Analysis of the weight of Ganor's statements and testimony. 86

The offense of bribery brokerage. 88

The offense of money laundering. 94

Offense of fraud according to Income Tax Ordinance. 95

Conclusion. 96

Introduction

1. This judgment was written after the case was transferred to me following the tragic death of the late Judge Benny Sagi. This panel did not conduct the proceedings and did not hear evidence in the course of the proceeding, except for one short hearing in which the parties asked not to add to what was placed before the late Judge Sagi.  This means that I did not hear any witnesses or the arguments of the parties orally, and in fact the entire verdict is based on the written and the evidence submitted in the proceeding that was conducted before the late Judge Sagi.

Introduction

2. A decision is on the agenda on the claim that the defendant brokered bribery by receiving money from a representative of the ThyssenKrupp corporation in Israel and transferring it to the Chief of Staff in the Prime Minister's Office, in order to "promote" the purchase of submarines from the corporation by the State of Israel.
3. Three main actors are at the heart of the story: the first is Miki Ganor (hereinafter: "Ganor") - a businessman and agent of the ThyssenKrupp corporation in Israel; the second is the defendant, Yitzhak Tzachi Lieber (hereinafter: "the defendant" or "Lieber") - a strategic advisor and independent media consultant; and the third is David Sharan (hereinafter: "Sharan") - who served as the secretary of EAPC, the director of the Prime Minister's Office and later the Prime Minister's Chief of Staff, and a close friend of the defendant, whose testimony was not heard in this proceeding.
4. The two parties who testified in our case, Ganor and the defendant, admitted in their interrogations to the police that they had acted in the manner described in the indictment. However, later on, they retracted their incriminating confessions and provided various explanations for changing their versions.  The verdict will deal, inter alia, with an analysis of the explanations they provided for the change in the version, as well as the defense's claims of flaws in the investigative process and the lack of evidentiary basis for what was stated in the indictment.

Before I dive into the examination of the evidence, I will present the relationships and acquaintance between the three parties that appear in the indictment.

5. The acquaintance between Tzachi Lieber and Mickey Ganor: The initial acquaintance between Lieber and Ganor took place in June 2014, and there is no dispute that their first meeting took place close to that date. The acquaintance was born through the mediation of Sharan, who first met them in Ganor's office and introduced Lieber as a media person.

The background to the meeting was Ganor's desire to receive regulatory consulting services from Liber regarding the tender for the construction of the ammonia plant, in which Ganor and the corporation he represented asked to compete.

6. The acquaintance between Tzachi Lieber and David Sharan: The evidence in the case does not indicate an exact date of acquaintance or the circumstances of their initial meeting, but it clearly indicates that they were close and very good friends. The two had a deep friendship, which included joint trips of their families abroad (for example, in 2016).

In addition, Lieber provided Sharan with general counseling and consulting services in the framework of the primary elections, as well as services for his wife Hagar regarding the Amidar company - all without financial consideration, but as part of the friendly relationship that existed between them.

7. The acquaintance between Mickey Ganor and David Sharan: The relationship and acquaintance between the two began in 2009 at the latest, and they are described as long-time friends who were in continuous and personal contact on a wide range of topics. Ganor's diaries attest to many meetings that the two have held since at least 2010.

The text correspondence that was submitted indicates that there was an unmediated and even friendly relationship between the two, which included personal conversations, investment proposals, and inquiries on issues related to Sharan's public positions.

8. In the margins, it should be noted that our case is connected to a large-scale affair concerning the State of Israel's defense procurement in the field of vessels, known as the "Submarine Affair" (or "Case 3000"). The main indictment in this affair (Criminal Case 18778-05-21) was filed against Ganor and his four friends, Sharan and other defendants, and his case is still being clarified in the Tel Aviv-Jaffa District Court before the Honorable Judge Tali Haimovich.

This indictment deals with various actions taken by Ganor and various public officials in order to promote the transactions of the State of Israel's vessels, while ensuring and transferring bribe payments, along with the commission of tax offenses and money laundering.

The Structure of the Verdict

9. The verdict will begin with the presentation of the summary of the affair, known as the submarine affair or Case 3000, and will present the three main actors: Mickey Ganor, Yitzhak Tzachi Lieber, and David Sharan, while reviewing the relationship and the connections between them. The indictment will be detailed below, which includes a general section, details of the facts and legislative provisions attributed to the defendant, along with the positions of the parties and the arenas of dispute.  In the defense's response, the defendant denies the charges, claims that he provided the truthful work he performed for Ganor, and rejects the thesis that he served as a conduit for the transfer of bribes, while raising a detailed petty claim to invalidate his confessions to the police.
10. As part of the arguments of the parties, the accuser relies on the defendant's confessions and the statements of state witness Mickey Ganor as the pillars of the conviction, while on the other hand, the defense focuses on proving the provision of genuine services and seeks to invalidate the confessions due to improper pressure and investigative methods. The court will focus the hearing on four core issues: the nature and circumstances of the payments, the legal status of David Sharan as a public servant, the admissibility and weight of the defendant's confessions, and the credibility and weight of the state's witness's version.  The hearing will first decide the question of the admissibility of the defendant's confession in the framework of the minor trial, in accordance with section 12 of the Evidence Ordinance and the doctrine of judicial invalidation.
11. The court will examine the defendant's petty claims regarding the use of unfair pressure and improper means during his interrogation. The defendant's claims regarding the detention and detention at Ben Gurion Airport, the interrogation and interrogation in the car on September 2, 2017, as well as the violation of the right to counsel on September 2, 2017 and September 4, 2017.  In addition, the arguments regarding promises of release from detention in exchange for a confession, the use of offensive expressions, the aggravation of suspicion on September 4, 2017, and the intrusion into the mobile phone by virtue of a judicial order will be examined.
12. The court will examine the holistic minor thesis, and examine whether the defendant's freedom of choice has been preserved, as well as his confession that he gave on September 5, 2017, after consulting with his defense attorney. In the second part, which discusses the reliability of the state's witness's version, the accuser seeks to accept Ganor's foreign statements, while the defense points to the changes in his versions, and in particular his retraction from the bribery version in 2019.  The court will apply the principle of "plaginen speech" and will examine whether full weight should be given to Ganor's first version as a state witness in the police, in which he exposed the involvement of Sharan and the defendant on his own initiative.
13. The court will examine Ganor's version as to whether it is supported by significant external reinforcements, including the consultants' tables, from Ronen Shemer's companies and Josie Singer's diaries, alongside the defendant's own confession. The court will examine the defendant's "work version" and ask whether the ammonia project was used only as a cover, or "shallax, " for the bribery conspiracy, as appears from the defendant's versions from September 2, 2017 to September 4, 2017.  As part of the examination of the elements of the offense, we will be required to examine David Sharan's status as a public servant, based on his status as secretary of EAPC, which is a corporation that provides services to the public, as well as his being a candidate for the position of director of the Prime Minister's Office from September 2014 until his official appointment.
14. At the time of the second payment on August 11, 2016, David Sharan served as an acting public servant in the Prime Minister's Office, until the end of his official employment on September 26, 2016. The defendant's confessions to the police, first and foremost the full confession of September 5, 2017, describe how he served as a conduit for the transfer of bribe money in cash from Gonor to Sharan, while disguising the payments through the companies N.T.  and Ness Mor Holdings Ltd.  and false invoices.  The court will be required to consider the defendant's belated repudiation on the witness stand and whether his version of confession to the police, which was given of his own free will and after consultation with his lawyers, should be preferred.
15. At the end of the verdict, we will examine whether the fabric of evidence, which includes the defendant's confessions, Ganor's statements, and financial evidence, is sufficient for the purpose of convicting the defendant of three offenses. Brokering bribes for receiving ILS 35, 400 on November 12, 2014 and ILS 58, 500 on August 11, 2016, and transferring them to Sharan.  For a money laundering offense under Section 3(a) of the Prohibition of Money Laundering Law, and for a tax offense under Section 220(4) of the Income Tax Ordinance.

The Indictment

General Part

16. The defendant is a strategic consultant and independent media consultant. The defendant is one of the owners of N.C.T.  Communications Ltd.  (hereinafter: "N.C.T."), which was established in 2009 and engages in media consulting and public relations.  Ness Mor Holdings Ltd.  (hereinafter: "Ness Mor Company") is a company owned by the defendant's partner, Natan Mor.  David Amichai Sharan (hereinafter: "Sharan") served from 2009 to 2012 as Chief of Staff to the Minister of Finance under Minister of Business and Antitrust Yuval Steinitz (hereinafter: "Minister Steinitz") Between January 2013 and December 2014, Sharan served as Secretary of the Eilat-Ashkelon Oil Pipeline Company Ltd.  (hereinafter: "EAPC Company").  In December 2014, Sharan began serving as the Director of the Prime Minister's Office, and was later appointed, to serve in parallel with this position, as the Prime Minister's Chief of Staff, until the end of August 2016.  In his positions in the Ministry of Finance and the Prime Minister's Office, Sharan was a public servant in accordance with Section 34 of the Penal   In his position at Katzaya, Sharan was a public servant under Section 290 of the Penal Law (hereinafter referred to as the positions specified in this section: "Sharan's Public Functions").  As of September 2014, it was learned that Sharan was expected to be appointed Director of the Prime Minister's Office.  In addition, Sharan had taken the necessary actions for him to take office, including conducting a polygraph test.  During this period, and until his appointment as Director of the Prime Minister's Office, Sharan was a candidate for the position of public servant, and therefore he was also a "public servant" in accordance with the provisions of section 34 of the Penal Law, together with section 294 (c) of the Penal Law.  The defendant and Sharan had a close relationship, including during the period of the acts that are the subject of this indictment.
17. Thyssenkrupp AG (hereinafter: "Ganor") is a German conglomerate and the owner of Thyssenkrupp Marine System (TKMS) (hereinafter: "Ganor") Michael (Miki) Ganor (hereinafter: "Ganor") is a businessman whose main business, until 2009, was in the field of real estate in Europe.  Between the years 2009-2017, Ganor served as the corporation's agent in Israel, as part of a series of contracts between Ganor and the corporation's subsidiaries.  The role of the corporation's agent is to operate in Israel in order to market and promote the corporation's activity there.  If the agent brokers a transaction that is executed, he receives a commission derived from the value of the transaction.  In 2009, Ganor founded T.G.  Israel Marine Consulting Ltd.  (hereinafter: "T.G.  Company").

The facts of the indictment

18. During the period of Sharan's tenure in his public positions, including the period when he was a candidate for the position. In the Prime Minister's Office, Ganor worked with Sharan in order for Sharan to promote his business.  On November 12, 2014 , Ganor transferred a payment of ILS 35, 400 from the account of the T.G.  company to the account of the N.T.T.    which the defendant owned, at the request of Sharan, in favor of actions related to Sharan's public functions, including in order to bias him in general (hereinafter: "the payment of the first death").  The payment of the first gift was allegedly made for consulting services that Ganor and T.G.  received from the defendant.  In practice, T.G.  and Ganor did not receive any service from the defendant or from N.C.T., for which the first gift payment was made.  The first gift payment, in the manner described above, was made at Sharan's request and in order to disguise it as a corrupt gift payment for Sharan.  The defendant agreed to transfer the payment, knowing that by doing so he was serving as a disguise for the payment of a corrupt gift between Ganor, the bribe giver, and Sharan, the bribe taker.
19. On August 11, 2016, Ganor transferred a payment in the amount of ILS 58, 500 from the account of T.G. to the account of the Ness Mor company.  The payment was made at the request of Sharan, for actions related to Sharan's public functions (hereinafter: "the payment of the second gift").  The payment of the second gift was allegedly made for consulting services received by Ganor and T.  C from the defendant.  In practice, T.G.  and Ganor did not receive any service from the defendant or from N.T.  Communications or from Ness Mor or from Natan Mor for which the second gift was paid.  The second gift payment, in the manner described above, was made at the defendant's request in order to disguise the fact that it was a corrupt gift payment for Sharan.  The defendant agreed to transfer the payment in the manner described above, knowing that by doing so he was serving as a camouflage for the payment of a corrupt gift between Ganor, the bribe-giver, and Sharan, the bribe taker.
20. On dates unknown to the accuser, the defendant transferred to Sharan the lion's share of the first and second bestowal payments. In addition to the above, during the period of Sharan's work in the Prime Minister's Office and at Sharan's request, the defendant served as a transfer of information and requests between Ganor and Sharan, for the purpose of disguising the corrupt relationship between Sharan and Shanor.  In his actions described above, the defendant received the first and second bestowal payments in the sum of ILS 93, 900 in order to bribe Sharan.  The payment of the first and second gifts, in the sum of ILS 93, 900, are bribe money that constitutes "prohibited property" as defined in the Prohibition of Money Laundering Law, 5760-2000 (hereinafter: the "Prohibition of Money Laundering Law"), as they are property that originated in an offense and was used to commit an offense.
21. By receiving the payments from Ganor and disguising them by means of false invoices from the N.C.T. and the Ness Mor Company, and subsequently transferring them, the defendant carried out operations on the property in order to conceal or disguise the origin of the funds for the first and second bestowal payments, or the identity of the owners of the rights therein, or taking action therein.  In his actions described above, the defendant assisted Ganor and T.G.  to prepare false ledgers and records, in order for T.G.  to evade paying tax.
22. On the basis of the aforesaid, the defendant was charged with the following offenses - 2 offenses of bribery brokerage under section 295(a) of the Penal Law, 5737-1977 (hereinafter - the Penal Law); 2 offenses of money laundering under section 3(a) of the Prohibition of Money Laundering Law, 5760-2000 (hereinafter - the Prohibition of Money Laundering Law); and 2 offenses of assisting in the preparation of false ledgers and records under section 220(4) of the Income Tax Ordinance [New Version] (hereinafter - the Income Tax Ordinance) together with section 31 of the Penal Law.

