Examining the specificity
As noted above, in order for an agreement to be specific enough to bind the parties, it must be done in writing, and include the material and essential details of the transaction (Civil Appeal 649/73 Kapolsky v. Ganei Golan Ltd., IsrSC 28(2) 291,296 (1974)). In our case, the draft agreement contained agreed details relating to the details of the property, the nature of the transaction, the consideration, the date of delivery of possession and tax matters. However, the draft did not include agreements regarding the dates of payment; the rent for the option period, if it is exercised, and regarding the construction deviation.
Over the years, the requirement of specificity has been softened, and today an agreement that lacks some of the material details can be seen as sufficiently specific if it is possible to complete the missing material details by means of external complementary mechanisms. This is unless there is a disagreement between the parties, explicit or implicit, regarding these details (Civil Appeal 692/86 Yaakov Butkovsky & Co. Import and Marketing Company Ltd. v. Gat, IsrSC 44(1) 58,66 (1989); Civil Appeal 9255/11 Yosef Daniel v. Anonymous, para. 19 [Nevo] (August 11,2013); Civil Appeal 7859/22 Dorit Construction and Development Company Ltd. v. Civil Administration, paragraphs 27-28 [Nevo] (July 15,2024)).
Therefore, it is necessary to examine whether the lack of agreement, particularly with regard to the payment schedule, within the circumstances of the present case, indicates that the draft was not sufficiently specific, or whether the draft contained most of the details required for the completion of a real estate transaction, and it is possible to fill in the gaps by means of the familiar completion mechanisms.
Before we need to do so, I will note that I am satisfied that the amount of the consideration and the option for a three-month lease were agreed upon by the parties on October 1,2024. Thus, Sapir admitted in paragraph 11 of his affidavit that "the seller (Z.L. "the price") and the date of the eviction were agreed upon (see also his interrogation at p. 33 of Pro. of May 6,2026, paras. 14-31; see also, ibid., p. 34, paras. 37-38; p. 36, paras. 13-14; regarding the date of delivery, see discussion below). Later in his interrogation, Sapir confirmed that the parties also agreed to provide an option for three months of paid rent (ibid., p. 39, paras. 23-26). Lihi also confirmed in her interrogation that the sum of the consideration in the amount of ILS 2,030,000 was agreed upon (p. 2 of Pro. of May 6,2026, paras. 26-37). In response to the question of whether she was told that the sum was agreed upon between the defendant and the plaintiff, she replied, "I always call, ask, so as not to make mistakes" (ibid., p. 5 of Prov. S. 28). In these circumstances, the defendant's argument that the parties had not yet agreed on the price of the apartment (paragraph 8 of his affidavit; p. 11 of Pro. of February 3,2025, Q. 35) is rejected by me. It should be noted that later in his interrogation, the defendant admitted that "the sum was agreed upon subject to approval in principle" (see p. 13 of Pro. of February 3,2025, Q. 21-22).