- To this, it should be added that Shteif's conduct has a criminal nature in the context of the Computers Law and the Wiretapping Law. In such circumstances, explicit consent is required, attesting to the assumption of responsibility for the commission of the tort, and "turning a blind eye" is not enough (for more information, see: The Matter of So-and-So, paragraph 42). The demand for explicit consent is also required by considerations of protecting freedom of the press and preventing a chilling effect on the existence of journalistic investigations.
For these reasons, I reject Naveh's argument that the conduct of the other defendants amounts to confirmation of Steif's actions. If so, I reject the claim of imposing liability for Steif's actions by virtue of Article 12 to the Torts Ordinance for the other defendants.
- Another dispute relates to the vicarious responsibility of the IDF Radio station (as the state organ) for Shteif's actions. As has already been determined, Shteif was the mediator and instigator of Naveh's breach of privacy. Shteif even consciously approved the process of extracting Naveh's personal information from mobile phones, while she was present during a visit to Yuli's home. No criminal proceedings were taken against Shteif (by virtue of an arrangement made with her by the State Attorney's Office), although it appears that her actions have a criminal nature.
- Article 13 The Torts Ordinance establishes the liability of the employer for an act committed by his employee if he authorized or approved the act or if the employee did the act while working. As I determined above, Army Radio did not authorize or ratify the act. Therefore, I will examine the second alternative, i.e., whether the act was done while the employee was working. In the context of this alternative, it states Section 13(b) In this way:
- (a) For the purposes of this Ordinance, an employer shall be liable for an act committed by his employee:
(1) if he authorized or ratified the act;