On the other hand, defendants 3-6 argued that the state should not be held vicarious responsible for Steif's actions, since in accordance with the "Shorosh rule" an employer is not liable for serious and deliberate criminal acts of an employee that were committed without the knowledge or approval of his superiors. They also clarified that the other defendants and editors at the station were not aware of the hacking or theft of the devices, and did not approve or ratify these acts at any stage.
- First and foremost, I will address the argument of confirmation of Steif's wrongful actions (the penetration of Naveh's phones and the extraction of information from them). As I have already noted, Article 12 The Torts Ordinance imposes direct liability on a person who involves, assists, advises, tempts, commands or ratifies a tortious act committed by another person. This is a direct liability - personal and special - that does not require the performance of all the elements of the tort. In contrast to this, Article 13 The Torts Ordinance deals with the liability of the employer for the employee's act in the event that the employer ratified the act or whether the employee committed the tortious act in the course of his work.
If so, in Article 12 The Torts Ordinance discusses direct liability as the conscious participation of the employer or manager in tort, as Section 13 Regulates liability by virtue of vicarious liability as a question of confirming the performance of the act or its performance during the work.
- Asher Section 12, the certifying act must attest to the assumption of responsibility for the commission of the tort. The reason for this is that the liability of the certifying person is chronologically later than the date of the commission of the tort. Therefore, case law has taken a cautious approach to imposing liability by virtue of Article 12 to the Torts Ordinance in the context of the ratifier's liability (Civil Appeal 2362/19 Anonymous v. Palestinian Authority, Paragraph 17 (hereinafter - The Matter of So-and-So); Amos Herman Torts Law 219 (2nd edition, 2020)). Thus, although the act of ratification can be by statement or silence, such conduct has not yet been recognized in case law as establishing liability (Civil Appeal 3024/10 Weiner v. Moyal, paragraph 26 (April 2,2013)). Moreover, where it is an offense such as assault, explicit confirmation is required - express (Civil Appeal 358/63 State of Israel v. Schwartz, IsrSC 17 2894,2900 (1963)).
- In our case, as I have already determined, Steif did not share with the other defendants in real time details about the way in which she obtained the information about Naveh's affairs. The general version she gave was that the information came from me. Her colleagues in the "What's Burning" program and the management officials at Army Radio did not know in real time about the improper way in which the information reached her. Therefore, they cannot be attributed confirmation of the wrongful conduct, i.e., the hacking of the phones and the extraction of personal information from them.
Nor can I accept Naveh's argument that the mere use of the materials that Steif brought to Army Radio amounts to confirmation of her activity. As I determined in the course of the discussion on the issue of normative expectations regarding the protection of good faith in the Protection of Privacy Law, it is not acceptable in the field of journalism to question a journalist about his sources and the manner in which information was provided to him. Therefore, Naveh's claim of ratification or "turning a blind eye" cannot be accepted.