Barak Ariel and Yael Levy-Ariel in their article: "Revisiting the Institution of Deterrence (and Ways to Create Effective Deterrence)", in: Justice Law? The Criminal Procedure in Israel – Failures and Challenges, 83, are based on the latest research on the impact of harsher punishment on deterrence. At p. 93, the authors insist that there is no empirical support that a change in the severity of the punishment affects deterrence, in contrast to the certainty of punishment, i.e., to the chances of the discovery of the offense, which constitutes a factor affecting the prevention of offenses (see especially paragraphs 38-39 and the references therein). According to the authors, deterrence in general is more effective in white-collar offenses, but there too deterrence stems from informal punishment (social condemnation and loss of status) and depends more on exposing the offense, and less on the severity of the formal punishment (p. 123 of their article, and especially notes 16-1698 and the references therein).
The authors propose to increase policing and enforcement, which will increase the risk of exposing the offenses and bringing the offenders to justice, thus increasing deterrence. I believe that in the context of corporations, compliance programs, including internal corporate control and enforcement procedures, increase "policing" in the sense that effective compliance programs significantly increase the chances of apprehending and punishing offenders, even if not in the criminal proceeding. Since many compliance programs also include the filing of complaints by the corporation against the employee or officer who has gone missing, the chances of them being criminally prosecuted also increase. Therefore, it seems that compliance programs will also contribute to the issue of deterrence, and therefore it is important to allow the imposition of punishment in this form in legislation, since, as I explained above, voluntary compliance programs are relevant, as a rule, only in the case of plea bargains.