In this regard, I found to Bachar Lihi's version, according to which she did not know about the condition relating to obtaining approval in principle for a mortgage, over Sapir's version, according to which he informed her on this matter. First, the defendant and his wife admitted that they did not inform Lihi regarding the said condition. Second, it is reasonable to assume that if Sapir had indeed informed Lihi that as far as the defendant and his wife were concerned, the receipt of approval in principle for the mortgage was a condition for the signing of the agreement, Lihi would have expressed this in the conversation she had with Racheli, and made it clear to her explicitly that the completion of the transaction is contingent on the receipt of such approval in principle. Against this background, it is not surprising that Lihi was surprised by the defendant's announcement that he had decided not to sell the apartment. According to her, she was not at all aware that the receipt of approval in principle for the mortgage constituted a condition for the completion of the transaction (p. 23 of Prov. S. 35-36; ibid., p. 24 S. 1-2). I will also note that further support for this is found in the gap between Sapir's version in his affidavit and his testimony in the cross-examination: while in paragraph 16 of his affidavit he claimed, "We knew throughout the period that until the transaction was signed, there was no room to rely on anything and nothing", in his interrogation he testified that he was surprised by the defendant's announcement that he did not intend to sell the apartment on the background of the aforesaid (p. 44 of Prov. S. 31-35 and p. 45 S. 8-12).
In any event, even if I assume that Sapir did indeed inform Lihi regarding the receipt of the mortgage approval, this does not matter much in our case. This is because it has not been proven that the condition from the defendant's point of view, according to which the validity of the transaction is contingent on the receipt of mortgage approval, was brought to the attention of the plaintiff, or anyone on her behalf. In these circumstances, the question of whether Sapir informed Lihi regarding the existence of this condition, or not, has no real implications for deciding the question of the parties' discretion. My conclusion regarding the lack of discretion and specificity is based on all the reasons detailed above, and not on the issue of obtaining approval in principle for the mortgage.