The assumption that the difference of ILS 170,000 constitutes subsistence compensation is based on the fact that if the plaintiff had purchased the apartment, she could have sold it at the price that the defendant initially demanded, ILS 2,200,000. However, this assumption clearly contradicts the evidence in the present case.
Thus, in her interrogation, the plaintiff noted that the realtor on her behalf, Tal, checked the price of the apartment, and found that it was valued "in the area of ILS 1,850,000,1, 900,000" (p. 81 of the prologue of April 26,2026, question 10). The plaintiff added that in view of the deviation in the construction of the apartment and the need to legalize it, it is even possible that the price of the apartment "is less, usually according to what I know, a reduction of ILS 20,000-30,000 for an excess" (ibid., question 17; The plaintiff also claimed that at the time of her cross-examination, she believed that the price of the apartment was even lower - ibid., paras. 20-32).
It is not clear, therefore, how the plaintiff petitions the "loss of discount" ruling granted to her by the defendant from the price he initially demanded in the sum of ILS 2,200,000, when she herself admits that the real price of the apartment at the time was approximately ILS 1,850,000. If the plaintiff had purchased the apartment at a price of ILS 2,030,000 in accordance with the price agreed upon between the parties, in her opinion it would have been a loss transaction, since the real value of the apartment was only about ILS 1,850,000. It has certainly not been proven that the plaintiff would have had an economic advantage from the purchase of the apartment.
To this must also be added the costs associated with the purchase of an apartment, starting with purchase tax payments and sometimes betterment tax, fees payments, attorney's fees, and more. The plaintiff did not present a calculation of these costs, which must be deducted from ILS 2,200,000, in order to ascertain the alleged profit that was denied to her.