The Defense Position and the Response to the Indictment

23. The defendant categorically denied the charges against him and petitioned for his acquittal of all charges. According to the defense, the payments that were transferred from Ganor, or from a company he owned, to companies in which the defendant was involved, were paid lawfully for real, acceptable and legitimate consulting services that he provided to Ganor in his field of expertise as a communications and strategy consultant.  The defendant categorically denied the "prosecution thesis" according to which he served as a "straw man" or as a conduit for transferring bribe money to David Sharan, and clarified that he did not transfer any of these funds to Sharan.
24. In response to the indictment, the defendant clarified that he did not dispute the actual transfer of the payments or their dates, but vehemently denied the criminal interpretation attributed to them. The defendant denied the claim that Sharan served as a public servant on the dates relevant to the charges, and in particular on the date of the "second bestowal payment" on August 11, 2016, in respect of which it was alleged that Sharan had previously completed his public position.  The defendant also insisted that the prosecution could not prove the very existence of the alleged "corrupt connection" between Sharan and Ganor, and that even if such a connection was proven, he had no connection to the defendant.
25. According to the defense, the defendant had a long-standing friendship with Sharan, and the latter introduced him to Ganor as a client in need of media and strategic consulting services. Following this acquaintance, the defendant maintained a business relationship with Ganor, provided him with consulting services, received compensation for his work, and issued invoices lawfully.  As a token of gratitude to Sharan, his good friend, for bringing him together with Ganor, the defendant transferred him on one occasion a sum of money of only a few thousand shekels.

With regard to the funds transferred from Ganor to the defendant, the defense argued that there was no dispute about the actual transfers of the funds, but that they were paid for actual work performed by the defendant for Ganor in the framework of the business relationship between them, without any connection to Sharan's public functions.  In addition, the defendant denied the claim that he served as a conduit for the transfer of information and requests between Ganor and Sharan during the period of Sharan's work in the Prime Minister's Office, or that he acted to disguise any corrupt relationship between them.

26. A central element of the defendant's defense relates to the admissibility and weight of his confessions to the police, about which a detailed petty claim was raised. The defense claims that the defendant's confession was extracted from him by improper means, using extreme pressure, using unusual asset freeze orders as leverage, and aggressively arresting him at Ben Gurion Airport.  According to his version, the interrogators used an unfair tactic of "seduction and deception, " promised him that he would be released from detention if he gave the version he wanted, and planted the incriminating details in his mouth in a way that deprived him of his free will.
27. The defense further argued that the version of the state's witness, Miki Ganor, lacked credibility and was full of lies and contradictions, which were adopted by him solely in order to please his interrogators and maintain his status as a state witness. According to the defendant, the investigators misunderstood the factual picture, built an artificial "ecosystem, " and even presented Ganor with erroneous data that became the core of his incriminating version.  These serious omissions, along with the failure to bring substantial witnesses to testify, led by David Sharan, omit the evidentiary basis of the indictment and require the defendant to be acquitted.

The parties' arguments

28. At the outset, I will briefly review the arguments of the parties, which spanned many pages. Later, as part of the focused discussion of the various disputes, the relevant arguments will be detailed in full.

The accuser's arguments

29. In her summaries of April 2, 2024, the accuser presents an orderly and comprehensive doctrine based on two main pillars for proving the defendant's guilt: his confessions detailed in his police interrogations, and the incriminating version of the state's witness, Miki Ganor, which is supported by significant external evidence. The accuser emphasizes that the combination of these two sets of evidence, which are intertwined and reinforce each other, leads to an unequivocal conclusion that the defendant committed the offenses attributed to him beyond a reasonable doubt.  According to her, each of these evidentiary foundations is sufficient in itself to establish a criminal conviction, even without the other.
30. The accuser attaches very heavy special weight to the defendant's confessions to the police, and clarifies that this is a coherent, detailed and incriminating version, which was given of his own free will without any empty promises. The accuser categorically rejects the defense's petty arguments, and notes that the defendant gave his confessional version while he was lawfully represented and after consulting with his lawyer.  According to her, there is no causal or chronological connection between the conditions of the defendant's arrest or the investigative actions taken and the development of his version, which matured into a full and detailed confession.
31. As for the second evidentiary evidence, the accuser claims that Ganor's version to the police is authentic, coherent, and full of truthful signals, and that he exposed the involvement of the defendant and Sharan on his own initiative already in the framework of the negotiations to sign the state's witness agreement. According to her, this version is supported by weighty external supporting evidence, which includes documents and correspondence in real time that confirm the route of transferring the bribe money.  The accuser further emphasizes that Ganor's testimony in court, despite the difficulties and upheavals that accompanied it, does not impair the basic credibility of the incriminating version he gave at the time as a state witness in the police.
32. The accuser analyzes the evidence at length and points out the complete absence of evidence attesting to the defendant's provision of truthful services to Ganor, which can justify the receipt of payments in the sum of approximately ILS 100, 000. According to her, the "service thesis" presented by the defendant completely collapsed in his cross-examination, and turned out to be a failed attempt to glorify marginal and economically worthless events, such as friendly meetings, futile mediation attempts, and futile conversations.  The accuser emphasizes that the only actual service given to Ganor was the defendant's function as a buffer and conduit for the transfer of the bribe money to Sharan, in order to disguise the corrupt relationship between the two.
33. With regard to Sharan's status as a public servant, the accuser claims that she proved this issue to be substantial by means of the testimony of Adv. Shlomit Barnea-Farago and official documents documenting the process of his absorption as director of the Prime Minister's Office. According to her, the evidence clearly shows that Sharan was a candidate for this position as of September 2014, and that he served as a full-fledged public servant throughout all the relevant periods for the transfer of the bribe money.  The accuser views the defense's arguments in this context as a purely procedural move, which was in practice abandoned during the conduct of the criminal proceeding.
34. In summary, the accuser claims that the various defense witnesses did not assist the defendant in any way and even contradicted his version as to the circumstances of the withdrawal of the funds. The accuser clarifies that the defendant knew very well that the issuance of the fictitious invoices helped Ganor evade paying tax, as he himself admitted that Ganor asked for a "recognized expense" in lieu of payment in cash to Sharan.  On the basis of this solid evidentiary fabric, which includes the defendant's confessions, the statements of the state's witness, and the absence of any reasonable and alternative explanation for the payments, the accuser petitions for the defendant's conviction of all the offenses attributed to him in the indictment.

The Defense's Arguments

35. In the defense's summaries of June 13, 2024, the defendant presents a firm and consistent line of defense that points to the complete collapse of the indictment concept and the accuser's failure to meet the criminal burden of proof. The defense argues that the accuser built a closed and artificial "ecosystem" based on speculation and reasoning alone, which was completely refuted by the objective evidence that was submitted.  According to the defense, in the absence of a real evidentiary basis - with the exception of the state's witness version, which was extracted under pressure and ratified by the defendant under investigative pressure - the defendant should be ordered to be fully acquitted.
36. The defense clarifies that the evidence in the case contradicts the thesis that the defendant served as a buffer in order to disguise the relationship between Ganor and Sharan during his tenure in the Prime Minister's Office. An analysis of the media studies and the locations clearly shows that Ganor and Sharan maintained a direct, continuous, and friendly relationship, without any need for mediation or buffering on the part of the defendant.  The existence of this direct connection undermines the central argument in the indictment, and shows that no attempt was made to conceal the relationship between them through the defendant.
37. In addition, the defense points to a profound lack of evidence with regard to the transfer of concrete information or specific requests by Ganor to Sharan through the defendant. Moreover, no accounting or banking evidence was presented to show that the funds transferred from Ganor to companies owned by the defendant and his partner, Nati Mor, ultimately reached Sharan's hands.  The defense emphasizes that the accuser's claim that the "lion's share" of the money was transferred to Sharan remains suspended, without any basis in the evidence or in the financial statements.
38. The defense claims that the defendant provided Ganor with legitimate truthful services as a communications and strategy consultant, in accordance with accepted practice in the industry. These services, which included meetings, conversations, and attempts to promote various ventures, were reasonably priced and in line with the scope of activity of other consultants employed by Ganor at the time.  According to her, the accuser improperly overturned the burden of proof by requiring the defendant to prove every minute of work, while the very provision of the services was supported by clear evidence and Ganor's own testimony.
39. As part of the petty arguments, the defense petitions to invalidate the defendant's confessions to the police, clarifying that these were false confessions that were extracted from him under extreme and unusual pressure. It was claimed that the interrogators took improper measures, deprived the defendant of the right to real consultation in real time, and implanted in his mouth with surgical precision the version they wanted.  The defendant acted out of a sense of complete helplessness and a strong desire to end the threatening experience of detention, and therefore no independent evidentiary weight should be attributed to his confessions.
40. Similarly, the defense attacks the credibility of the state's witness, Ganor, and notes that he gave a variety of contradictory versions and alternative scenarios, some of which do not establish a basis for the offense of bribery at all. When it became clear that Ganor retracted his version as a state witness, the defense argues that one scenario cannot be preferred over the other, and therefore the defendant should be acquitted because of the clear doubt that arises from these versions.
41. The defense further emphasizes that the accuser completely failed to prove Sharan's status as a public servant during the relevant periods, and in particular when he served as the secretary of EAPC. It was also argued that the exact date of the termination of Sharan's employment in the Prime Minister's Office was not properly proven in the course of the prosecution's case, which severely harmed the defendant's ability to defend himself in real time.  The accuser's decision not to bring Sharan himself - who is the alleged "biased side" - as well as other substantive witnesses to testify, lies before it and establishes a serious investigative and evidentiary failure that justifies the acquittal of the accused.

Summary of the Arenas of Dispute

42. The arena of dispute between the parties in this case is broad and branches over a number of core factual and legal issues, relating both to the nature of the transfers of funds and to the integrity of the investigation process. The accuser bases the indictment thesis on the claim that the defendant served as a "conduit" for the transfer of bribe money from Ganor to public servant Sharan, under the guise of fictitious consulting services.  On the other hand, the defense denies this criminal interpretation and presents an alternative positive version, according to which the defendant provided Ganor with legitimate truthful services.
43. The first and central dispute relates to the nature and circumstances of the payments that were transferred from Ganor to the defendant and from the defendant to Sharan. According to the prosecution, on November 12, 2014, Ganor transferred to the defendant a payment in the sum of ILS 35, 400, and on August 11, 2016, an additional payment in the sum of ILS 58, 500.  It was claimed that these payments were allegedly transferred for a service performed by the defendant to Ganor as a communications consultant, but in practice, the defendant did not provide Ganor with any service and did not perform any work for him.  30
44. According to the prosecution, these payments constitute bribe payments that Ganor paid to Sharan for actions taken by the latter in the framework of his public duties in order to promote Ganor's business, and the defendant, in his capacity as a bribe broker, received them in order to transfer them to Sharan.
45. On the other hand, according to the defense, the basis of the payments that were transferred from Ganor to the defendant was actual work performed by the defendant on behalf of Ganor, in the framework of a legitimate business relationship in which he served as a communications consultant. It was claimed that the defendant performed actual work for Ganor, inter alia, regarding the ammonia tender and holding work meetings with him, as is customary in the field of media consulting and in accordance with Ganor's engagement patterns with his other consultants.
46. In this context, there is a dispute involving the transfer of the funds, and deals with the circumstances of their transfer from the defendant to Sharan. Although there is no dispute about the actual transfer of the funds from the defendant to Sharan, the dispute focuses on the scope of the sums transferred and the reason for their transfer.  According to the prosecution, the transfers of funds to Sharan were made in close accordance with the sums received by the defendant from Ganor, and in a cumulative scope of tens of thousands of shekels (ILS 93, 900).

It was claimed that these funds, which the defendant transferred to Sharan, originated from payments he received from Sharan and were intended to reach Sharan for actions that the latter performed in the framework of his public duties to promote Ganor's business, and hence the defendant acted as an intermediary for bribery.  On the other hand, according to the defense, Sharan presented Ganor to the defendant as a potential customer who needed his professional services.  As a token of gratitude for this acquaintance, which contained significant business potential, the defendant transferred to Sharan a sum of only a few thousand shekels, on a one-time social occasion, without any connection to the payments he received from Ganor for his work.

