Caselaw

Family Case (Ashed) 37081-08-24 M.M.G. v. B.M. z”l

November 5, 2026
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Family Court in Ashdod
Family Case 37081-08-24 M.G. et al.  v. M.  et al.

 

 

Before The Honorable Judge Hila Ohayon Gliksman

 

 

Plaintiffs

 

1.MMG ID ***

2.Y.G. ID ***

Both together by Attorney Dayana Har Even

 

Against

 

 

Defendants

 

1.  B.M. , Deceased, ID ***

2.BMA Ltd.  Companies ***

By Adv. Avivit Moskowitz and Adv. Sigal Berkler

 

Judgment

Plaintiff 1 is the daughter of defendant 1.  In 2004, defendant 2, a company owned by defendant 1, acquired rights in a real estate property.  From the date of the purchase of the property until today, a veterinary clinic operated on the property operated by the plaintiffs, spouses and veterinarians by profession.  After the father signed a prenuptial agreement granting his common-law spouse half of the company's shares, the plaintiffs filed a claim for declaratory relief, according to which the rights to the property and the equipment used by the clinic were granted to the daughter by the father as a completed gift, and that the daughter was granted a license to use the property permanently . 

  1. The facts that need to be relevant.
  2. Plaintiff 1, Dr. G. (hereinafter: "the daughter"), is the daughter of defendant 1, Mr. B.M. , Deceased (hereinafter: "the father").  Plaintiff 2, Dr.  Y.G. , is the spouse of the daughter (hereinafter: "the spouse").  Defendant 2, BMH.  Ltd.  (hereinafter: the "Company"), is a private company that was established in 2000 and the father held all of its shares for all the years since its establishment.  It should be noted that, unfortunately, the father passed away on July 3,2026, after the parties' summaries were submitted in the present proceeding.
  3. The plaintiffs are veterinarians by profession, and the father was a businessman in the field of investments. For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that the father had a marital relationship with Mrs. V.B. (hereinafter: "the common-law spouse") from 1993 (or thereabouts) until the date of his death (the father and the daughter's mother separated many years ago).  It should also be noted that the daughter is the father's adopted daughter, and that the father has another adopted daughter, Mrs. S.G.
  4. In 2004, the Company purchased rights in the property on B*** Street from a company Ltd. (hereinafter: the "Property"), pursuant to an agreement made on February 26,2004 (hereinafter: the "Agreement" or the "Purchase Agreement").  According to the agreement, at the time of the purchase of the rights in the property, due to the fact that parcellation had not yet been carried out, it was not possible to complete the registration of the house as a condominium, and the seller undertook to complete the registration in the name of the buyer (i.e., the Company) after the registration of the building as a condominium (the agreement was attached to A/1 to the plaintiffs' exhibits).  In 2021, the property was registered as a condominium, and in accordance with the registration wording that was submitted, the rights in the property are registered in the name of the State of Israel (P/2 for the plaintiffs' exhibits).  It should be noted that the parties (or any of them) did not present confirmation of the registration of the company's rights in the property from the Israel Lands Authority (hereinafter: the "ILA").
  5. From the date of the purchase of the property until today, for more than 20 years, a veterinary clinic has been operated and managed on the property under the professional management of the plaintiffs (hereinafter: "the clinic"), with all the income and expenses of the clinic, including the purchase of equipment, income from patients, employment of employees, etc., done through and by the company. Accordingly, the plaintiffs were employed by the company as employees, and it was the company that paid their wages over the years.
  6. In July 2024, the father and the common-law spouse entered into an agreement, which was approved by the Tel Aviv Family Court (agreement file 45694-06-24), in which it was determined, inter alia, that upon the expiration of the relationship between the father and the common-law spouse, she would be entitled to half of the company's shares, by virtue of the partnership and prenuptial relationship between them (hereinafter: the "Prenuptial Agreement"). There is no dispute, as will be presented below, that the background to the drafting of the prenuptial agreement is, inter alia, the deterioration of the relationship between the daughter and the common-law spouse, due to disputes that arose between the two.
  7. The Sequence of the Legal Proceedings
  8. On August 15,2024, the plaintiffs filed the claim under the heading against the father, the company, and the common-law partner, in which they petitioned for a series of remedies in connection with the property and the clinic, including enforcement of an undertaking by the father to grant the daughter the rights to the property as a gift, and recognition of the daughter as having received unqualified permission to hold the property with an irrevocable use license in perpetuity; granting declaratory relief regarding the cancellation of any consent or contrary undertaking given by the father to the common-law spouse, including in the framework of the prenuptial agreement, in relation to the clinic; granting declaratory relief whereby the plaintiffs may stop managing the clinic through the company; granting declaratory relief regarding the plaintiffs' ownership of the property's property in the clinic.
