"It is clear that even the rights of a licensee (which do not amount to lease rights) cannot be inherited, if the agreement by virtue of which the rights were granted does not permit this. If the grantor of the permission restricts the offenses of the right and prohibits its transfer by inheritance, then the licensee cannot bequeath his rights (see also CA 260/65 Z. Chaikin et al. v. Memar et al. [Nevo] [4], at p. 190). In the Azoulay case [1] as well, President Shamgar clarifies that the permission to use can be transferred only subject to a permit implied in the terms of the contract or from the totality of the circumstances (see the Azoulay case, CA 103/89 Mazal Azoulay v. Pnina Azoulay, 45(1) 477 (1991) at p. 481). Therefore, when the lease contract or the authority establishes the lease right or the permission for the period of the settler's life without these being part of his estate, the result is that his right to the property is indeed not part of his estate."
- Not only that, but the case law also accepted the position that a right granted to a licensee as a result of a license is a personal right that is not valid for all of us, when the successor of the licensee is not subject to this right. Therefore, even if there was any undertaking by the owner of the land in the years preceding theexpropriation of the land by the municipality, and I do not believe that this is the case, this undertaking does not bind the municipality now, and it is entitled to cancel it.
- I would also like to refer in this matter to CA 6757/13 Miriam Abitsam Nahum v. State of Israel - Development Authority (Nevo 19.08.2015), which was also presented in the plaintiffs' summaries, and discussed the issue of the cancellation of the license upon the change of ownership. It is worth emphasizing and noting that contrary to the Abitsam judgment, in our case it is highly doubtful whether permission was ever given to the defendant Or's father or to the previous holders before the Danoch family.
"Indeed, the approach is accepted in case law that the right created by a license constitutes a personal right (in personam) of the licensee vis-à-vis the grantor of the license, as opposed to the right of the object of power vis-à-vis the entire world. Therefore, the successor of the owner granting the license, from whom he purchased the property that is the subject of the license, is not subject to the right given to the licensee, and the authority will come to an end with any transfer of ownership rights in the land that is the subject of the license (License in Real Estate, p. 33; Weissman, pp. 484-485; CA 7242/00 Ports and Railways Authority v. Kaduri, [published in Nevo], paragraph 12 (November 25, 2002); CA 346/62 Rechter v. Estate Tax Administrator, Jerusalem, IsrSC 17 701, 708 (1963))."
- Scholar Nina Salzman addressed this issue in her article "License in Real Estate," Hapraklit 42, 24, 28 (1995), and noted as follows: "Alongside permission given with an explicit promise, it is possible to describe situations in which the consent of the landowner is studied, and hence his permission, his silence and his non-protest against the possession of a certain person's property, or the use he makes of the property, when in the circumstances of the case his objection could have been foreseen. In these situations, the possession or use was obtained in the tort of trespassing on the land, but the landowner's acceptance of the presence of a certain person in the property assumes his tacit consent, over time."
- This therefore requires that the grantor of the permission consented to the transfer of the right, whether this can be deduced explicitly from the clauses of the contract or whether it can be implied from his conduct, silence or non-protest.
- In our case, there is no doubt that plaintiff 1 or plaintiff 2 did not give their consent to the transfer of the rights of the alleged licensee and did not give their consent to the continued use of the land - not implicitly, in light of their actions and attempts to evacuate the land (inter alia in the form of the warning letter and the filing of eviction claims for the entire complex), and not explicitly, since there is no agreement attesting to the intention to permit the transfer. It should be noted that the defendants themselves did not present or prove the existence of a document or agreement from which it is possible to learn about the intention of the municipality or the authority to permit such a transfer.
The right of the landowner to revoke the permission granted by him
- There is no dispute about the right of plaintiff 2 as the registered owner of the land, as well as the right of plaintiff 1 to be registered as the owner of the rights in the land that is the subject of the suit, given that the notice of expropriation is registered in the land deed. Thus, there is also no dispute regarding the absence of an agreement between the parties that could contradict the plaintiffs' desire to evacuate the land from its occupants. This was expressed in the publication of the notice of expropriation and the demand for the restitution of the land, in the warning letter sent to the defendants demanding their eviction, and in an unequivocal and clear manner in the filing of this lawsuit, which contains an explicit statement and a demand for the return of the land and the removal of the defendants.
- There is extensive case law regarding the right of the owner of the license to cancel the permission he granted, including in the case of Hyper Lap, as presented above. The scholar Nina Salzman also described this well in her article "License in Real Estate" Hapraklit 42 24, 56-57 (1995) (emphasis added):
"The concept of implied permission includes all those situations in which the possession or use of a certain person in the property is not anchored in an explicit consent given by the landowner, but rather by the consent inferred from the failure of the landowner to act to remove a certain person from the property, even though he has all the means at his disposal to do so. It is the tacit consent of the landowner to the activity of a certain person in the property that is at the basis of the implied authority. The consent is learned from the amount of time that has passed and from the passive behavior of the landowner in the circumstances of the case, which indicates that he accepted the presence of a certain person in the property or with the use he makes of the property... In principle, an authority that is learned from the implied does not prevent the landowner from bringing it to an end at any time by expressing his opinion to a certain person that he is no longer willing to continue it. This is a free authority that is renewed from moment to moment, as long as the landowner has not acted to remove a certain person."
