar of Databases v. Ventura (hereinafter - the Registrar of Databases Case), at p. 826; the Dan Avi Yitzhak case, supra, at pp. 56-57; G. Segal, "The Right to Privacy vs. the Right to Know, " at p. 196). More often than not, the "public interest" in the publication may stem from the fact that the publication relates to a public figure, although this is not always sufficient (for example, when the publication relates to the privacy of the individual, whose knowledge by the public does not bring real benefit to the public). It is clear that it is not possible to determine in advance what issues will constitute a "public interest", and this will be examined with respect to each publication on its merits."