(See also: Civil Appeal 4241/06 Levy v. State of Israel – Israel Police (unpublished, March 12, 2009), paragraph 13 of the judgment of Justice Arbel and the references therein (hereinafter: the Levy case); Elyakim Rubinstein, "Trickery in the Interrogation – False Court Protocol," Defense Attorney 78 (2003)); and compare to Criminal Appeal 398/89 Mansour v. State of Israel (unpublished, January 19, 1994); Meir Gilboa, Tricks in the Investigation and the Moving Chair in the Holy of Holies, The Defense 75 (2007)).
There is no denying that it is difficult to define the line between a prohibited subterfuge and a legitimate interrogation exercise, and as stated in the case law, the guidelines on this issue are "quite vague" (Matter Levy, ibid.), and it is appropriate to leave the decision on this question In any case, on its own merits (Criminal Appeal 5121/98 Issacharov v. Military Prosecutor, IsrSC 61(1) 461 (2006) paragraph 64 of the judgment of Justice (as then described) Beinisch). This issue is beyond our interest, since we are not in the framework of a criminal proceeding and we are not required to examine the validity of a defendant's confession. For the purposes of this discussion, it is sufficient to recognize that the trick employed by the police was in the form of crossing a red line, and when this is added to the series of flaws listed above, the picture that emerges from the conduct of the state is far from satisfactory and arouses great discomfort, to say the least (See Boaz Sanjaro's notes, in which the author criticizes the state's conduct following the trial court's ruling in our case: Sanjaro – The Use of Tactics, at p. 416; "Police crimes, prosecutors' negligence, judges' optimism and conviction of the innocent" בועז סנג'רוThe defense attorney 158 (2010); בועז סנג'רו "I also blame the judges" The defense attorney 159, 5 (2010)).
- In summary, the conclusion that emerges from the evidence casts some of the police's conduct in a rather negative light. Is the respondent entitled to compensation for this improper conduct and in what framework? We will now turn to this question.
between the respondent's tort claim and his request under section 80(a) of the Penal Law
- Our feet are rooted in the tort of negligence in tort law, and therefore, despite the problematic conduct of the police, in the absence of damage or a causal connection between the negligence and the damage, no cause of action for negligence has arisen, and in any case no award of compensation should be awarded.
Neither the trial court nor this court, sitting as a court of appeal against the District Court's decision according to Section 80(a) to the Penal Law. However, it should not be ignored that the procedural circumstances in the case before us are exceptional. As will be recalled, and as described in the chapter on the sequence of proceedings, after the respondent's application was rejected according to the Section 80(a) According to the Penal Law, he acted in two ways: one – filing a claim for damages to the court of first instance. The second is to file an appeal to the Supreme Court against the District Court's decision to reject his application under the Section 80(a) to the Penal Law.