There are employers that circumvent the prohibition on dismissal of pregnant women by significantly harming the scope of these women's jobs and thus forcing them to terminate their jobs. ..
In order to prevent this phenomenon and in light of the extensive litigation on the question of whether the reduction in the scope of the position is in fact an indirect act of termination, which requires the approval of the Minister of Labor and Welfare, it is proposed to explicitly state that the scope of the position and the income of a pregnant woman should not be harmed except with the approval of the Minister of Labor and Welfare, similar to the issue of the dismissal of a pregnant woman."
- In accordance with the rulings of the National Court, an infringement on the scope of a job or the amount of income of a pregnant employee requires an application to the supervisor, and an employer who did not request a permit is obligated to pay compensation by virtue of the Women's Employment Law, even 'without being required to exhaust the decision on the question of whether or not we are dealing with dismissal' (Labor Appeal (National) 6049-08-21 T. Al-Obra Infrastructures Ltd. - Linoy Akko (April 10, 2022)).
- However, in accordance with the ruling of the National Court, section 13a(b)(1) of the Women's Employment Law, which prescribes a remedy of compensation of no less than 150% for an employee who was dismissed, cannot be automatically applied when it comes to harming the scope of the job under section 9A (Labor Appeal (National) 673-01-19 Rama's Kitchen - Meirav Ben David (July 5, 2020), hereinafter – Rama's Kitchen): "The Severance Pay Law He did not rule that resignation is dismissal, but only that resignation under certain circumstances entitles the employee to severance pay as the employee would have been entitled to if he had been fired. This is a special provision of the law, which was not explicitly applied in the Women's Employment Law, whereas the legislature wished to apply it could have done so explicitly. "
- In accordance with the ruling in the Rama case, the court is authorized to award monetary and non-pecuniary compensation to an employee at its discretion, in connection with the compensation determined in the Women's Employment Law, to the extent that it is found that the employer breached the duty of good faith under section 39 of the Contracts (General Part) Law, 5733-1973, or when the employer's conduct amounted to a breach of the Equal Opportunities in Employment Law, 5733-1988.
The plaintiff's pregnancy was an improper consideration in terminating her placement in the video focus
- Section 2(a)(2) of the Equal Opportunities Law prohibits discriminating against an employee on the grounds of pregnancy in "working conditions. "
- The termination of the plaintiff's placement in shifts following Sigal's instruction meets the definition of harm to working conditions. In this context, it was held that the fact that the pregnancy was a secondary consideration is sufficient to tarnish the decision as a discriminatory decision, and that the existence of additional legitimate considerations does not 'cure' the defect in the decision (Labor Appeal (National) 363/07 Sharona Arbiv v. Poamix Ltd. (May 26, 2010)).
- With regard to the burden of proof, section 9 (a) (1) of the Equal Opportunities Law stipulates that in a claim due to the provision of section 2 of the law, the employer will have the burden of proof that he did not act in contravention of the law "if the employer has established conditions or qualifications in respect of them, and the job seeker or the employee, as the case may be, has proved that the said conditions or qualifications have been met. "
- This is a provision of the law that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, in view of the difficulty inherent in proving the considerations that underpinned an employer's decision with respect to the employee, and therefore it was ruled that in such circumstances prima facie evidence is sufficient to transfer the burden of proof to the employer. The transfer of the burden in discrimination claims is required by the essence of an action in which an employee is required to prove the employer's state of mind (Labor Appeal 30585-09-12 Human Solutions Implementation Company Ltd. et al. v. Orit Bussi (August 4, 2013)).
- After discussing the sequence of events that led to the termination of the plaintiff's placement in shifts at the call center, we are persuaded that the plaintiff met all the conditions and skills required to perform the work at the video call center, and we did not find that the defendant was able to prove that the plaintiff's outputs were low, that she created demoralization, that she complained a lot or that she did not meet the appropriate conditions and skills to perform the work at the call center.
- The evidence indicates that Sigal did not raise any criticism of the plaintiff in real time about her work skills or suitability, and that the plaintiff heard retrospectively from Lior that Sigal was not satisfied that the plaintiff had complained about a shortage of manpower during the Saturday shift, and therefore requested that she no longer be assigned (Appendix 4 to the plaintiff's affidavit).
- We were persuaded that among the considerations that Sigal considered was the consideration of pregnancy, even if this was not the only consideration that was in front of her. We reached this conclusion on the basis of the transcript of the conversation with Sigal dated November 15, 2022, in which Sigal told the plaintiff that she was poor, that it was difficult for her to see her hot and difficult to sit because of the pregnancy, and therefore she asked that someone else be brought to her, 'someone who is not hot, does not hurt and is not good for him' (Appendix 9 to the affidavit at pp. 4-5): "And I said, if there is someone else to bring in your place, then bring in your place, because it was hard for me to see that you are hot and you are pregnant and it is difficult for you to sit for so many hours, I fully understand you. I didn't notice that you're a pregnant woman who has to do the work and you're hot and hurt and it's not good for you, and I said, "No, bring me someone who isn't hot, doesn't hurt and doesn't feel good... I don't know, maybe there's another mission to give you and let them give you. "
- As evidence, the defendant asked two months later to correct the defect – whether in light of section 9A of the Women's Employment Law or in light of section 2(a) of the Equal Opportunities Law – and suggested that the plaintiff return to work at the call center. However, this was done close to the date of the birth, and the defendant rejected the plaintiff's demand for compensation for the damage she caused during this period.