- Subsequently, it seems to me that the plaintiffs' objection is clear and clear, so that it is not possible to accept a claim that concerns tacit consent or passive conduct that could indicate that permission was given to the defendants or their predecessors.
- In summary, from the totality of the evidence that was laid out before me, and after carefully examining and considering the arguments of the parties, I am satisfied that the defendants have no rights to the land and that they have no real defense against this claim. I am convinced that the defendants are not licensees in the land (which constitute public land), and the existence of an implied license has not been proven. The defendants did not prove that they were the owners of the tenant's license, and certainly not a non-resident license, to live in the compound and make use of it. Therefore, the defendants must vacate the compound from any person and object and remove their hands from the land.
There is no obligation to tie the evacuation of the land to the compensation of the defendants
- In accordance with the rulings of the Supreme Court and as appears from the plaintiffs' arguments, I accept the argument that the eviction of the defendants should not be conditioned on the receipt of compensation, and that the defendants' claims regarding the existence of a right to compensation should be clarified in a separate proceeding before the relevant court.
- It should be noted that the proceedings before me were already opened at the end of 2021, while only in June 2025 was a claim for compensation filed with the District Court. The claim of compensation in the framework of the proceedings in this case was made in weak language and in an unfounded manner, relying on payments made in other cases in the framework of negotiations and negotiations conducted outside the court. Nevertheless, I found it appropriate to relate to the defendants' mistake regarding the demand for compensation as a condition for the evacuation of the land, and all of course, without setting any precedents on the matter, since the claim was filed with the District Court only recently.
- The issue of binding the eviction with compensation was discussed at length in CA 7242/00 Ports and Railways Authority v. Yosef Kaduri (Nevo, November 25, 2002), where the Honorable Justice Englard ruled that the right of eviction available to the landowners vis-à-vis the members of the authority upon the termination of the license is not intertwined with the right to compensation of the members of the authority. The Honorable Court further noted that the termination of the authority entitles the landowner to receive possession of the plot from the members of the Authority, while the members of the Authority, for their part, are entitled to file a separate claim for compensation due to the termination of the license. In the framework of the separate compensation claim, the tests will be determined in relation to the scope of the compensation, against the background of the special circumstances, including the investments made by the members of the Authority.
- The Honorable Justice Englard further emphasizes that it is unacceptable that in the circumstances of the case under discussion, the holders of the plot will continue to hold it until all the proceedings are concluded with a (separate) claim for payment of compensation. The Supreme Court clarifies clearly and unequivocally that the eviction of the land should not be tied to compensation from the licensees, and that the way to proceed in order to receive financial compensation for the eviction of a property is by filing a financial claim and clarifying it in accordance with the tests and circumstances of the case.
- It should be said at once that the judgment in the matter of the Ports Authority mentioned above concerned the respondents who signed an agreement with the owner of the original rights in the land, so that in fact they were given permission to use, operate and construct facilities on the coast, and it was proven that they were licensees. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did not find it appropriate to bind their eviction from the property to compensation, and held that a separate claim should be filed for compensation.
- This conclusion carries great weight in our case, in the sense of all the more so, when here we are dealing with defendants who did not prove that they were licensees in the land and did not prove that they received any license from the owner of the rights, or that consent was given for their residence in the land - whether by virtue of a signed and explicit agreement or by virtue of an implicit consent.
- I would also like to refer in this matter to LCA 7924/06 Aharon Avitan v. Chaya Oren Baumschermeister (published in Nevo, October 3, 2006), where Justice Rubinstein ruled that since permission to use the land was not granted, it was not possible to claim compensation for a revoked permission.
- The defendants filed their financial claims with the Tel Aviv District Court demanding compensation for the eviction. These claims were filed only in June 2025, i.e., about three and a half years after the opening of the proceeding before me, and only after the court repeatedly raised the issue. The absence of a separate compensation claim in the early stages of this proceeding makes it very difficult to accept the defendants' claims.
- See in this matter Civil Case (Shalom Civil Case) 7198-12-18 Tel Aviv Municipality v. Zaki Dahanus (Nevo 17.02.2021):
"Not every case of revocation of an implicit permission on public land arises an entitlement to compensation. The litigation on the issue of compensation requires more extensive factual clarification than is required to decide the eviction claim, and therefore it is more complicated and lengthy (for a discussion of the conditions for receiving compensation, see CA (Civil Case District) 43018-10-15 Tel Aviv-Jaffa Municipality v. Shobli, [published in Nevo] paragraphs 84-94 (March 8, 2017); CA (District Civil Case) 58568-04-18 Baruch v. Municipality of Tel Aviv-Jaffa, [published in Nevo] paragraph 20 (September 2, 2019))."