Studies conducted have substantiated the assertion that the deterrence effect that accompanies harsher punishment is more weighty in the context of offenses by public officials and economic offenses, as opposed to a weaker effect in the context of street offenses and violence (Hagit Larnau, Crime and Law Enforcement, 67, and the references ibid. (2016). See also in this regard the words of the Honorable Justice Elyakim Rubinstein in Crim. Crim. 677/14 Danny Dankner v. State of Israel (published in Nevo, 2014, in paragraph 38 of his judgment).
In the Davidovich case, the appellants referred to the report of the Dorner Commission in support of their claim that there is no evidence of the effectiveness of the aggravated punishment for deterrence. The Honorable Justice Yoram Danziger ruled that this argument should not be adjourned until the Penal Law was amended and sections 40F and 40G of the Law remain in place (ibid., at paragraph 105 of his judgment) and added that most of the conclusions do not relate at all to economic offenses, since they deal with deterring offenders who grow up in a criminal environment, whereas this is not the case, as a rule, in economic offenses. He said: "Thus, it seems to me that when we come to examine the question of the effectiveness and success of deterrence, a distinction must be made between instrumental and rational offenses – including economic offenses – and impulsive offenses committed in the heat of the moment." These things are all the more beautiful when it comes to offenses that are often committed through a corporation.
In the article by Moshe Bar-Niv and Zvi Safra, "The Effectiveness of Structuring Judicial Discretion in Worsening Cases with Repeat Offenders," in: David Wiener's Book on Criminal Law and Ethics, 583, 589 (2009), the authors propose a model based on an economic analysis of criminal law, which indicates that the policy of punishment, according to which the punishment of a repeat offender should be harsher, is not always effective, and a policy that increases the first fines should be preferred. According to them, maximum deterrence will be achieved by imposing a fine on the first offense "up to the full wealth of the offender" (ibid., at p. 597. However, it should be noted that increasing the fines for the first offense may constitute an excessive aggravation from the perspective of the principle of adequacy, certainly when it comes to a corporation.