  9. The plaintiffs' request for temporary relief to order an order prohibiting disposition of rights in the property was rejected in the format in which it was filed (see the decision of the Senior Registrar Merav Goldner of August 15,2024).
  10. The Ottoman Settlement [Old Version] 1916 It should be noted that the company was added as a defendant in the proceeding, without an appropriate request for its incorporation as required by the provisions of section 6(f) of the Family Court Law, 5755-1995. Therefore, I ordered its deletion (see decision of August 18,2026).  Subsequently, after an appropriate application was filed to join the company as a defendant, a decision was issued ordering its incorporation, despite the defendants' objections (see decision of October 5,2024).
  11. 12-34-56-78 Chekhov v. State of Israel, P.D. 51 (2)On February 24,2025, I granted the plaintiffs' request to file an amended statement of claim, the essence of which is to change the main remedy requested - instead of a declaratory relief regarding an undertaking to give a gift, the plaintiffs petitioned in the amended statement of claim for declaratory relief, according to which the obligatory rights in the property and equipment of the clinic were given as a completed gift to the daughter.
  12. Many attempts were made by the court to formulate agreements between the parties, including by referring them to mediation, but unfortunately, these attempts did not bear fruit, and the proceeding continued to proceed.
  13. In a pre-trial hearing held on December 22,2025, after hearing the court's comments, the plaintiffs abandoned the remedies requested by them regarding the cancellation of the father's conflicting obligations, including in the framework of the prenuptial agreement, as well as the provision of declaratory relief, whereby the plaintiffs may stop managing the clinic through the company. Therefore, it remains to discuss and decide on the plaintiffs' petition for a declaratory judgment according to which the daughter is the owner of the rights in the property, and that she has received unqualified permission to hold an irrevocable license in the property permanently, as well as to rule on the plaintiffs' petition for a declaratory judgment regarding their ownership of the movables in the clinic and vehicles registered in the company's name, which are used by the plaintiffs.
  14. Subsequently, and when the remedies relating to the prenuptial agreement between the father and the common-law spouse were abandoned, it was agreed to delete the common-law spouse as defendant 3 in the proceeding (decision of February 15,2026).
  15. As part of the proceeding, two evidentiary sessions were held, on February 15,2026 and February 22,2026. The plaintiffs testified on behalf of the plaintiffs ; the realtor, Mr. G.S., who assisted the father in purchasing the property; Mr. A.T., the son of the father's friend and business partner; Mrs. M.H.B., the father's sister (the daughter's aunt); Mrs. T.A., the daughter's friend; The father testified on behalf of the defendants; Mrs. S.S., an accountant in the companies owned by the father; the common-law partner; the son and daughter-in-law of the common-law wife, Mrs. R.H. and Mr. L.H.; as well as Mrs. S.M., the father's other daughter and the daughter's (adopted) sister.
  16. For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that, due to his poor health and physical weakness, the father was exempt from appearing for the hearings that took place in court, and he appeared only for the first pre-trial session and the first evidentiary session (in which his testimony was heard).
  17. the plaintiffs' summaries were filed on April 9,2026; the defendants' summaries were filed on May 20,2026; and the reply summaries were filed on June 1,2026.
  18. Unfortunately, as noted above, on July 3,2026, the father passed away. Following the notice submitted in the matter, the plaintiffs announced that they were insisting on further investigation of the claim, and attached a will drawn up by the father on December 7,2025, according to which, prima facie, the father's heirs are the spouse, daughter Sapir and her children, as well as the daughter, who is the beneficiary of the father's rights in the clinic and/or the value of the father's rights in the company that operates it, if it is sold (hereinafter: the "Late Will").
  19. The parties were asked to respond to the question of determining an alternative litigant, and subsequently, the common-law spouse's request to join the proceeding as an alternate litigant was denied, by virtue of her being a potential heir of the deceased father in accordance with the later will. It was held that in view of the advanced procedural stage in which the proceeding was located at the time of the father's death (after the submission of the parties' summaries as aforesaid), and given that the causes of action in relation to the company continue to exist even after the father's death, the application to join the common-law spouse as a party to the proceeding should be rejected (decisions of July 20,2026 and August 18,2026).
  • Summary of the parties' arguments