47. The second dispute concerns Sharan's status as a "public servant" on the dates relevant to the indictment. According to the prosecution, in his positions in the Ministry of Finance and the Prime Minister's Office, Sharan served as a public servant as defined in section 3424 of the Penal Law, and in his position at EAPC, he served as a public servant under section 290 of the Penal Law.  In addition, it was argued that from September 2014, when Sharan was a candidate for the position of director of the Prime Minister's Office, until his actual appointment, he was defined as a "public servant" by virtue of being a candidate, according to section 3424 of the Penal Law.

On the other hand, according to the defense, although there is no dispute that Sharan fulfilled the duties, he did not hold the status of a "public servant" as the state claims, and the state even failed to prove the exact dates of his employment.  The defense argues that during the period of his employment at EAPC, Ran was not considered a public servant, since EAPC was not a government company, and that he began his actual employment in the Prime Minister's Office only after the date of the second payment on August 11, 2016.

48. The third dispute revolves around the admissibility and weight of the defendant's confessions in his police interrogations, which were discussed in the framework of a mini-trial. The accuser claims that the defendant's confession was given freely and voluntarily, as he was represented and after consulting with his lawyer, and therefore it constitutes coherent and reliable evidence that reflects the truth.  On the other hand, the defense petitions to invalidate the confessions or to attribute zero weight to them, claiming that they were extracted by improper means of "seduction and deception", while exerting heavy emotional and financial pressure and false promises to be released from detention.
49. The fourth dispute focuses on the credibility of the state's witness, Miki Ganor's version. The accuser believes that Ganor's statements to the police are coherent, authentic, and backed by external and actual evidence of assistance, and that his retraction of his version on the witness stand does not impair the credibility of his original statements to the police.  On the other hand, the defense claims that Ganor is an unreliable witness who gave a variety of contradictory versions, acted out of a clear personal interest to extricate himself from punishment, and recited a "fabricated story" that was filmed by his interrogators.

In the context of the state's witness's version, a dispute arose at a later stage of the proceeding, regarding the issue of the "new figure", according to which Sharan officially terminated his employment in the Prime Minister's Office only on September 26, 2016.  The accuser claims that this is a simple technical fact that confirms that at the time of the payment of the second gift, Sharan was a full-fledged public servant, and that this figure does not harm the defendant's defense.  On the other hand, the defense sees this as a material fact that indicates a serious investigative failure, revealing that the investigators made a mistaken assumption in Ganor's mouth that Sharan had already terminated his position in August 2016, which severely harmed the defendant's ability to defend himself in real time.

Discussion and Decision

50. The indictment, whether it is decided for acquittal or conviction, is based on two main pillars: the defendant's statements and testimony, and the weight that should be attributed to Ganor's version, which constitutes support for the defendant's version in the parts in which he confessed to the police. If it is found that the defendant's confessions should be invalidated, there will be room to order his acquittal.  Similarly, if it is determined that no weight should be given to Ganor's statements, then no support will be found for the defendant's confession, and even then there will be room to order his acquittal.
51. On the other hand, to the extent that the defendant's interrogations are not invalidated and it is determined that Ganor's version should be accepted as one that clarifies and explains the objectified evidence, I will be required to move on to the next stage. At this stage, I will examine the defense's arguments regarding the existence of the elements of the offense.  Therefore, I will first examine the admissibility of the defendant's statements, and then I will turn to examining the weight of Ganor's statements.

The Admissibility and Weight of the Defendant's Confession to the Police - A Hearing on the Minor Claims

52. The focus of the hearing is the defendant's argument that his confessions given to the police should be invalidated, or that they should be given zero weight. The defendant raises a long series of trivial holistic claims, according to which his confession is a "false confession" that was born out of improper pressure and inadequate interrogation methods.  According to him, the interrogators used "tricks and unfair actions during his interrogations, seduction and deception, " which deprived him of his free will.
53. The defendant complains, first, about the manner in which his arrest was carried out at Ben Gurion Airport - an event that he described in his language as someone who was "picked up at the airport." According to him, the unfair interrogation operations began even before his arrest, and continued by "presenting a very partial picture to the court that heard the proceedings, in order to use the arrest tool as leverage to pressure the defendant." The defense further argues that his arrest and bringing him to the police station were mainly intended to create an aggressive and illegal pressure mechanism.
54. In addition, the defendant complains about "interrogation in the vehicle and the 'smearing' of the consultation in a technical and substantive manner, " which took place immediately after his arrest on the way to the interrogation facility. According to him, his constitutional right to consult with a lawyer was severely and sophisticatedly violated, and among other things, there was an improper event of "holding a conversation with the lawyer over the loudspeaker in the presence of the interrogators." These actions were intended, according to his version, to crack his walls of defense and leave him without a real ability to defend himself.
55. The defendant further claims that "unacceptable use was made of unusual asset freeze orders and exploitation as leverage." The defense details that the police investigators "used the seizure order of bank accounts as a mechanism to exert pressure, " in order to restrict his economic steps and increase the distress in which he was imposed. These mechanisms, according to her, were used with the stated purpose of breaking his spirit and extracting from him a confession of offenses he had not committed.
56. At the heart of the "seduction and indoctrination" argument is the claim that the suspect was given "various promises and the instruction given to the defendant during his interrogation that in exchange for a confession he would be released from detention." The defense attorney emphasizes that in his initial interrogations "he was promised that if he said certain things, he would be released from detention and that he would no longer be needed." According to the defendant, the defendant developed a strong hope that his cooperation would lead to a quick end to the difficult "detention experience."
57. The defendant points to abusive and dismissive behavior on the part of the interrogation team, which sought to weaken his mental stamina. In this context, he mentions the interrogators' statement that after a few days in detention, the suspect will be "buttered" - a statement that reflects, in his view, their intention to make improper use of the detention tool as a tool for exerting pressure.  This attitude, which combines "disrespectful and disrespectful interrogators' discourse, " has led to serious harm to his dignity and his ability to make free choice.
58. Another claim relates to "illegal penetration of the phone - a parade of shame, snooping, conditioning a confession and extortion with threats." The defendant claims that the interrogators searched his mobile phone while exerting heavy pressure, and told him that "the matter is in his hands and he will decide whether they will continue to snoop on his phone or confess and not snoop on him." According to him, this is behavior that constitutes extortion by threats and a fatal violation of the individual's autonomy and privacy.
59. In terms of the weight of the confession, the defendant claims that the details of the confession were learned directly from the interrogators during what he called the "gap calls." According to him, "the interrogators pressured Lieber to confess to very specific details that they gave him, " and dictated the version to him in order to fit the state's witness's version. Therefore, these conversations undermine the foundations of the criminal investigation, since the interrogator tells the interrogee what he must say in order for it to be considered a confession.
60. In summary, the defendant wishes to determine that the accumulation of these unacceptable actions forms a "holistic minority", which shows that from the moment he was arrested, the pressure to please his interrogators increased. This was a heavy psychological pressure that led to a false "false confession", which was given contrary to the advice of his lawyer and only out of "a desire for the nightmare to end".  Therefore, the defense petitions to disqualify these statements or to attribute zero weight to their content.

Legal Framework - Admissibility of the Defendant's Confession

61. Israeli law has outlined two possible tracks for examining the question of the admissibility of defendants' confessions: The first track is the statutory track set forth in section 12 of the Evidence Ordinance. This section states that testimony about a defendant's confession will be admissible only where the prosecutor brought testimony regarding the circumstances of the confession, and the court considered that the confession was free and voluntary.  The burden of proof that the confession was free and voluntary rests with the prosecution, and it is sufficient for the defendant to cast doubt on this matter, in order for the court to invalidate the confession.  The purpose of this section is to correct the injustice done to the defendant by granting relief.
62. The second track was established in the doctrine of judicial disqualification formulated in criminal appeal 5121/98 Issacharov v. Military Prosecutor, 66(1) 461 (2006) (hereinafter: the Issacharov Rule), which was enshrined in section 56A(a) of the Evidence Ordinance.  This track gives the court the discretion to invalidate a confession if it finds that it was obtained unlawfully, and that its acceptance will substantially impair the defendant's right to a fair trial that is not in accordance with the boundary clause.  This rule is forward-looking and its purpose is to prevent further harm to the defendant and the integrity of the criminal proceeding.
63. I will note that in certain cases, the court can order the disqualification of a defendant's confession in accordance with the two tracks described above. See, for example, the Supreme Court's ruling in Criminal Appeal 1301/06 Estate of the late Yoni Elzam v.  State of Israel (June 22, 2009), where the Honorable Justice Hayut ruled (as she was described at the time) that the defendant's confession should be invalidated both in accordance with section 12 of the Evidence Ordinance, and according to the doctrine of judicial invalidation - "The invalidation of Elzam's confessions is necessary in the circumstances of the case also in accordance with the provision of section 12 to the Evidence Ordinance, as the meaning and interpretation given to this provision in case law as a provision invalidating the confession of an interrogee if he was subjected to improper "external pressure" that would have deprived him of his ability to freely choose between giving a confession and exercising the right to remain silent and the privilege against self-incrimination (see: Issacharov, para.  23; Dadon, paragraph 18(3)).  This result is particularly good in view of the emphasis placed in this context according to the Issacharov rule on the infringement of the autonomy of free will in such a way that the question of whether the things that were given are true or not is no longer the only question that decides the scales in this context (ibid., paragraph 34)."
64. The defendant's claim that he wishes to invalidate his confessions given to the police and alternatively to give them zero weight. The defendant raises a long series of trivial holistic claims, according to which his confession is a "false confession" born out of improper pressure and inadequate interrogation methods.  According to him, the interrogators used "tricks and unfair actions during his interrogations, seducing and deceiving him, " which negated his free will.
65. The defendant first complains about the manner in which his arrest was carried out at Ben Gurion Airport, an event that he described in his language as someone who was "picked up at the airport." According to him, the unfair interrogation activities began even before his arrest, and continued by way of "presenting a very partial picture to the court that heard the proceedings, in order to use the arrest tool as leverage to pressure the defendant." The defense argues that his arrest and bringing him into custody were mainly intended to create an aggressive and illegal pressure mechanism.
66. In addition, the defendant complains about "interrogation in the vehicle and the 'smearing' of the consultation in a technical and substantive manner", which took place immediately after his arrest on the way to the interrogation facility. According to him, his constitutional right to consult a lawyer was severely and sophisticatedly violated, and among other things, there was an improper incident of "holding a conversation with the lawyer over the loudspeaker in the presence of the interrogators".  According to his version, these actions were intended to crack his walls of defense and leave him without a real ability to defend himself.
67. The defendant further claims that "improper use was made of unusual asset freeze orders and exploitation as leverage." The defense specifies that the police investigators made "use of the seizure order of bank accounts as a mechanism for exerting pressure" in order to restrict his economic steps and increase the distress in which he was imprisoned. These mechanisms were used with the stated purpose of breaking his spirit and extracting from him a confession of offenses he did not commit.
68. At the core of the "seduction and indoctrination" argument is the claim that the defendant was given "various promises and the instruction given to the defendant during his interrogation that in exchange for a confession he would be released from detention." The defense attorney emphasizes that in his initial interrogations "he was promised that if he said certain things, he would be released from detention and that he would no longer be needed." The defendant developed a strong hope that his cooperation would lead to a quick end to the difficult "experience of detention."
69. The defendant points to abusive and contemptuous behavior on the part of the interrogation team, which sought to weaken his mental stamina. In this context, he mentions the interrogators' statement that after a few days in detention the suspect will be "buttered, " a statement that reflects, in his view, their intention to make improper use of the detention tool as a tool for exerting pressure.  This attitude, which combines "the interrogators' discourse is disrespectful and disrespectful, " has led to serious harm to his dignity and his ability to make free choice.
70. Another claim relates to "illegal penetration of the phone - a parade of shame, snooping, conditioning a confession and extortion with threats." The defendant claims that the interrogators searched his mobile phone while exerting heavy pressure, and told him that "the matter is in his hands and he will decide whether they will continue to snoop on his phone or confess and not snoop on him." According to him, this is behavior that constitutes extortion by threats and a fatal violation of the individual's autonomy and privacy.
71. In terms of the weight of the confession, the defendant claims that the details of the confession were learned directly from the interrogators during what he called the "gap calls." According to him, "the interrogators pressured Lieber to confess to very specific details that they gave him, " and dictated the version to him in order to fit the state's witness's version. Therefore, "these conversations undermine the basis of the criminal investigation...  when the interrogator tells the interrogee what he needs to say in order for it to be considered a confession to him."
72. In summary, the defendant wishes to determine that the accumulation of these undesirable actions forms a "holistic minority" that from the moment he was arrested, the pressure to please his interrogators increased. This is a heavy psychological pressure that led to a false "false confession", which was given against the advice of his lawyer and only out of a "desire for the nightmare to end".  Therefore, the defense petitions to disqualify these statements or to give zero weight to their content.