- Before concluding, we will note that Sigal's words to the plaintiff in the later conversation between them, that she is willing to 'make discounts for a pregnant woman', do not change the fact that in real time Sigal demanded that Lior bring her another employee, and this does not retroactively cure the defect in the defendant's conduct.
Ruling on Compensation for Pecuniary Damage
- From the moment we determined that the plaintiff resigned due to the defendant's conduct, we found that the plaintiff should be awarded monetary compensation for the wages that were not paid to her during the period in which she was not assigned to shifts. However, we did not find that the plaintiff should be awarded punitive compensation at the rate of 150% for the entire protected period, because the plaintiff was not fired, and we were convinced that the defendant offered the plaintiff to return to work on November 15, 2022, or at the end of her maternity leave.
- The calculation of the monetary compensation to which the plaintiff is entitled will be made on the basis of the plaintiff's average salary in the twelve full months in which she worked.
- According to the table in paragraph 132 of the statement of claim, and after we found that the amounts specified in the table correspond to the "Wage 276" component of the pay slips, the plaintiff's salary was in the 12 months before the defendant ceased to be assigned to shifts as follows:
| September 2021 | 4,719.05 |
| October 2021 | 1,706.60 |
| November 2021 | 1,830.15 |
| December 2021 | 4,815.30 |
| January 2022 | 1,705.55 |
| February 2022 | 2,613.45 |
| Mar 2022 | 2,876.65 |
| April 2022 | 2,976.40 |
| May 2022 | 3,367.00 |
| June 2022 | 1,147.65 |
| Jul 2022 | 4,008.55 |
| August 2022 | 3,251.15 |
| Overall | 35,017.5 |
- The division of the cumulative sum of NIS 35,017 over 12 months leads to an average monthly salary of NIS 2,918. The plaintiff's hourly wage was NIS 35 per hour, and therefore the average scope of her job was about 83 hours per month, which is 45.6% of the job.
- We are unable to accept the defendant's calculation of an average salary of NIS 2,760 because the defendant also included in this calculation the two months in which the plaintiff was not assigned to work. In this context, we note that Dori admitted in his cross-examination that the average salary in the calculation made by the defendant also included the two months in which the plaintiff did not work (p. 35 of the transcript, lines 7-14).
- Since we determined that the plaintiff legally resigned from her dismissal and refused the defendant's offer to return to work before she went on maternity leave and after her maternity leave, we found that she should be awarded compensation expressing the loss of average wages for the period in which she was not assigned to shifts, from September 18, 2022 to November 15, 2022, in the sum of NIS 5,836.
- Before discussing the other pecuniary remedies, we note that the plaintiff abandoned in her summaries some of the remedies that she claimed in the statement of claim, and therefore we will discuss the remedies that were claimed in the summaries, while considering the provisions of the collective agreement that applies to the defendant (Appendix 21 to Dori's affidavit).
- After reviewing the defendant's calculations, we found that we accept her calculations for the social components that she paid to the plaintiff, and that the gaps between the sums paid to the plaintiff for these components and the average scope of the job that we determined are negligible and amount to several tens of shekels.
- In respect of the convalescence days component – the defendant paid the plaintiff convalescence pay in the June 2023 salary, for 2.97 convalescence days according to the scope of the position of 42.44% (clause 58.1.2 of the statement of defense).
- In respect of the annual vacation component, as part of the final account, vacation redemption in the sum of NIS 3,830.05 was paid for 109.43 hours of vacation at a rate of NIS 35 per hour according to the same scope of job (Appendix 19 to Haim Dori's affidavit).
- With respect to the deposit component , after deducting the amount of the deposits that the defendant actually made after September 18, 2022 (NIS 925 for benefits and NIS 990 for compensation), the defendant was no longer liable to the plaintiff.
- The plaintiff's claim for monetary compensation in relation to the following components is also rejected:
Supplementation of maternity allowance – In accordance with the ruling of the National Labor Court, an employee is entitled to payment of rights to which she was entitled from the National Insurance, including supplementary maternity allowance (Labor Appeal (National) 1353/02 Margalit Appelbaum vs. Nitza Holtzman (September 22, 2003)). However, the plaintiff received a maternity allowance from the National Insurance Institute in the sum of NIS 14,429, according to her income in the amount of NIS 24,736 for a period of six months (between May 2022 and October 2022). The plaintiff received a maternity allowance for 105 days at a daily wage of NIS 137.42, which is derived from the average monthly salary according to these incomes, which is NIS 4,122.67 (Appendix 9 to the plaintiff's affidavit of disclosure of documents). As appears from the appendix, the National Insurance Institute subsequently made an amendment to the amount on December 27, 2022, so that in the end, the amount paid to the plaintiff was not derived from the last three months of her employment, and in fact was higher than the annual average salary because it was made on the basis of six months in which she earned the highest salary, and therefore the plaintiff is not entitled to the supplement.