Rehabilitation is a central and important value in the Penal Law, as indicated by Amendment 113. Although the amendment states that the model is retributive, that is, the punishment compound must reflect an appropriate punishment in view of the severity of the offense in its circumstances. However, as stated, the law allows the court to deviate from this area in two cases, strictly, due to a special need to protect public safety (which is not relevant to this proceeding) and the second, for reasons of rehabilitation (section 40(d) of the Penal Law).
A rehabilitative punishment model (which was not accepted as the basic defendant's model of determining the punishment compound in the Penal Law) is intended to bring about his reintegration into the society of the accused, as a law-abiding citizen who no longer endangers society and its values (in contrast to the principle of proportionality, whose purpose is to repay the defendant as his reward). The law established the principle of proportionality as the main principle, but gave the court discretion to deviate from this principle for the purpose of rehabilitating the defendant. Section 40D(a) of the Law allows for the replacement of the principle of proportionality, which requires a certain range of punishment, with the principle of rehabilitation, which requires a reduced punishment, by stating:
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If the court has determined the appropriate punishment range in accordance with the guiding principle and finds that the defendant has rehabilitated or that there is a real chance that he will be rehabilitated, it may deviate from the appropriate punishment range and determine the defendant's sentence according to the considerations of his rehabilitation, as well as order the adoption of rehabilitative measures against the defendant.
including putting him to the test..."
In Crim. Appeal 7781/12 Anonymous v. State of Israel (published in Nevo, 2013), the Honorable Judge Salim Jubran insisted on the preference for the principle of rehabilitation over the principle of retribution in punishing defendants as "young adults", due to their proximity to the age of minors (although the Honorable Justice Yitzhak Amit disagreed with this as a general distinction). See also on this matter the words of the Honorable Justice E. Rubinstein in the matter of relief, in paragraph 19 of his judgment).