Even the absence of a signature on the draft agreement constitutes a significant evidentiary indication of the lack of discretion, as detailed above.
The essence of these teaches that in the absence of full discretion and specificity, the unsigned draft that was exchanged between the lawyers was not perfected into a binding agreement. Therefore, I reject the remedy that deals with the award of agreed damages, since, in the absence of a binding agreement, no fundamental breach should be attributed to the defendant by virtue of an unsigned draft. In any event, there is no room to award the plaintiff agreed damages by virtue of this draft alone.
The conduct of the defendant's counsel, Adv. Lihi, raises a difficulty, but it does not in itself perfect the agreement
It is not possible to conclude this chapter without addressing the factual gap that arose between the defendant and his attorney, Lihi, in relation to the conduct surrounding the transaction. The gap stemmed from the fact that the defendant did not share all the facts with his attorney, as detailed above. However, even the conduct of Lihi's attorney was not without difficulties, and if she had acted as her duty, it is doubtful that this claim would have ever existed.
Thus, the defendant claimed that Lihi did not give him the first draft that she sent to Racheli (paragraph 16 of his affidavit; the defendant's interrogation at p. 80 of Pro. of May 6,2026, paras. 31-37; see also his interrogation regarding the temporary relief, p. 12 of Pro. of February 3,2025, paras. 28-36; ibid., p. 13, paras. 3-4; ibid., p. 14, paras. 8; ibid., p. 15, paras. 1-2; see also Lihi's difficult reply in her interrogation, p. 4 of Pro. of May 6,2026, paras. 18-32). The defendant's version on the matter was not contradicted.
I also got the impression that Lihi did not bother to update the defendant or Adi regarding her demands from Racheli to improve the payment schedule, and certainly did not receive their approval regarding the change in the payment schedule (the defendant's interrogation at p. 103 of Pro. of May 6,2026, questions 1-2; his interrogation regarding the temporary relief, p. 13 of Pro. of February 3,2025, questions 5-9 and questions 23-29, and at p. 15, questions 14-20, and at p. 16, questions 10-11; transcript of Adi's conversation with the plaintiff, pp. 168-169 of the plaintiff's exhibits). In fact, the defendant and his counsel for Lihi have not spoken by telephone at all since the matter of the sale of the apartment was transferred to her (the defendant's interrogation, p. 12 of the prologue of February 3,2025, paras. 14-16), and the conversation between them was limited to a limited exchange of messages (ibid., paras. 20-23). Admittedly, I have already determined that Racheli was aware that Lihi's comments were conveyed to her, but this does not dull Lihi's duty to update the defendant at every stage of the conversation between her and Racheli.