The plaintiffs' arguments

  1. The plaintiffs petitioned for declaratory relief to enforce the father's contractual obligations, through the company he owns, to register in the daughter's name the rights in the property, rights that were given to the plaintiffs, according to them, as a complete gift for the purpose of running the veterinary clinic; to recognize the plaintiffs as the owners of the equipment and movables used to operate the clinic; and to recognize the daughter's permanent irrevocable license to use the property.
  2. The plaintiffs claimed that the father purchased the rights in the property for the daughter in 2004, through the company he owned, from funds received from the sale of an apartment owned by the father and mother of the daughter, and that the rights were granted as a gift to the daughter upon the handover of possession of the property to the daughter in 2004. It was claimed that the location of the property was chosen on the recommendation of the father's sister to establish a veterinary clinic in City A. From a legal standpoint, the plaintiffs argued that, since these are only obligatory rights (prior to the registration of the condominium), their transfer is not subject to the substantive written requirement in section 8 of the Land Law, 5729-1969 (hereinafter: the "Land Law"), but is governed by the Gift Law, 5728-1968 (hereinafter: the "Gift Law").  The plaintiffs responded to the defendants' argument that the amendment of the statement of claim attests to a lack of credibility, and argued that the amendment of the statement of claim was necessary when the plaintiffs discovered that the rights acquired by the company in the property were only obligatory rights.
  3. According to the claim, ample evidence was presented attesting to the intention of the acquisition and the father's discretion in real time - the father's statements to many witnesses at the opening of the clinic; the father's behavior over the years, when he allowed the plaintiffs to manage the clinic completely independently; a will drawn up by the father on June 21,2021 (hereinafter: the "2021 Will") in which the father bequeathed all his shares in the company to the daughter, which, according to the plaintiffs, constitutes, a confirmation of the act that may be done in order to hand over the rights in the property to the daughter; The father confirmed his will as expressed in the 2021 will in a conversation between him and the daughter and the father in 2023, which was filmed and documented at the father's request; transcripts of recorded conversations from dates close to the date of filing the claim, in August 2024.
  4. As to the plaintiffs' reliance, it is claimed that the daughter began her professional career as a veterinarian in 2002, when she worked as an employee for another veterinarian in A., when her salary was transferred from her then-employer to the company, and the company paid her daughter's salary. After the clinic opened in 2004, and for the two decades that have passed since then, the plaintiffs relied entirely on the father's representations and undertakings that the property from which the clinic operates belonged to them - they established their home in City A, even though they were originally from the Sharon area; they gave up on other employment alternatives; they invested most of their energy, money and years in developing and establishing the clinic.  It was argued that this reliance, along with the investment of a copy in the property, now prevents the father, through the company, from denying his obligations and the completed gift.
  5. The plaintiffs further claim that the gift that the father gave to the daughter was through the company, with the father being the sole owner and director of the company, who fully controls its liabilities and assets. In these circumstances, in accordance with the provisions of section 6(b) of the Companies Law, 5759-1999 (hereinafter: the "Companies Law"), and in view of all the evidence presented - there is room to attribute to the company the father's obligations to the daughter.
  6. With regard to the equipment and movables in the clinic, it was claimed that the equipment was purchased from the clinic's income, when it was proven from the testimony of the bookkeeper that the only income in the company was from the clinic's business activity. As a result of the aforesaid, the plaintiffs claimed that the equipment used for the clinic's activity had been purchased over the years from the income of the business that was fully managed by them, and that this equipment was given to them as a complete gift upon its delivery to them.  The plaintiffs sought to categorically negate the defendants' claim that the equipment belongs to the company, and that they serve only as employees of the company.  The plaintiffs added that the defendants' claim that the clinic's activity had been loss-making over the years was an extension of an improper façade, and in any event, they conducted an accounting examination from which it emerged that these were not losses as claimed, but rather the burden of personal expenses of the father, such as salary, laundry, etc., on the company, in a manner that created only alleged "losses".  In the summaries of the reply, the plaintiffs argued that there was no "employee-employer" subordination relationship between them and the company, so the defendants' claim that the plaintiffs were only employees of the company should be rejected.
  7. According to the plaintiffs, the prenuptial agreement that the father made with the common-law spouse was made in bad faith, and under the erroneous assumption that the rights in the property belong to the company. The plaintiffs claimed that this was a failed attempt by the common-law spouse to take over the rights in the property in shameful bad faith, amounting to enrichment and not in law, when the prenuptial agreement was signed by the father under pressure, as he was dependent on the common-law spouse in view of his nursing condition.  It was further argued in this context that, due to the father's weak condition, the common-law spouse took over the management of the company's affairs in bad faith, and in contravention of the rights that had already been granted to the plaintiffs in the property and in the clinic, although it was noted that the plaintiffs did not dispute the father's cognitive competence at the time of the proceeding, as emerged from the evidence and testimonies presented, including by the defendants.
  8. The daughter claimed that since she was granted the obligatory rights in the property, she was also granted a license to use the property permanently and without consideration, as part of the rights that the daughter received and on the basis of the parties' agreements and intention at the time of the purchase of the property and in the years that have passed since then.