The alleged improper investigators' actions

Arrest of the defendant at the airport

73. In his testimony in court, the defendant described his arrest at the airport as a traumatic moment. He said, "I was in a taxi on my way to the airport to go to the United States, and the taxi stopped for me...  It was just like an episode of Fauda.  They opened the doors, pulled out the detectives and searched me.  They told me I was accused of all kinds of things.  At first I thought it was a mistake and that someone else was looking for me.  I was really doing it in my pants.  They handcuffed me, put me in the car, where I met Mr. Farjon, who told me that I was suspected of bribery.  I didn't understand what he was and wanted from me.  I was shocked" (Transcript, at p.  661, paras.  10-14).
74. According to the prosecution, the defendant's arrest at the airport does not constitute a defect in the conduct of the investigators. It was argued that the transition to an open interrogation of suspects involves surprising them, in order to avoid disrupting the interrogation proceedings.  The prosecution referred in its arguments to the testimony of Investigator Kanner, according to which as soon as it was clear that the defendant, together with Nati Mor, was supposed to be interrogated as part of the open interrogation, they were included in the report at Ben Gurion Airport and arrested at the airport (Transcript, at p.  269).
75. Moreover, the defendant confirmed in his cross-examination that it was the surprise of the arrest at the airport that caused his subjective feeling that it was an aggressive arrest (Protocol, at pp. 783-784).  In addition, he did not claim that any aggressive or physical means were used against him.  It was further claimed that, as the recording shows, the meeting with Interrogator Farjun was respectful and polite.
76. There is no doubt that the experience of arrest is not a simple one, and certainly when we are dealing with a normative person, without a criminal record, and this is his first encounter with the law enforcement authorities as a suspect. However, I did not see fit to accept the defense's argument that the arrest was made in an aggressive or unusual manner that amounts to a violation of the defendant's basic rights, and in my opinion, the arrest of the defendant at the airport constitutes a legitimate investigative act.  The defense did not raise claims regarding the use of physical or violent means against him, and beyond the description of the defendant's personal experience, no evidence was brought that testifies to improper acts by the interrogators at the time of the arrest.

Questioning of the Defendant in the Car

77. On September 2, 2017, at approximately 9:40 P.M., upon the defendant's arrival at the airport, he was arrested by detectives who were joined by Interrogator Farjun. The defendant was brought from the airport to the interrogation facility at Lahav 433.  Investigator Farjun was carrying a recording device, and his conversation with the defendant from the beginning of the initial meeting until they arrived at the interrogation room (inclusive) was fully documented (P/1A).
78. The interrogator warned the defendant about the various offenses, explained to him the suspicions attributed to him, as well as his right to remain silent and consult with a lawyer (P/1A, at p. 1, paras.  9-18).  Afterwards, Investigator Farjun began to ask the defendant, during the car ride, questions about his acquaintance with Ganor and the relationship between them.
79. According to the defense, at the time of his arrest, the defendant felt helpless, following the traumatic arrest he underwent at the airport. It was argued that although the defendant was formally warned at the time of his arrest and was given the right to counsel, in practice he could not exercise the time he was interrogated and asked substantive questions during the ride in the car, relating to his acquaintance with Ganor and the services he provided him.  According to the defense, the interrogators abused their legitimate authority to arrest a person in order to ask the defendant substantive questions before consulting with a lawyer, while claiming that they saw the lawyer as a factor that prevented them from backing up the statement in its entirety.
80. Thus, for example, it was claimed that during the trip, Investigator Farjun explained to Lieber - according to the defense method "before he was given the operative right to consult with an attorney" (Defense Summaries, at p. 121) - that this was a complex case and that his part in it was substantial.  It was further claimed that the defendant asked several times to consult with a lawyer, but the interrogator continued to ask him questions in the car.
81. The defendant was asked in his main interrogation about his feelings in the police car and in the first interrogation as a whole, and testified as follows: "The feeling in the car was that they didn't care what I said. Nothing of what was said there was meaningless, nothing.  They knew what they wanted me to say.  There was no meaning to a single word that I said.  That's the thing that sat in my head the most.  With all these faudas and all these things, it's sixty percent null and void compared to the feeling that no matter what you say and say, it won't help you.  They came to catch me and I'll tell them what they wanted, from the first hour that's what happened there.  It's a very difficult feeling" (Transcript, at p.  661, paras.  16-20).
82. According to the prosecution, Investigator Farjun warned the defendant in accordance with the law and stated to him his right to remain silent and consult with a lawyer, and only afterwards began to question him. After a few minutes and a few questions, the defendant asked to stop the interrogation in the car and continue in the interrogation room, and Investigator Farjun granted his request.  It was claimed that most of the ride passed in silence, as can be seen from the recording of the ride (P/1A).
83. It was further argued that as Investigator Farjun testified in court, the trip was an integral part of the interrogation, and according to him, the defendant also understood when he asked to continue the interrogation in the interrogation room. The prosecution referred in addition to the testimony of Investigator Kanner, who referred to a police vehicle as a police facility (Protocol, at p.  259).  It was argued that the defendant did not ask to consult with his lawyer during the trip, and if he had requested this, he could have called him from the vehicle or chose not to answer questions until he was consulted.
84. The question that arises in this case is what is the status of the investigation conducted in the police car? First, a police car does not constitute a "police station" as defined by law. Therefore, the interrogation of a suspect within it constitutes an investigation outside the station, which is permitted only when there is an urgent or practical need and subject to defined documentation obligations.  A decision to conduct an investigation outside the station and its reasoning must be documented in writing as close as possible to the date of its receipt (see section 3 of the Criminal Procedure Law (Interrogation of Suspects), 576-2002).
85. The definition of a "police station" in the law specifies permanent physical places, such as a police station, a police detention center, or places located in a national, district, regional, and similar police headquarters, where a police unit operates and is supervised by a police officer. A police car is not included in this definition, and therefore it applies to any place that is located "outside the station" (see section 1 of the Criminal Procedure Order (Arrest and Search) (Determination of Police Stations), 5736-1976).
86. In the framework of the detention of a suspect or witness in the field, a police officer is authorized to interrogate or question the person "at the place of his whereabouts" (which includes the scene of the incident or the patrol car). However, this authority is limited to preliminary questioning and clarification of details, and to the extent that the person cannot be interrogated at the place of his whereabouts or the identification is insufficient, the authority arises to require him to accompany him to the police station (see section 67 of the Criminal Procedure Law (Enforcement Powers - Arrests), 5756-1996; see also: Assaf Harduf, Criminal Procedure, Part I, Types of Actions Underlying Police Detention).
87. If an interrogation of a suspect is carried out outside the station (including in a police car), strict documentation obligations apply to it. An interrogation outside the station will be documented in visual, audio, or written documentation.  If the investigation is an offense punishable by ten years in prison or more, the suspect is obligated to present the interrogation documentation at the police station as soon as possible for his approval, and this proceeding must be documented in visual or audio documentation (see sections 9 and 11 of the Criminal Procedure Law (Interrogation of Suspects), 5762-2002).
88. In summary, a police car does not have the status of a "police station" for the purpose of conducting an investigation. An interrogation or questioning carried out in a police car is legally considered an "investigation outside the station".  Such an investigation is permitted only when there is an urgent or practical need, and it is subject to the obligation to document in writing, by voice or video, alongside the obligation to give a written explanation by the officer or police officer in charge of its very existence outside the walls of the station.
89. In the present case, according to the documents in the file, no written authorization was given by the officer in charge of the interrogation of the defendant, Tzachi Lieber, in the police car upon his arrest. Investigator Shlomi Farjun testified that the interrogation in the vehicle was his initiative and that no explicit written authorization was given to it (see transcript of January 8, 2023, at p.  62, para.  27, and also at p.  89, para.  25).
90. In addition, the Investigation Officer, Superintendent Uri Kaner, confirmed in his testimony that in this case the question of the interrogation in the patrol car was "not approved in writing" (see transcript of January 19, 2023, at p. 292, paras.  29 ff.).  Kanner noted that he did not recall seeing written permission to interrogate the defendant in the patrol car, and that he did not even instruct Investigator Farjun to do so.
91. In the accuser's summaries it was noted that to the extent that there was a defect in the interrogation process in the patrol car, its source was not in its very existence, but in the "documentation of the procedural approval" (the accuser's summaries, at p. 36, paragraph 259).  Therefore, there is no written confirmation in the file that can be referred to, since it was clarified that such approval was not given in writing.
92. I find it possible to determine that there was indeed a defect in the police car during the interrogation. However, this is not a theoretical discussion, and the question that needs to be decided is the extent to which this defect led the defendant to confess to things he did not do at that time.  According to the accuser's summaries, from the first moment the defendant demonstrated control and caution, refused to be interrogated in the car or answer certain questions before consulting with a lawyer, and rejected the basic claim that he had made payments to Sharan.  I heard the footage and perused the transcript, which shows that the defendant was indeed careful and did not appear to have given any incriminating details in the course of the interrogation carried out in the vehicle.  "No, then you know I don't want to (an unclear word), tell me yes, you told me in the car like that and I'll tell you, listen, I was nervous, you asked like that, I said that, I don't want it to be" (P/1A, page 4, line 10 onwards).  Later on, the defendant clarified that he preferred not to answer without consulting beforehand.
93. The defendant maintained this line and did not provide incriminating details during the ride in the car, even though he testified that he felt very threatened and uncomfortable because of the situation. I did not see fit to accept the argument that interrogating the defendant while driving in the car amounted to a disproportionate violation of his rights.  It appears that the feelings described by the defendant stemmed solely from his internal distress, in view of his arrest, which constituted a complex event for him, and not from the actions of Investigator Farjun during the interrogation in the car.
94. From listening to the recording of the interrogation in the car (P/1A), it appears that from the moment of the arrest until the arrival at the interrogation room, about 23 minutes passed, during which Interrogator Farjun approached the defendant in a respectful and non-aggressive manner. Interrogator Farjun explained to the defendant his right to consult with a lawyer and did not prevent him from doing so.  When the interrogator asked the defendant if he had worked with Mickey for a period of time, the defendant replied, "What are we going to do now while standing in the yard?" and the interrogator replied, "No problem, whatever you want, what you feel comfortable" (P/1A, at p.  2, para.  30).
95. In the car, the interrogator continued to ask the defendant how long he had known Ganor, how they met and who knew each other, and all in a calm manner. The defendant asked not to conduct the interrogation in this way, but "in an orderly manner, " and the interrogator replied to the defendant that there was only one truth, and that he knew exactly why he was here.  The defendant stated that he understood that he was being interrogated about the services he had given Ganor, and the interrogator told him: "Services that you claim you gave him, unless you say otherwise" (P/1A, at p.  4, paras.  27-33).  This is more or less the end of the interrogation in the car, after about 2:30 P.M.  From there, it appears that the interrogator and the defendant made their way to the interrogation room, when the interrogator stopped asking the defendant questions.
96. The interrogator's statement, to which the defense referred, that "this is a complex case" and that the defendant's role is "substantial", does not infringe on the defendant's right to counsel, but rather the opposite. It is reasonable to assume that such a statement will actually strengthen the defendant's perception that due to the seriousness of the incident, he must exercise his right to contact an attorney, and it certainly does not distance him from doing so.  If the interrogators had downplayed the significance of the arrest and painted a picture according to which the defendant had nothing to fear and that this was a minor case in which there was no need for consultation, this argument would have been accepted, but this is not the case in our case.
97. Since the defendant, in the course of that conversation, did not say anything that would incriminate himself or testify to a particular version that he was about to take, the defendant took the utmost caution. Therefore, the fact that the interrogator asked material questions relating to the body of the investigation during the ride in the car does not constitute the use of an improper means.  On the basis of the aforesaid, I did not see fit to determine that the interrogation of the defendant in the car constitutes an improper measure, or a means that violated the defendant's freedom of choice.

