In more detail, attribution of liability in torts to the officer who caused the tort stems from the basic principle of tort law, that a person who upholds the foundations of tort is liable for his own actions, as well as for his own lack of good faith. The status of the wrongdoer in the corporation does not absolve him of his personal responsibility for his own actions (LCA 7875/06 Saltz v. Hachsharat HaYishuv Insurance Company Ltd. (November 29, 2009); CA 407/89 Tzuk Or Ltd. v. Car Security Ltd., IsrSC 48(5) 661, 697 (1994)). The mere fact that a person commits a tort not for himself, but as an employee or agent of another does not release him from personal liability in torts. Similarly, the mere fact that a person commits a tort as an officer of a corporation does not absolve him of liability for committing a tort (CA 148/82 Glick v. Arman, IsrSC 45(3) 401, 404 (1991)). And as the court said: "The position of tort law is the individual position, according to which every person shall bear his sin" (CA 507/79 Roundoff v. Hakim, IsrSC 36(2) 757, 794 (1982)). It should be emphasized that the officer's tort liability is his own. It is not the responsibility of the company. Indeed, the company may bear responsibility together with him, but the officer's liability in such a case stems from his own actions and omissions.
The test for imposing personal liability on an officer of a company is the same "regular" test that exists in tort law, i.e., the existence of the elements of tort. At the same time, the applicant must impose personal liability on an officer of the company, there is a duty to point to a specific cause of action against him and to lay an evidentiary basis from which it emerges that the officer has fulfilled its foundations. If not, it may be possible to be repaid from the company, but not from the officer himself (Pessal, p. 43). In this framework, it is not enough to seen, as is usually the requirement of the law, that the norm of good faith that dictates the level of objective conduct has been violated, but it must be shown that the officer is personally subjective to blame for acts or omissions that constitute the commission of a tort or a breach of a legal duty (CA 9183/99 Fenigstein v. Makeover Members Company No. 1 (Quarries) Ltd., IsrSC 58(4) 693; 701 (2004); CA 10385/02 Machnes v. Regent Investments Ltd., IsrSC 58(2) 53, 58 (2003)). The imposition of personal liability in torts on the manager of a company is contingent on the fact that by his actions or omissions, all the elements required for the formulation of liability under tort law were met (CA 4612/95 Matityahu v. Shatil, IsrSC 51(4) 769 (1997)))."
- As for the imposition of personal liability on an organ in the contractual aspect in accordance with the principle of good faith (according to section 12 of the Pre-Contractual Negotiations Contracts Law or section 39 of the Contracts in the Performance of a Contract Law), this applies only in exceptional cases. In these cases, it is necessary to prove the personal and subjective guilt of the organ, and it is not enough to violate the objective good faith norm. In other words, it must be shown that the manager is personally responsible for acts or omissions that constitute the commission of a tort or a breach of a legal duty. This is in contrast to a tortious creditor who does not choose the tortfeasor, a contractual creditor can choose whether to contract with the company only or demand a personal charge from the organ.
- See the judgment of the Honorable Justice Ruth Ronen in CA 7721/22 Dr. Ofer Walter v. Yosef Stavholtz (paragraphs 60-62), December 24, 2024:
"Although, as stated, the application of the duty of good faith in negotiations is not limited to the direct parties to the contract, the case law established a restrictive standard for the purpose of imposing personal liability on an officer or an organ in a corporation due to a breach of the duty of good faith in pre-contractual negotiations.