The defendants' arguments

  1. The defendants argued that the claim should be dismissed when the father did not grant his obligatory rights in the property to the daughter as a gift, and there is no element of the determination of the giver of the gift, which is necessary to prove the giving of a gift, such as this.
  2. According to the defendants' position, even though the company's proprietary rights in the property were not registered, it is still a real estate property in a manner that requires a high level of proof, which would attest to the desire of the giver of the gift to give it, while in our case, it was claimed that the father testified consistently and clearly that he did not give the property to the daughter as a gift, and that he did not intend to give her the property as a gift, and that all he gave her was a place of work. The defendants added that it was not proven that the alleged gift was given to the daughter in accordance with section 6 of the Gift Law - no agreement was made between the parties; The claim that the father made an oral declaration at the time of the opening of the clinic about the granting of the property to the daughter was not proven by the testimonies and evidence brought on behalf of the plaintiffs, in contrast to the father and witnesses on his behalf, who testified that they were aware that the father had only asked to provide the plaintiffs with a place of work.
  3. Moreover; According to the defendants' position, the claim that the property was purchased after the purchase had been planned in advance constitutes an expansion of the façade, and in any event, it was proven that at first the father only asked to rent the property, but because the seller did not agree to allow renovation of the property, it was decided to purchase the rights therein, as the daughter even confirmed in her testimony.
  4. As for the 2021 will, the defendants argued that the father's very intention to bequeath the company's shares to the daughter after his longevity proves beyond any doubt that the property was not given to the daughter as a gift during the father's lifetime, since it is not possible to bequeath an asset that has already been granted. They added that the plaintiffs' conduct indicates that they knew and understood that the rights in the property were not given to the daughter as a gift, otherwise it would not be clear why the daughter should have recorded the father and/or why she testified, had it not been for the quarrel that broke out between her and the common-law spouse that led to the drafting of the prenuptial agreement, she would not have filed the claim at all.
  5. The defendants further claimed that it was proven that the plaintiffs were only salaried employees of the company and by virtue of their work, operated the clinic - the company determined their wages, while the daughter's version that the plaintiffs determined their wages was not proven; the company paid the plaintiffs' social benefits; all the expenses of the clinic and equipment were purchased by the company and not by the plaintiffs; etc. According to the defendants' position, just as a seller in a clothing store, no matter how senior, does not become the owner of the store - so too the fact that the father gave the daughter a free hand in the management of the clinic does not make her the owner of the property and equipment purchased by the company.
  6. The defendants added that the plaintiffs drastically changed their version, when they claimed in the original statement of claim that we were dealing with an undertaking to give a gift, while in the amended statement of claim they claimed that it was a gift that was completed, in a manner that shows, according to the defendants, a lack of reliability. The defendants argued that the manner in which the rights were registered does not constitute a satisfactory explanation for the change in the factual claims underlying the statements of claim that were filed.