Violation of the right to consultation

98. The defense's argument regarding the violation of the right to counsel relates to two interrogations. During the interrogation on September 2, 2017, despite the defendant's requests to consult with a lawyer in the car and in the interrogation room, the interrogators did not stop interrogating him, while deceitfully trying to dissuade him from exercising his right.  The defense referred to the interrogator's statement after the defendant asked to consult with a lawyer: "This is your decision, you want us to talk to your lawyer, they will talk to the lawyer, you want us to start and how you feel" (P/1A, at p.  8, paras.  17-28).
99. In another case, it was claimed that the interrogator told the defendant to call his lawyer, but continued to present him with substantive questions to the body of the investigation (P/1A, at p. 8, paras.  30 ff.).  Later, the defendant spoke with his lawyer, Adv. Cohen, via loudspeaker, while Interrogator Farjun listened to the conversation (the defense has a separate argument regarding this conversation, which will be discussed later).  It was argued that at the end of the conversation, the interrogator increased the pressure on the defendant and continued to ask him many questions regarding the relationship between him and Ganor and Sharan (defense summaries at p.  121).
100. It was further argued that while the defendant asked to wait for his lawyer, the interrogators tried to coax him to answer their questions even before the meeting (defense summaries at p. 121, referring to A/1A, at p.  34, para.  4).  It was also argued that even after the defendant returned and asked to consult with a lawyer, the interrogation continued until the representative arrived.  Ultimately, the defendant went out for counseling only after he had been interrogated for an hour and fifty minutes (the defense summaries at p.  122).
101. Thus it was argued in the defense summaries: "... Lieber was asked questions directly to the body of the investigation for a long time, without being given an opportunity to consult with a lawyer and while the interrogators knew how the lawyer advised Lieber to conduct himself until he arrived" (Defense Briefs, at p.  121).
102. During the interrogation on September 4, 2017, the defendant asked to consult with his lawyer, Attorney Yair Regev, and requested that until he arrived, the interrogation would focus on Ganor. It was claimed that Interrogator Kanner replied that the interrogators would ask as they chose, and that the defendant would be entitled to remain silent.  According to the defense, in a certain sense, Interrogator Kanner forced the defendant to maintain his right to remain silent so that the matter would be recorded in the transcript (the defense summaries at p.  122, referring to L/3A, at p.  114, paras.  17 ff.).  The defense believes that the interrogators saw the lawyer as a factor preventing them from backing up the statement in its entirety.
103. It was argued that the interrogators' conduct in these interrogations was improper and shows that they violated the right to consult and viewed it as a purely technical act. According to the defense, even after the defendant asked to consult with his lawyer, the interrogators did not stop interrogating him and gave him advice on how to end the interrogation as soon as possible.  His interrogation on core issues, while the interrogators relied on the fact that he could have remained silent (after hearing the lawyer's advice), constitutes improper conduct.
104. On the other hand, according to the prosecution's approach, the interrogator has the right to interrogate and the interrogee has the right to remain silent. Whether or not the conversation with the lawyer took place privately, where the interrogee is aware of his rights and chooses not to maintain the right to remain silent, the interrogator has the opportunity to continue interrogating him.  In addition, it was argued that throughout the interrogation and at each stage, the defendant was given the opportunity to consult with his attorneys privately and privately, and that the defendant was aware of his rights and when he wanted to wait for his lawyer, he knew how to do so (the prosecution summaries, referring to A/1A, at p.  33).
105. The interrogation video dated September 2, 2017 (P/1B) documents the defendant from the moment he arrived at the interrogation room together with Interrogator Farjon. The defendant asked the interrogator to explain to him again the status in which he was, and the interrogator read him the list of suspicions once more.  The interrogator explained to the defendant that he had been interrogated with a warning, that this was not an open testimony, but rather a criminal case, and that he had his rights as he had been told earlier, and the defendant, for his part, confirmed: "Lawyer, blah blah blah" (P/1B, at p.  1, s.  26).  In doing so, the defendant showed an understanding of his right to consult with an attorney and his status as a suspect in the interrogation (P/1B, p.  2, s.  3).
106. It seems to me that the defense's argument, according to which the interrogator deceitfully tried to get the defendant to waive the right to counsel, exaggerates what happened in the interrogation room. A view of the interrogation recording (P/1B) shows that the defendant asked the interrogator if in similar cases of interrogation with a warning, interrogees usually contact a lawyer, and noted that he had a good friend who was a lawyer and was interested in contacting him.
107. The interrogator replied: "It's your decision, you know, you're the way you feel, each one is individual for himself" (P/1B, at pp. 21-22); and also: "Look, it's your decision, you can now, you can do it later, tell me what you feel to me and we'll do it" (P/1B, at pp.  2, paras.  27-29).  In addition, the interrogator said: "I told you that this is an interrogation with a warning with all the implications of it and it's your decision if you want us to talk to a lawyer, talk to your lawyer, you want us to start and how you feel..." (P/1B, at p.  2, paras.  9-12).  The interrogator therefore left the decision in the hands of the defendant, and even made it clear to him that if he wished to exercise his right, the interrogators would help him contact his lawyer.  From here to the allegation of an attempt to deceitfully dissuade the defendant from exercising his right - the distance is great.
108. The interrogator suggested that the defendant give him the phone number of his lawyer so that the interrogators would call him, and even allowed him to use his personal mobile phone for this purpose. Afterwards, the interrogator returned to interrogate the defendant and asked him to detail what services he had provided to Ganor.  The defendant replied: "I will give you the general background, and before that, and then a lawyer and all this nonsense as far as I am concerned" (P/1B, number 11:40).  At this stage, I am prepared to assume that the interrogator sought to exert some manipulation on the defendant in an attempt to extract information from him about his relationship with Ganor, but this is not a case of crossing boundaries, using improper means, or applying unfair pressure.  The defendant, for his part, knew how to set clear boundaries, and made it clear to the interrogator that he did not intend to answer the question in full, but only to provide "general background" before his meeting with his lawyer.  Finally, I find it necessary to reject the defense's argument that the violation of the right to counsel constitutes an improper means that can lead to the invalidation of the defendant's statements.

Holding a conversation with the lawyer on the loudspeaker in the presence of the interrogators

109. Thisdefense answer relates to two different incidents. During the interrogation on September 2, 2017, the defendant asked to speak with his lawyer, Attorney Daniel Cohen, and after Investigator Farjun tried to call him without answer, the defendant turned to the lawyer from his mobile phone.  The interrogator confirmed this but asked to place the phone next to him in order to supervise his actions, which led, according to the defense, to conducting the conversation over a loudspeaker in the presence of the interrogator listening to it.  During the conversation, the lawyer advised the defendant: "Listen, use common sense, don't make it difficult for them" (P/1A, at p.  10, para.  26), advice that was well heard by the interrogator.
110. The defense further claims that similar conduct also occurred during the interrogation on September 3, 2017, in the context of the waiver of the presence of witnesses during the search of the mobile device. According to her version, Investigator Farjun called the defendant's lawyer, and while the conversation was taking place over the loudspeaker, the interrogators demanded that the defendant consult with him in their presence.  At that point, the defendant explained to his lawyer that the interrogators were asking for his signature on a permit to search the mobile phone and asked him to clarify the implications of the matter, while the interrogators listened to the exchange and even actively intervened in the conversation.
111. According to the defense, the conversation between a lawyer and his client is confidential by its very nature, and the presence of the interrogators listening to him severely violates this confidentiality. The defense referred to the testimony of Investigator Farjun, who claimed that "this is a technical matter" (Transcript, at p.  193, para.  22), and argued that it is not within the interrogators' authority to classify the conversation as technical or substantive, especially when technical matters are also protected by attorney-client confidentiality.  According to the defense, the real impropriety lies in the fact that the interrogator made use of the advice he heard on the night of the arrest (in the interrogation of September 2, 2017) and used it as leverage to pressure the defendant during his arrest.

In addition, the defense emphasized that the investigator had presented the lawyer with a representation that the defendant was a suspect in Case 3000 - an affair with a high public and security profile - and not of specific offenses of bribery.  According to her, this presentation misled the lawyer, so that his advice to the defendant "not to make it difficult for the investigators" was in fact obtained fraudulently (defense summaries, at p.  126).

112. On the other hand, according to the accuser, there is a considerable gap between the defendant's claims of violation of the right to counsel and his actual conduct during the arrest. With regard to the interrogation of September 2, 2017, it was argued that the defendant voluntarily chose to conduct the conversation over the loudspeaker, telling the interrogator: "It's not a problem as if everything is transparent, my brother.  I put it on a loudspeaker and all that" (P/1A, at p.  10).  The defendant even chose on his own initiative to seek the advice of his lawyer in the presence of the interrogator, despite his knowledge that the purpose of the conversation was limited to his physical summons to the interrogation facility.
113. It was further claimed that the lawyer was well aware that the conversation was taking place over a loudspeaker, after he heard Investigator Farjun speaking directly to him. Although he understood that this was a large-scale affair, the lawyer did not see fit to instruct his client to wait for his arrival before answering questions.  In any event, the defendant did not give any incriminating version during this conversation, and even refrained from addressing the substantive content of the investigation in the two cases under discussion.  The accuser further noted that the defendant refrained from summoning Adv. Cohen as a witness on behalf of the defense in order to support his version.
114. The accuser referred to the testimony of Investigator Farjun, according to which the conversations made from the interrogation room were intended for technical purposes only, such as summoning the lawyer or signing a procedural signature, without going into the details of the suspicions (Protocol, at pp. 49, 193, 197).  The interrogator's intention in both cases was to regulate these administrative matters, and even the lawyers themselves did not express any reservations about the manner in which the conversations were conducted in real time.  According to her, the defendant's conduct in the interrogation on September 6, 2017 proves that he fully understood the distinction made by the interrogators between technical and confidential conversations.

In that case, the defendant asked to speak with his lawyer and clarified that this was not a matter of confidential matters, but of a purely financial matter.  The interrogators emphasized to him that he must refrain from speaking in their presence about matters that are protected by the attorney-client relationship, and when they recognized that the conversation was spilling over into substantive matters, they instructed him to move to an alternative room in order to preserve his privacy (P/6, at p.  10, paras.  316-320).

115. After examining the arguments of the parties, I found that the telephone conversations that the defendant had with his lawyers over the loudspeaker in the presence of the interrogators did not constitute an improper means of interrogation that violated the defendant's rights. I will detail my reasons for this determination below.

First Incident - Investigation of 2 September 2017

116. After the defendant asked to contact his representative, Investigator Farjun tried to call Attorney Daniel Cohen twice over the loudspeaker in the presence of the defendant, but there was no response. As a result, the defendant asked to call the lawyer from his personal mobile device, and the interrogator agreed to his request.  The defendant dialed the lawyer twice over the loudspeaker in the presence of the interrogator, but again there was no response.

Later, when the interrogator noticed that the defendant was holding the mobile phone, he asked him: "Just tell me everything you are doing before you do it" (P/1B, number 18:08), and the defendant replied: "Yes, yes, I understand the matter." At this point, the defendant leaned back in his chair and moved a little away from the interrogator.  When the interrogator asked him to place the phone near him so that he could see his actions, the defendant replied: "Everything is transparent, brother, it's also on the speaker, everything is fine" (18:20), and immediately afterwards answered the incoming call from the lawyer on the loudspeaker.

117. An analysis of the exchange shows that the defendant fully understood the boundaries that he had to set in the conversation in the presence of the interrogator. During the conversation, the defendant informed his lawyer that he was being detained at the offices of Lahav Unit 433 prior to interrogation with a warning, and asked him to come to the scene.  When the lawyer asked him, "What happened?", the defendant replied cautiously: "What happened is not on the phone, I guess right?", and the lawyer replied: "No. Not on this phone" (P/1B, number 19:07).

This dialogue proves, in my opinion, that the defendant correctly perceived the purpose of the conversation for the purpose of summoning the lawyer, and that his ability to place a confidential qualification was not impaired.  The defendant showed composure and sophistication, refrained from providing material details in the presence of the interrogator, and made it clear to the lawyer that the details would be provided in a frontal meeting at the station.

118. Moreover, the lawyer's advice given on that occasion was very general and rudimentary. When the lawyer asked, "What subject you are being interrogated on, you can't tell me, " Investigator Farjun replied directly that it was "Case 3000." In response to the defendant's question, "And in the meantime, what do you want me to do?", the lawyer made do with the general instruction: "Listen, activate Common Sense right now, don't make it difficult for them..."
119. It is evident that the lawyer also understood very well that the conversation was being conducted over the loudspeaker in the presence of the interrogator, and did not express any objection to it. After Investigator Farjun replied that the interrogation was dealing with "Case 3000, " the lawyer continued the conversation as usual and instructed his client to use common sense.  Subsequently, Investigator Farjun intervened and asked the lawyer to register his phone number in order to contact him upon his arrival at the unit.

The lawyer fully cooperated with this request, replied that he was writing down the number, and asked to know the name of the interrogator, who identified himself as "Shlomi Farjun".  This conduct shows that the lawyer acted with full awareness of the interrogator's presence and with implicit agreement to the content of the exchange at the time.

120. Another significant fact is that immediately after the end of the telephone conversation, it was the defendant himself who actively initiated the continuation of his interrogation by saying: "Well, background, yes?" (P/1B, count 20:48). The defendant chose on his own initiative to continue answering the interrogators' questions without waiting for his lawyer to physically arrive.  This fact strengthens the conclusion that the defendant's free will was not violated and that the interrogation was resumed with his full consent.

