(Civil Appeal 1104/00 Appel v. Hasson, IsrSC 56(2) 607,621 (2002); and see also: Ze'ev Segal, "The Right to Privacy vs. the Right to Know, " Iyunei Mishpat 9,175,194-193,5743))
When it comes to publications on public affairs concerning public figures, the right to freedom of expression takes precedence over the right to a good name (Civil Appeal 214/89 Avnery v. Shapira paragraph 25 (Nevo 22.10.1989); Civil Appeal Authority 21942-11-24 Ben Gvir v. Media Network Ltd., paragraph 4 (Nevo 10.11.2024).
- In this case, the information provided by Steif for the review of the other defendants indicated that there was a real concern that a senior and influential public figure, who serves as chairman of the Israel Bar Association and a member of the Judicial Selection Committee, took advantage of her position and public position in order to accumulate personal power, to promote associates or to engage in improper "give-and-take" relationships. All of these are at the heart of the term "public interest". Even maintaining the integrity and integrity of the judicial appointment procedures in the State of Israel, which constitute the basic foundation of the rule of law and the public's trust in the judicial system as a whole, is a public matter. Thus, not only is this a matter of news and a public figure, but we are also dealing with information that is important to be disclosed to the public (Shock, at pp. 238-244). In these circumstances, the public interest justifies the violation of Naveh's privacy.
- Since part of the violation of privacy involved the publication (the special broadcaster), it is necessary to examine the veracity of the publication. This is an objective requirement, i.e., there is no relevance to the question of the advertiser's subjective belief. The person claiming the protection must prove that the publication was indeed true (Ze'ev Segal, "The Right to Privacy vs. the Right to Know" Law Studies 9,175,192 5743(.
The evidence presented to me shows that the publications were not false, but rather reflected the factual reality and were based on authentic correspondence found on Naveh's mobile phones. Reinforcement for this can be found in the State Attorney's Office's decision of March 21,2021 to shelving the affair (P/54). In accordance with this decision, on the basis of the materials produced from Naveh's devices, suspicions were formulated that led to the investigation. The investigation revealed "difficult factual findings that allegedly amount to criminal acts" (paragraph 21 of P/4). A major reason for not filing an indictment against Naveh for these findings lies in the way the materials were obtained, i.e., by illegally penetrating Naveh's mobile phones.
- It therefore follows that the two conditions of Section 18(3) The law is fulfilled: the violation of privacy had a public interest that justified it, and the publication was not false.
However, the defense is not an absolute defense. The law establishes a language - "in the circumstances of the matter", i.e., the justification for an injury due to the public interest is supposed to be examined in each case according to its circumstances (Civil Appeal 439/88 Registrar of Databases v. VenturaIsrSC 88(3) 808,827 (1994); (Shock, p. 235)). Therefore, the court was required to strike a balance between the opposite right (the public's right to know) and Naveh's right to privacy. Other Municipality Requests 8954/11 Anonymous vs. Anonymous (22.5.2014) (hereinafter: A Certain Matter) Justice (as he was then called) S. Jubran changed the following in the context of freedom of expression: