I was persuaded that Adi and the defendant believed that the message they conveyed to Sapir, according to which as far as they were concerned, the agreement would not be binding as long as approval in principle for the mortgage was not obtained, was conveyed by him to Lihi, and through her to Racheli (the defendant's interrogation at p. 81 of Pro. of May 6,2026, question 1). This clearly emerges from the fact that already on October 13,2024, the defendant wrote to Mr. Herman, "Let's make a phone call now and move forward... because I told the buyers that I would not sign until I knew what the bank approved for me" (p. 45 of the defendant's exhibits file). However, although the defendant worked to update Sapir on this matter, he made do with it and did not make sure that the matter would indeed be brought to the attention of the attorneys and the plaintiff, and that it would be made explicitly clear to them that receiving the mortgage approval constituted a condition for signing the agreement with the plaintiff.
In his interrogation, Sapir claimed that not only did he inform Lihi that receiving approval in principle for the mortgage was a condition for the defendant to sign the agreement with the plaintiff - a claim that was rejected by me - but he also informed Tal on this matter (p. 32 of the prologue of May 6,2026, paras. 30-37), and this, according to him, "in a telephone conversation" (ibid., p. 32, question 1). Sapir further added that it is possible that Tal did not convey the matter to the plaintiff's attention (ibid., p. 32, paras. 10-13; p. 36, paras. 22-23; p. 37, paras. 1-3). I cannot accept Sapir's version that he informed Tal about the mortgage. First, this argument was not expressed in Sapir's affidavit, and he raised it for the first time in his interrogation. Second, and even more important, in the framework of the extensive exchange of notices between the parties, which was attached to Tal's affidavit - and because it is not pale, was not attached to Sapir's affidavit - there is no mention that the receipt of approval in principle for the mortgage constituted, as far as the defendant is concerned, a condition for signing the agreement. It is difficult to conclude that the condition that Sapir knew was essential and constitutive from the defendant's point of view to the engagement, did not find any mention in the messages exchanged between him and Tal.