Second Incident - Investigation of 3 September 2017

121. With regard to the second incident in the interrogation on September 3, 2017, it was claimed that Investigator Farjun called the defendant's new lawyer, Attorney Yair Regev. The defendant asked to consult with him regarding the interrogators' demand to sign a waiver of the presence of witnesses during the search on his mobile device.  Attorney Regev instructed him not to sign at this stage, and advised him to wait for a frontal meeting in which he would explain to him the legal implications of the matter (P/2A, at p.  24, paras.  1 and 12), when this conversation took place over the loudspeaker in the presence of interrogators Farjun and Bat Chen Cohen.
122. I am convinced that the conversations that took place between the defendant and his attorneys over the loudspeaker and in the presence of the interrogators, both in the interrogation of September 2, 2017 and in the interrogation of September 3, 2017, do not amount to an improper means of interrogation that violate the defendant's rights. This conclusion is based on an analysis of the circumstances of the case, which show that the defendant acted out of full awareness and free will, while adhering to the boundaries of confidential discourse.  In addition, the defendant's attorneys understood in real time that the interrogators were hearing what was being said, and did not express any protest or objection to it.
123. In the interrogation on September 2, 2017, it was the defendant who chose to hold the conversation over the loudspeaker on his own initiative, telling the interrogator: "Everything is transparent, brother, it's also on the speaker, everything is fine, " and even showed caution and prevented the disclosure of material information by saying, "What happened is not on the phone." The lawyer's advice that night was very general, and he fully cooperated with Investigator Farjun, wrote down his number and asked for his name without expressing any reservations. In addition, the defendant himself initiated the continuation of the interrogation immediately after the conversation with the words: "Well, background, yes?", which indicates full autonomy of his will.
124. With regard to the incident of September 3, 2017, I am persuaded that this was purely technical advice by Attorney Yair Regev, which dealt solely with the question of signing the form waiver of the presence of witnesses. The totality of the facts shows that the defendant's autonomy of will was not violated and that his right to counsel was not thwarted in a manner that justifies the disqualification of the evidence.  Therefore, I determine that the defendant's rights were lawfully protected and reject the defense's argument for the invalidity of this investigative process.

Seduction and deception, and linking the defendant's confession to his release from detention

125. Case law indicates that the promise of a real and tangible benefit to the interrogee, such as release from detention in exchange for a confession, amounts to improper temptation and inducement. These measures violate the defendant's autonomy of free will and freedom of choice, and lead to the invalidation of the confession in accordance with section 12 of the Evidence Ordinance or by virtue of the doctrine of judicial invalidation.
126. According to the case law, seduction and intimidation are defined as the promise of a real and tangible benefit to the interrogee by a person of authority, "in return" for relinquishing his right to immunity from self-incrimination and the delivery of a confession. Such a promise constitutes an abuse of governmental powers, impairs the freedom of will of the interrogee, and raises a real fear of receiving a false confession (see: Criminal Appeal 10049/08 Rateb Abu Issa v.  State of Israel (August 23, 2012); Yaniv Vaki, The Law of Evidence (2020), Chapter 8: Rules for the Disqualification of Evidence).
127. An explicit promise or a clear hint from an interrogator that the defendant will be released from detention or released on bail if he pleads guilty, amounts to unacceptable temptation and inducement that negates freedom of will. Case law and the legal literature make it clear that a promise of release from detention disrupts the interrogee's ability to choose, as it confronts him with a difficult and cruel choice between continuing detention and confession.  Therefore, a confession made under the impression of such a promise is liable to be disqualified (see: Serious Crimes Case (Beer Sheva District) 48082-12-17 State of Israel v.  Zahi Abu Judah (August 10, 2021); Criminal Appeal 1292/06 Yahya Torek v.  State of Israel (July 20, 2009)).
128. The case law distinguishes between active and proactive temptation and persuasion on the part of the interrogators and other situations, such as internal pressure, subjective distress, or the defendant's self-expectation that his confession will yield leniency, which in the absence of an external promise does not invalidate the confession. In some rulings, the court refrained from invalidating a confession when the information regarding release was provided only as an answer to the defendant's question, and not as an active and enticing initiative by the interrogator.  However, the basic rule remains strict and stringent with regard to promises made by authority figures (see: Serious Crimes Case (Central District) 53-10-08 State of Israel v.  Meir Abuhi (June 28, 2011); Criminal Appeal 636/77 Shimon Levy v.  State of Israel (November 21, 1978)).
129. The defense argues that the interrogators made improper use of the means of detention and systematically linked the defendant's confession to his release from detention, while creating a "suggestive monologue" and a prohibited conditioning mechanism (see: Defendant's summaries, pp. 133, 134).  According to the defense, the interrogators made it clear to the defendant that his fate was in his hands and that if he confessed, "all aggressive and illegal actions" would cease, such as breaking into the phone and freezing assets.  In this context, the defense refers to statements such as "You could have finished this a long time ago and we would not have pryed on you" (P/3, p.  118, paras.  16-22) and "If you had come and told us the truth, you would not be here today" (P/3, p.  20, paras.  21-29).
130. On the other hand, the accuser responds that the defendant was not given any promise of release, but that it was made clear to him - as part of a legitimate investigative process - that cooperation that leads to the conclusion of the investigative activities is likely to make the need for continued detention obsolete (see: The accuser's summaries, p. 47, para.  350).  The accuser emphasizes that the interrogators made it clear to the defendant time and time again that the filing of an indictment against him was certain, and that the arrest serves as an essential means of interrogation and not as a punitive tool (see: the accuser's summaries, p.  28, para.  201).  It is further argued that the defendant gave his confession only three days later, and after repeatedly consulting with his lawyer, a fact that undermines the existence of a causal connection between the interrogators' statements and the confession (see: accuser's summaries, p.  47, para.  357).
131. The main evidence leading to the rejection of the defense's arguments is memorandum P/57, which was prepared by investigator Uri Kanner on September 5, 2017, and documents a preliminary meeting in the presence of the defendant's defense attorney, Adv. Yair Regev (see: Accuser's summaries, p. 22, para.  207).  The memorandum indicates that Kanner explicitly made it clear to the defendant and "Rachel, your little daughter" that cooperation does not establish entitlement to any conditions, which is not guaranteed to him, and that the question of his arrest or release of his funds does not depend on it.  The defendant even confirmed at the same time that he understood the clarification and was disappointed that he would not receive anything in return for his confession, thus ending the claim of seduction (see: Memorandum P/57; the accuser's summaries, p.  28, para.  201).
132. Additional support for this conclusion is found in the testimony of the defendant himself in the framework of his cross-examination in court (Transcript, pp. 871, 904).  In this testimony, the defendant admitted that he fully understood that he had not been promised anything, and that the expectation of immediate release from detention was only a "wishful thinking" and a subjective hope that he had developed in his heart.  He even confirmed that his decision to confess was made against the advice of his lawyer, who "did not go along with him" about the said move (Protocol, p.  904).
133. The defendant's decision to stop cooperating with his interrogators was made on September 7, 2017, immediately after the court extended his detention for an additional 6 days, contrary to his expectation of release. The defendant appeared for interrogation angry and frustrated, and expressed to his interrogators his feeling that the extension of his detention was a "blow under his belt" after he agreed to give his version.  In the transcript of his interrogation from that day (P/7), the defendant explicitly declared to interrogators Bat Chen Cohen and Shlomi Farjon: "I am not going to cooperate today" (ibid., p.  12, lines 31-32).
134. Later in the interrogation, the defendant explained his position and said: "I'm nervous, I'm frustrated, I feel like I've given everything I have, I don't have the strength now again, so I'm not cooperating" (lines 44 onwards). This decision is consistent with the accuser's summaries (dated April 2, 2024), in which it was noted that "on September 7, 2017, Lieber stopped cooperating due to the extension of his detention" (section 36.f), and that he was deeply hurt by the decision to keep him in detention (paragraph 177).  Similarly, in the defendant's summaries (p.  172), the quote that directly links the silence to the arrest is given: "The more I cooperate with you, the more you abuse me...  Today, the extension of the detention has been hallucinating" (P/7A, page 4, lines 34-39).
135. The defendant's cessation of cooperation on September 7, 2017, immediately after his detention was extended by six days, indicates that he did not rely on a government promise to release him. Despite his anger and disappointment at the extension of his detention, he did not claim at any stage that the interrogators had broken any promise or that they had been misled.  Moreover, even after he chose to maintain his right to remain silent, the defendant did not retract his incriminating version of what he had given regarding Sharan and Ganor, and did not claim that his words were the result of temptation.
136. He refrained from retracting his confession during four additional interrogations, including an interrogation that took place a week after he was released from detention and was a free person (see: P/7 of 7 September 2017; P/8 of 08 September 2017; P/9 of 11 July 2017; P/10 of 18 September 2017).
137. Moreover, on September 8, 2017, after he stopped cooperating, the defendant began to grope on his own initiative about the possibility of formulating an arrangement "as Miki Ganor arrived" (P/8A, pp. 53-55).  He also made it clear to interrogator Tzachi Ben Hamo that he was waiting for approval from his defense attorney and that he was "willing to continue talking, but not for free" (P/8A, pp.  108-109).  In my opinion, these statements prove in real time that the defendant knew very well that he had not been given any prior promise of release, and that future cooperation on his part required a new agreement.
138. After carefully examining the defense's arguments regarding seduction and deception, I found that they should be rejected in their entirety. Although the defense pointed to various statements by the interrogators that ostensibly link cooperation to release from detention, the evidence proves that the defendant was not given any governmental assurance that denied his freedom of will.  In my opinion, the analysis of the meetings and the defendant's conduct in real time undermines the argument that his confession was extracted by improper means.
139. Memorandum P/57 of September 5, 2017, which documents that the interrogator Uri Kanner, in which he made it clear to the defendant, in the presence of his defense attorney, Adv. Yair Regev, that the cooperation does not establish entitlement to any conditions and that nothing is guaranteed to him. The defendant's conduct as of September 7, 2017, when his detention was extended by an additional 6 days, also strengthens the conclusion that he was not misled by the interrogators.  These facts show that the defendant did not see his confession as a technical act that was forced upon him by temptation, but chose to use the right to remain silent as an independent tactical measure following the extension of his detention.
140. Ultimately, the defendant's initiated requests on September 8, 2017 to promote a plea bargain "as Miki Ganor came", while stating that he is "willing to continue talking, but not for free" (P/8A), seal his claims. These appeals prove in real time that the defendant fully understood that he was not entitled to any prior promise of release or benefit, and that any future cooperation on his part is subject to a new agreement that has not yet been formulated.  Therefore, I determine that there was no improper temptation or intimidation in our case, and order the rejection of the defense's petty argument in this chapter.

Disparaging discourse on the part of researchers

141. The case law indicates that disparaging, humiliating, and degrading discourse by interrogees toward an interrogee may lead to the invalidation of his confession, both by virtue of section 12 of the Evidence Ordinance (due to severe infringement of the autonomy of free will or "the image of the human person") and by virtue of the doctrine of judicial invalidation (due to a violation of the right to a fair trial). Case law and the legal literature recognize discourse characterized by humiliation, insults, and contemptuous treatment by interrogators as an improper means of interrogation, which belongs to the category of "fathers of inadmissibility." These measures are usually intended to break the spirit of the interrogee, and they violate his fundamental rights to peace of mind and dignity (see: Criminal Appeal 10477/09 Muhammad Mubarak v.  State of Israel (April 10, 2013); Criminal Appeal 6932/17 State of Israel v.  Ilan Yosef (October 11, 2018)).
142. In the framework of section 12 of the Evidence Ordinance, which requires that a confession be given "free and voluntary, " humiliating and degrading discourse is examined from two perspectives: infringement of the autonomy of free will, which constitutes a significant and severe impairment of the interrogee's ability to make choices due to the pressure and humiliation exerted on him, and harm to the "image of the human person." In the post-Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, the protection of the freedom of will and the dignity of the interrogee, constitutes an independent purpose for invalidating a confession, regardless of the question of its veracity. In extreme cases where the level of humiliation and humiliation amounts to an injury to the human image of the interrogee, the confession will be invalidated categorically (miniature and bilateral), without being required to prove how the actual treatment affected the interrogee's freedom of will (see: Criminal Appeal 4109/15 Lior Mirez v.  State of Israel (July 9, 2017)).
143. In addition to the statutory route, the use of derogatory and humiliating discourse may amount to obtaining "unlawful" evidence, i.e., by unfair means that violate a protected fundamental right. Therefore, the court has discretion to invalidate the confession by virtue of the doctrine of judicial invalidation, to the extent that its acceptance at trial would substantially impair the defendant's right to a fair criminal trial.  In this framework, the court must balance the severity of the illegality with the public interest in accepting the evidence (see: Criminal Appeal 10049/08 Rateb Abu Issa v.  State of Israel (August 23, 2012); Criminal Appeal 7090/15 Hussein Khalifa v.  State of Israel (August 25, 2016)).
144. However, the doctrine does not automatically disqualify evidence, and is based on the fundamental principle of "no harm - no disqualification" (Criminal Appeal 6359/21 State of Israel v. Alaa al-Amrani (Nevo, September 8, 2022), which instructs that in the absence of infringement of one of the defendant's basic rights, the rule of disqualification will not apply.  Therefore, the measures taken by the investigators must in fact violate a basic right of the defendant in order to lead to disqualification.
145. According to the ruling, harsh, ridiculous, and derogatory expressions by the interrogators - even if they are unacceptable or constitute an error - do not in themselves lead to the invalidation of the confession, as long as the interrogee's autonomy of free will has not been impaired. It was held that "not every deviation from the rules of the investigation and not every means used in the interrogation, even if they are not acceptable to the court, will lead to the invalidation of the evidence." (Criminal Appeal 5121/98 Column Raphael Issacharov v.  Military Prosecutor, 61(1) 461 (May 4, 2006) In order to bring about disqualification, it is required to prove that the improper measure caused significant and severe harm to the suspect's ability to choose and had a direct causal connection to the delivery of the confession.
146. The defense claims that the interrogators used humiliating, ridiculous and disparaging discourse in order to harm the defendant's dignity, break his spirit, and extract a false confession from him. In this context, the defense refers to blatant statements directed at the defendant and his accomplices, who were called, inter alia, "monkeys, " "garbage collectors, " and "crooks, " while the interrogators screamed over him while he was handcuffed by his legs.  According to the defense, this abusive conduct, which violates human dignity and human dignity, was recognized in case law as improper conduct that justifies the invalidation of the confession (Defense Summaries, p.  135).
147. The accuser, on the other hand, responds that no flaw or illegality in the interrogators' conduct was proven, and that the interrogation did not cause the defendant to be humiliated or humiliated, and in any case did not infringe on his autonomy of free will. In the testimony of interrogator Shlomi Farjun (transcript of January 8, 2023, p.  41, s.  25), it was stated that the interrogation was conducted as usual, that raising his voice in the interrogation room was a legitimate tool, and that he had never abused the interrogee.  In addition, the head of the investigation team, Uri Kanner, explained in his testimony (transcript of January 19, 2023, pp.  272, s.  18 and p.  276, s.  12 ff.) that the use of these expressions was legitimate and was intended to serve as an interrogation technique that diminishes the defendant's part in the offense, and not in order to humiliate him.
148. A view of the videos documenting the interrogation shows that in real time the defendant was not in a state of collapse or loss of control, but rather demonstrated resilience and conducted a matter-of-fact and sophisticated dialogue with the investigators. The evidence (Exhibit P/3A, at pp.  118-121) shows that the defendant knew how to cope with the pressure, did not collapse or burst into tears, and even diverted the conversation to other topics, such as the US Open championship matches.  In addition, in his cross-examination, the defendant confirmed that he maintained a "passion" and was vocal with the interrogators, and that he had spoken to them about these issues in order to make it easier for himself (transcript of July 6, 2023, pp.  844, paras.  22-31), a fact that strengthens the accuser's position that his confession was given freely and voluntarily.
149. During his cross-examination, the defendant was confronted with the claim that he had kept his voice in front of his interrogators, and explained his coping mechanism in real time: "I tell you in my inner feeling, and by the way, in my internal mechanism, as if when I talk to him about things, it's to make things easier for me..." The defendant even explicitly added in response to the statement that the interrogators did not experience him as someone who broke down: "I didn't cry on the floor, that's okay." Indeed, there is no dispute that the interrogators used harsh and disparaging expressions toward the defendant (such as "crook, " "monkey, " "garbage cans" and "garbage cans") while he was handcuffed by his legs.
150. While the defense argues that this is a serious and improper flaw that testifies to an extreme investigative process intended to break the defendant's spirit, the evidence shows a significant gap between the harsh verbal nature of the discourse and the defendant's actual behavior. The defendant maintained a "passion, " spoke with them about the U.S.  Open tournament, and even saw fit to joke with his interrogators.  I found it appropriate to reject this argument, since the investigative materials and evidence show that the blatant discourse did not harm the defendant's autonomy of free will and did not negate his ability to choose.
151. A criminal investigation by its very nature is not a pleasant process, and it is clear from the interrogation recordings that the defendant did not undergo an easy procedure and that this caused him significant discomfort. However, in order to disqualify a defendant's statements, the test is not based on the "balance of convenience" that the interrogators must provide to the interrogee, but rather on the question of whether the discomfort caused to him motivated him to give a false confession.  From watching the interrogation videos, I am convinced that the defendant's statements were given "freely and voluntarily", without any extreme improper measures being taken against him that justify their disqualification in accordance with section 12 of the Evidence Ordinance.
152. The defendant's conduct in the interrogation room stands in complete contradiction to the claim that his spirit was broken or that he experienced humiliation that negated his free will. The defendant demonstrated complete control throughout the entire interrogation, gave his versions in a calculated and selective manner only on issues he saw fit to answer, and intelligently chose when to remain silent or consult with his defense attorney.  Therefore, the conclusion is that even though the very existence of a blatant and disparaging discourse as the defendant felt and expressed during the interrogation in court, it had no real effect on the defendant's freedom of will, and does not justify the invalidation of his confessions.  In view of the above, I find it necessary to reject the argument that the defendant's confession should be invalidated according to the doctrine of judicial invalidation.

Unnecessarily aggravating suspicion

153. According to case law, a defendant's confession will be invalid if "external pressure" was exerted on him during the interrogation that denies him the ability to freely choose whether to use the immunity from self-incrimination and the right to remain silent. Unnecessarily aggravating suspicion or presenting a false and inflated representation of the severity of the offense attributed to the interrogee serves as a prohibited means of psychological pressure, which undermines the interrogee's ability to make choices (see: Criminal Appeal 5954/06 Yevgeny Serenchukov v.  State of Israel (October 13, 2010); Criminal Appeal 6359/21 State of Israel v.  Alaa Al-Amrani (08.09.2022)).
154. Case law distinguishes between legitimate interrogation tricks and missed tricks. While interrogators are permitted to use certain interrogation exercises, creating an extreme and deliberate misrepresentation of the severity of the suspicion (such as unnecessarily aggravating it in an extreme way) is considered a missed trick.  It prevents the interrogee from correctly assessing his legal situation, denies his ability to make real choices, and violates the autonomy of free will protected under section 12 ofthe Evidence Ordinance (see: Criminal Appeal 4109/15 Lior Mirez v.  State of Israel (July 9, 2017); Criminal Appeal 10049/08 Rateb Abu Issa v.  State of Israel (August 23, 2012)).
155. The use of unfair interrogation methods intended to break the spirit of the interrogee, including severe manipulation of the severity of the suspicion, is one of the "fathers of invalidity" recognized in case law. Beyond the scope of section 12 ofthe Evidence Ordinance, such conduct constitutes unlawful obtaining of evidence (by unfair means), which grants the court the authority to invalidate the confession by virtue of the doctrine of judicial invalidation (which is currently also enshrined in section 56A of the Evidence Ordinance), due to the material violation of the right to a fair trial.
156. The defense argues that during the interrogation on September 4, 2017, after the interrogators shouted at the defendant and spoke to him in a derogatory manner, and for no apparent reason, Investigator Kanner aggravated the suspicion against the defendant of bribery. The defense referred to the testimony of Investigator Kanner, who testified that he did not remember exactly on what basis he made this decision, and denied that he did so in order to exert pressure on the defendant (Transcript, at p.  364, paras.  18; 26).  It was argued that in his testimony, Investigator Kanner initially assessed that there were indications that the suspicion was aggravated, but when the defense presented to him that these statements were not true, he retracted his statement (Transcript, at p.  365, paras.  1-10).
157. According to Investigator Kanner, the indication of the aggravation of the suspicion arose before he entered the interrogation room, but when confronted with the claim that he did not allow the defendant to consult an attorney despite the new suspicion and despite the defendant's requests, he did not know how to provide answers.
158. The defense argues that if there was any indication of aggravation of the suspicion against the defendant, it was not an improper act, but the accuser did not bring evidence during the trial of the existence of any indication. In the absence of any other explanation, it was argued that this was an improper act by the interrogators.  The defense is of the opinion that a review of the interrogation film shows that unlike Investigator Kanner's testimony in court, the aggravation of suspicion was carried out spontaneously and in the interrogator's anger toward the defendant, while the interrogators emphasize to him that the new suspicion will add years to him in prison.
159. Since no indication was presented as to the reason for which the suspicion against the defendant was aggravated, the defense is of the opinion that the accuser's arguments regarding the existence of such indications should not be accepted. According to her, her claim was not contradicted and it should be determined that this was an improper investigative action.
160. According to the accuser, at the time of the interrogation, the investigators had indications of the defendant's suspicion of the offense of bribery, and therefore it was argued that the defense's argument was illogical. Investigator Kanner testified in court that he did not remember the incident exactly, but after Roanan replied that the intention might have been to bribe Sharan in exchange for information from the Cabinet, and to Hagar Sharan, who is a public servant in Amidar, in exchange for preliminary information regarding internal tenders (Transcript, at p.  369, para.  22).  As proof of this, the accuser referred in her summaries to A/3A, where Investigator Farjun referred questions to the defendant regarding his relationship with Hagar Sharan, and the information that she or Sharan allegedly conveyed, and then Investigator Kanner suspected the defendant of the offense of bribing a public servant, and warned him (P/3A, at p.  46).
161. Parallel to the interrogation of the defendant, investigative actions were carried out that exposed additional suspicions relating to his conduct with public figures, so that from the beginning of the interrogation, and certainly from September 4, 2017, the defendant was asked about a number of figures with whom he was in contact (who were not directly related to Ganor) and suspicions arose as to the nature of the relationship between them. However, the defendant decided that these figures were irrelevant to his interrogation and asked not to answer questions relating to them, even though the interrogators made it clear to him that he must answer the questions or choose the right to remain silent.  These directions of investigation did not mature into the filing of an indictment, so that the accuser did not detail in her summaries the investigative activities that were carried out at the same time, and the court could not get an impression of them.
162. According to the accuser, there was a development in the interrogation that justified the defendant's suspicion of bribery, and this can be seen from the number of interrogators who were interrogated in the warning at the same time as his interrogation, and from the fact that the defendant continued to be interrogated on these issues in most of his interrogations. This was also supported by the court's decision to extend the defendant's detention on September 7, 2017 for an additional six days.  It was further argued that the defendant's suspicion protected his rights in this context, in order for him to understand that questions relating to other public servants are most relevant to the suspicions against him.
163. According to the accuser, even if this is a misrepresentation that aggravates the suspicions against the suspect, according to the case law, this is a valid ploy that is not likely to infringe on the right of the interrogee to refrain from self-incrimination or one that harms the message of justice, in accordance with other municipal requests 4241/06 Levy v. the State of Israel, in paragraph 18 of the judgment of Judge Arbel (March 12, 2009).
164. After examining the arguments of the parties, I find it necessary to reject the argument for invalidating the confession, since the addition of the suspicion of bribery on September 4, 2017 was not arbitrary, but was based on real indications and suspicions that arose during the investigation. Investigator Kanner explained in his testimony that suspicions arose of bribes given to David Sharan for information from the Cabinet, and to Hagar Sharan for preliminary information about the Amidar tenders, as reflected in the questions addressed to defendant Bat 3A.  At the same time, other people involved in the warning were interrogated, and the court even extended the defendant's detention for six days on September 7, 2017, which indicates that the suspicions were indeed well-founded.
165. In addition, the aggravation of the suspicion and the formal warning regarding it did not infringe on the defendant's rights, but rather protected them, by enabling him to understand that the questions regarding other public servants were relevant to his interrogation, and to plan his steps accordingly. Contrary to the defense's claim that these were "the ancestors of wrongdoing" or a perverse ploy that denies freedom of choice, the warning properly clarified to him his legal situation and his right to remain silent.  Beyond that, aggravating suspicion must be an extreme action by the investigators in order to justify disqualification, and in our case this is not an extreme action, but rather a proportionate action that presented suspicion in other cases, all of which are connected to a single series that ultimately did not mature into an indictment.
166. Finally, even if the aggravation of the suspicion was considered a misrepresentation that inflates the severity of the offense, case law states that this is a valid ploy. According to the judgment in Other Municipality Applications 4241/06 Levy v.  State of Israel (para.  18), such a misrepresentation does not work against the right to refrain from self-incrimination and does not harm the line of justice.  Therefore, this conduct does not infringe on the autonomy of free will, which justifies the invalidation of the confession by virtue of section 12 ofthe Evidence Ordinance or by virtue of the doctrine of judicial invalidation.

Unlawful intrusion into the defendant's phone

167. Case law indicates that unlawful penetration of a defendant's mobile phone constitutes a serious violation of his constitutional rights. In these circumstances, the court is authorized to order the invalidation of the search products and the confessions derived from them by virtue of the doctrine of judicial invalidation, while striking a balance between the severity of the illegality and the social benefit of the receipt of the evidence.  Intrusion into a mobile phone without an explicit judicial order, in contravention of the provisions of section 23A of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Arrest and Search), amounts to a severe violation of the constitutional right to privacy and the fairness of the criminal proceeding, an infringement that does not fade even if the device itself is lawfully seized.
168. According to the Issacharov rule, which was enshrined in section 56A of the Evidence Ordinance, the court is given discretion to disqualify evidence obtained illegally, including confessions and the results of a search of the mobile phone. For this purpose, a balancing formula is applied that examines the nature and severity of the illegality, the extent of its effect on the evidence, and the balance between the harm and the benefit of receiving it.  To the extent that a defendant makes a confession in relation to an object or information seized in the course of an illegal search of his mobile phone, this confession is considered direct and proximate "derivative evidence" of the invalid search, and the disqualification of the search results directly reflects on its admissibility.
169. On the other hand, case law distinguishes between these cases and situations in which there is no causal connection between the illegality and the delivery of the confession. Insofar as the confession was made independently and detached from the illegal search - for example, when the defendant confessed of his own free will even before the interrogators examined the telephone - the confession remains legally admissible.  The defense's arguments in this regard are divided into three main circles: formal flaws, "disguise searches, " and extortion by threats.
170. In the first circle, the defense claims that the mobile phone constitutes an "institutional computer" that is protected under unique seizure arrangements, and that the search was carried out without the presence of witnesses, before evidence was exhausted, and by investigators who are not trained to do so. In the second circle, it was claimed that a "disguise search" was carried out on the device, which constitutes a blatant invasion of privacy, in which the interrogators reviewed correspondence with parties unrelated to the investigation at all, such as Yaffa Ben David, Yona Yahav, and Edna Harel.  According to the defense, the purpose of the search was to exert improper pressure on the defendant, a strategic advisor to the Ministry of Finance, whose device contains sensitive information of key people.
171. In the third circle, the defense argues that an act of "extortion by threats" was committed, when the interrogators made it clear to the defendant with explicit statements such as "You could have done this a long time ago and we would not have snooped on you, " that his confession would lead to the end of the search. This pressure, according to her, intensified from the moment the interrogators left the phone available to receive messages, which led to the defendant's young daughter calling him in the midst of the interrogation and shaking his spirit.  The accuser, on the other hand, responds that from a substantive point of view, there was no legal or procedural impediment to conducting the search before the defendant and asking him questions in real time, on the basis of a valid judicial order.
172. The accuser emphasizes that the actual search did not yield a single piece of evidence, and that the vast majority of the parties examined were figures relevant to the suspicions, such as David Sharan, Hagar Sharan, Gary Hakim and Rami Tayeb. In addition, she rejects the claim that it is an "institutional computer", and clarifies on the basis of case law that a personal phone used for work does not meet this definition.  In this context, the accuser relies on the guiding judgment in the Benizri case (Criminal Appeals Authority 536/16), according to which simply browsing the telephone for the purpose of producing information does not require a skilled computer investigator, and that this action was in accordance with the interrogation norms that were accepted at the time.
173. The interrogation materials show that the defendant gave his explicit consent to carry out the search, when the interrogator told him, "Then let's see your phone, " and he replied: "Okay, you have an order, let's enter" (P/3A, p. 53, para.  26).  In addition, the defendant's versions and his partial confession were given to the investigators even before the search of the phone began, a fact that negates the existence of a causal connection between the search and the extraction of the confession.  A view of the recording documenting the defendant at the search stage shows that his cooperation was partial, and I did not find that he volunteered new information that constitutes an invalid confession.
174. The defendant maintained full control during the interrogation, knew how to stand up for his rights, and refused to answer questions on matters unrelated to the interrogation, while demanding that his defense attorney be consulted. The testimony of investigator Bat Chen Cohen indicates that the phone was transferred from flight mode at the defendant's own request in order to locate an agreement in his email inbox, and as a result, the device was inadvertently left unavailable when his daughter dialed.  This claim of infringement of the defendant's rights, which has the power to invalidate his confession, should have been based on the fact that this did indeed shock him in real time, but a view of the recording shows that this is not the case.
175. In addition, I did not find that after the search, the defendant sought to confess and give a new incriminating version, which might have established a causal connection between the search and the grounds for disqualification. In addition, I cannot accept the argument that the defendant's telephone constitutes an "institutional computer" that is protected under special protections.  The defense based this argument on the fact that the device was used by the defendant in his work as a communications and strategy consultant, and argued that for this reason he is subject to unique seizure arrangements that do not allow consensual penetration without an explicit order.
176. According to the law and case law, a self-employed person's mobile phone used for his work is not automatically classified as an "institutional computer", unless it is proven that it is actually essential to the day-to-day operation of the business and that its seizure will lead to its paralysis. The classification as an "institutional computer" is conditional on an operational vitality test and not on the purely professional use.  According to section 32(b) of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Arrest and Search), there is indeed a special arrangement that restricts the seizure of a computer that is "used by an institution" (as defined in section 35 of the Evidence Ordinance, which includes a "business" or "occupation"), but the case law states that the mere use of the device for business purposes does not automatically turn it into an institutional computer.
177. The test for determining this status is the "test of the impairment of the routine of the institution's activity" - that is, whether the seizure of the device is liable to lead to the paralysis of the business or to severe and real damage to its routine of operations. Since the seizure of a personal telephone does not lead to the paralysis of the business, it is not covered under this definition (see: Another Appeal (Hai District) 52758-07-21 Tom Ben Harush v.  Coastal Police (01.08.2021)).  The claim that this is an institutional computer requires proof, and I have not found that the defendant based this claim on a piece of evidence, beyond raising it in his summaries.
178. The defense tried to build on the testimony of the interrogator Bat Chen Cohen and the investigator Shlomi Farjun regarding the veracity of the claim, but they returned it empty-handed. Thus, for example, in the transcript on page 414, line 1, Cohen testified that she could not confirm that the defendant's phone was an institutional computer.  The distinction that the defense is trying to make between a private device and an institutional device with regard to the need for a special order is legally incorrect, since the law establishes a sweeping prohibition on penetration of any smartphone without an explicit judicial order, regardless of its classification.
179. Section 23a(b) of the Ordinance explicitly states that no search or penetration of computer material shall be conducted except in accordance with a judge's order that explicitly states the permission to penetrate computer material and specifies its purposes and conditions. In our case, a judicial search warrant was lawfully issued on August 29, 2017, which explicitly permits seizure and penetration, "including a computer, an institutional computer and anything that embodies computer material", so that the search was lawfully permitted in any alternative (see: Miscellaneous Criminal Applications 5105/20 Yoel Yuli Shimon v.  State of Israel (May 25, 2021)).  In view of the aforesaid, I find that the defendant did not prove that his telephone constituted an "institutional computer" as defined in the law, and in the absence of proof of this and the existence of a lawful search warrant, I did not find that the defendant's rights were violated with regard to the search.
180. Finally, I found that the defendant's argument regarding the invalidity of his confession should be rejected due to the lack of a causal connection, since the defendant's versions and his partial confession were given to the interrogators even before the search on the mobile phone began. The argument of invalidity of the confession should have been formulated if the search had indeed shocked him and led to the confession, but in practice the defendant did not ask to provide his "true version" following the search, and the recording does not show such a shock.  In addition, the defendant gave his explicit consent to carry out the search when the interrogator told him, "So let's see your phone, " and he replied: "Okay, you have an order, let's go in."
181. During the search, the defendant maintained full control, knew how to stand up for his rights, and refused to answer questions on matters unrelated to the interrogation, while demanding that he consult with his lawyer. In addition, the defendant failed to prove that his phone constitutes an "institutional computer" according to the law, and the mere use of it for the purposes of his employment as a communications and strategy consultant does not automatically make him so.  Finally, in any event, a judicial search warrant was issued in the case on August 29, 2017, which explicitly permits seizure and penetration, "including a computer, an institutional computer, and anything that embodies computer material", so that the search was lawfully permitted, the defendant's rights were not violated, and there is no justification for invalidating his confession.

A conversation from the defendant's daughter during the interrogation and violations of the Wiretapping Law

182. The defense claims that during the interrogation on September 4, 2017, the defendant's mobile phone was removed from airplane mode by Investigator Farjun under the pretext of searching for an agreement. While the device was active, a surprising phone call was received from the defendant's young daughter - an event that shook his spirits and led him to believe that the police were using his daughter to extort a confession from him.  It was also claimed that the investigators examined the phone while it was not in flight mode and received many messages on it, which constitutes a violation of the Wiretapping Law, since the data was not stored on the device at the time of its seizure.  In addition, the defense adds that the interrogator Bat Chen took advantage of the difficult situation to leverage the investigation, by telling the defendant immediately after the conversation: "This is the reality, it is very unfortunate, it is frustrating, it is in your hands when to arrest her." This reference is documented in Exhibit P/3B (transcript of the defendant's interrogation dated 04 September 2017, p.  44, line 24).
183. On the other hand, the accuser claims that this was not a proactive interrogation exercise, and that Investigator Farjun categorically denied any proactive contact with the daughter or any coordination of the conversation (Transcript, p. 243, line 4 ff.).  The prosecution explains that the phone was left out of flight mode by mistake after the defendant himself asked to activate the device in order to retrieve a record of a contract from his e-mail box, and therefore there is no basis for the claim of an intention to violate the Wiretapping Law.  Regarding the statement of the interrogator Bat Chen, the prosecution clarifies that this is a routine statement that means that the interrogee has the ability to bring about an end to the unpleasant interrogation experience by providing a full version, without any connection to the conversation with the daughter.
184. In the transcript of the hearing on February 6, 2023, investigator Bat Chen Cohen testified that the phone was placed on the table when it was not in flight mode for the purpose of locating the contract in the defendant's email box. According to her, as soon as the defendant's daughter called, she immediately turned the device over and offered the defendant a glass of water out of sheer sensitivity, without taking any advantage of the situation.  Moreover, in the transcript of the hearing on July 6, 2023, the defendant himself admitted in the course of his cross-examination that his suspicions regarding the incident being a planned exercise may stem from his personal inclination to conspiracies ("For my part, it really may be that this is not true, it may be that I am conspiratorial").
185. In his testimony in court, the defendant described the phone call from his daughter as a particularly shocking event (transcript of the hearing of July 6, 2023, p. 840, line 6), noting: "This incident as far as I am concerned was a shocking event, it is an event that should not happen in a normal country...  and it was simply a terrible and terrible event." This description is also mentioned in the accuser's summaries, which relate to the fact that the defendant defined the phone call received from his daughter during his interrogation on September 4, 2017, as a "particularly shocking" event.  The defendant's statement that he would have preferred to be "blown up with blows" was made during his testimony before the court, as documented in the transcript of June 11, 2023, p.  666, line 9.  The defendant explicitly declared: "I was ready to be blown up with blows in the face, but just not to be there when my daughter called." These words were also quoted in the accuser's summaries, according to which the defendant claimed that he would have preferred to receive physical blows rather than stand in the situation he was in when he received the call from his daughter.
186. The defendant's change in attitude and his transition to giving a confessional version were reflected in the fact that on the night after that difficult interrogation (on the night of September 4, 2017), he decided in the detention cell that he was "no longer ready" and agreed to give the interrogators the version they wanted to hear in order to bring his detention to an end. On the morning of September 5, 2017, he shared with his interrogators that he had had a difficult night full of thoughts, refused to continue on the current course of investigation, and asked to consult with his father and his lawyer, Yair Regev, in order to examine "a different direction." Immediately after consulting with the lawyer, the defendant returned to the interrogation room under renewed warning and began to give a full confessional version, in which he admitted to transferring money in cash to David Sharan, in connection with his relationship with Ganor and his role in the affair.  During his interrogation on September 5, 2017, the defendant fully admitted to carrying out the actions attributed to him and completed his version regarding his defined role in the money transfer mechanism.  He admitted that he acted as a "conduit" for transferring funds from Mickey Ganor to David Sharan.  The defendant described that David Sharan explained to him that Ganor owed him money, and asked that these funds be transferred through him.
187. In addition, the defendant explained in this interrogation the motive for changing his version, and stated that he understood in retrospect that he was "a kind of pawn in the game." He elaborated that he had reached a decision according to which it would not be right on his part to "continue to bear the burden of defending the friend" (David Sharan), who knew him and Miki Ganor, asked him to carry out the aforementioned actions, and he himself led to the difficult situation in which he is now finded. In order to understand the exact course of events, it is necessary to view the documentation of the defendant's interrogation and read the transcript documenting the moment his daughter called his phone during the interrogation.
188. The following is a transcript of Yitzhak Lieber's interrogation from the interrogation file 531531/16-26 from 04.09.2017, beginning with the footage documented at 01:51:30 and ending at 01:53:52.034, which describes the receipt of the call from his daughter and the continuation of the interrogation following it.

Shlomi Farjun (Investigator 1): [01:51:30.534] Kick it out [01:51:32.078] Isn't it?