In our case, the parties did not sign an agreement, nor did they set a date for its signing. As noted above, the lawyers who drafted the draft agreement explicitly stated in it that the parties' signature on the agreement would constitute evidence of their final opinion. In these circumstances, weight must also be given to the fact that a person from the community, who is not a jurist, attaches great importance to the status of the signing of the contract, as the stage at which his contractual obligation is formulated and takes effect. I am faithful to the version of the defendant and his wife Adi, according to which they were of the opinion that the mere exchange of the draft agreement, as long as it was not signed, does not create a binding contractual obligation between the parties. This approach is also consistent with the manner in which the draft agreement was drafted and with the conduct of the parties during the negotiations.
In the absence of a clear indication, the plaintiff could not assume that the defendant had authorized his attorney, Lihi, to reach final agreements on his behalf. Lihi made it clear to Racheli, from time to time, that she was required to obtain the defendant's approval. In these circumstances, it is simple and clear that the power of attorney given to Lihi was for the purpose of conducting negotiations only and nothing more.
Moreover, even though the draft contract was forwarded to Racheli on October 10,2024, it was only on October 29,2024 that she forwarded to Lihi her full comments on the draft. I got the impression that the reason for this was that the plaintiff first secured the completion of the transaction for the sale of her apartment, and only afterwards - when she knew for sure that this transaction would be carried out and that she would have the necessary financial resources at her disposal - would she be able to move forward with signing the agreement for the purchase of the defendant's apartment. If, at the end of the day, the plaintiff had not succeeded in selling her apartment, it is presumed that she would not have claimed that the negotiations with the defendant had matured into a binding agreement. Even the adjustment of the payment schedule in the draft agreement to the payment schedule set out in the agreement for the sale of the plaintiff's apartment, supports the conclusion that she intended to finance, at least partially, the purchase of the defendant's apartment out of the consideration that would be received from the sale of her apartment (this is clearly evident from paragraph 7 of the plaintiff's affidavit; see also: Tal's message to Sapir that "the buyer is in the process of signing her house in the north. Then she will know when she has the ability to pay for the purchase at Hasidah... we are on it" - p. 80 of the plaintiff's exhibits). Only on October 29,2024, after she knew that she would complete the sale of her apartment on that day, did the plaintiff see herself as the one who could proceed with the transaction for the purchase of the defendant's apartment, and accordingly assumed that the defendant would adapt himself to the constraints and timetable derived from the transaction of selling her apartment.