  7. As to the declaratory relief requested in the matter of the equipment, it was claimed that the company purchased with its full funding all the expensive equipment available in the clinic, including ultrasound devices, treatment beds for animals, and air conditioners, and this was not equipment that was given to the plaintiffs as a gift. The plaintiffs themselves admitted in the statement of claim that the equipment was financed by the company, and therefore the plaintiffs' demand to declare them as the owners of the equipment and movables should be rejected.  According to the defendants, the plaintiffs' reputation is personal and they are entitled to continue it anywhere else, without connection to the company's property or equipment.
  8. According to the defendants, the father could not give the daughter the rights in the property as a gift, since the rights do not belong only to him but also to the common-law spouse - the father and the common-law spouse have lived as a couple since 1995; the company was established in 2000; and the rights in the property were purchased in 2004, so that the common-law spouse has half of the rights in it, as is also evident from the prenuptial agreement between the father and the common-law spouse in 2024.
  9. As to the plaintiffs' claim that they were granted permission to use the property permanently, according to the defendants' position, according to the case law, an irrevocable license granted without consideration will be granted sparingly and only in exceptional cases. In our case, the defendants argued that, it was not claimed, and in any case has not been proven, that the permission cannot be revoked "in the blink of an eye", when the burden of proof resting on the plaintiffs in this matter is increased, but not lifted.
  10. Discussion and Decision
    • 1. Summary of the story of the incident - as indicated by the evidence that was placed before the court
  11. More than 20 years ago, when the daughter completed her veterinary studies, the father asked to open a veterinary clinic for her, so that the daughter could develop independently in this profession, while promising her (according to him) that after his long life and years, the "clinic" would be owned by her. This was done without the parties defining in writing what the meaning of the term "clinic" was and what exactly the promise was made.  Later, the daughter was joined by her partner, plaintiff 2, and together they managed, developed and invested considerable personal resources in the veterinary clinic, until they turned it into a prosperous, profitable and reputable business.

The parties agreed that the clinic's activities would be managed through the company, which is owned by the father, in a manner that indicates a relationship of trust, closeness, and mutual concern between the father and the daughter.  In accordance with the agreements, the company purchased the rights in the property in 2004 for the purpose of operating the clinic; over the years, the plaintiffs provided veterinary services, and all the income received from their work was deposited in the company's account, and constituted, at least, most of its income (testimony of the company's bookkeeper, p. 5, paras.  22-24).  At the same time, all the expenses of the clinic's activity were also paid by the company - including the plaintiffs' wages and their social rights; it was the company that financed the purchase of the permanent and consumable equipment necessary for the operation of the clinic; it was the company that employed additional employees in the clinic and paid their wages; The company paid all the additional payments involved in operating the clinic from the property, including municipal taxes and taxes; throughout the years, the company submitted reports to the authorities, both for the aforementioned expenses and for the income received from the operation of the clinic as aforesaid.

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