Defects and Improper Conduct by the Police
- The trial court discussed at length a series of flaws in the conduct of the police, and criticized its conduct quite harshly. Thus, in its summary, the court noted, inter alia, that the police officers acted "at best in an unreasonable manner and in complete disregard of the evidence before them, and in the worst case they acted illegally, presenting the evidence in a false manner." The court did not spare its criticism of the policemen who testified before it and also against one of the policemen who was not brought to testify. Thus, for example, it was determined that Officer Desta's remarks "constitute a disruption of proceedings and misleading the court. Just like that!! [...] and we regret that in this case, fairness was not here" (paragraph 12 of the judgment); that the level of the policemen's responses "bordered on insult" (paragraph 15 of the judgment); that "in order to explain the terrible injustice done to the plaintiff, it is necessary to understand the conduct of the interrogators, their way of thinking, their fairness and integrity, or rather, their unfairness and dishonesty" (paragraph 16 of the judgment); that the evasive answers of the police officers testified to "wretchedness" (paragraph 19 of the judgment); and that Officer Sweid's answers were "stupid" (paragraph 22 of the judgment); The trial court also mockingly notes that in one of the memoranda, "Sweid demonstrated his psychological skills and his deep understanding of the human soul" (paragraph 23 of the judgment).
- The words are poignant and harsh, and I personally believe that it is appropriate to exercise extreme caution before accusing a witness, certainly a witness who is not a party to the proceeding, criminal acts and malicious intent. "Be moderate in judgment" (Avot 1:1) is our teacher in the opening mishna of Tractate Avot, and as Judge Kedmi says, "A judge is tested, inter alia, on his ability to restrain himself and exercise restraint in the sensitive area of finding credibility and expressing an opinion on the nature of those who appear before him" (High Court of Justice 188/96 Cyrinsky v. Vice President of the Magistrate's Court in Hadera, IsrSC 52(3) 721, 738 (1998)). Indeed, it was the trial court that heard the police and the investigators and was as impressed as it was, and thus I do not see the need to intervene. I will also note that a reading of the transcript shows that the answers given by the interrogators were better than not said. However, it seems that the trial court did not give even the slightest weight to the fact that the interrogators testified about events that took place almost eleven years ago before giving their testimony, and that during their testimony they were asked to remember and explain decisions or statements of one kind or another, as if it were an investigation that they had conducted only recently. This, despite the fact that the delay, with the evidentiary damage involved, is entirely at the Respondent's doorstep. Nor do I believe that interrogators' impression of the interrogee's behavior is illegitimate, at least in the initial stages of the investigation. Even if the interrogator is not a psychologist, he is required to use his experience and intuition as an integral part of the investigative work, and examining the behavior and reactions of interrogees is an integral part of the interrogator's impressions.
- To be precise: I do not believe that the trial court's criticism of the police's conduct was baseless. There was room for criticism, and I will reiterate the main points:
(-) The police initially claimed that the suspicion against the respondent was based on the testimony of the injured minor that she identified the suspect at random in the supermarket. This is while the words of the minor and her father indicate that these words do not reflect reality.