The respondent's detention was extended three times for the purposes of interrogation: on July 17, 1999, his detention was extended with consent, until As of July 20, 1999 (Hereinafter: the first extension of detention). On July 20, 1999, his detention was extended until July 27, 1999 (hereinafter: the second extension of detention). On July 22, 1999, an appeal was filed with the District Court against the second extension of detention, and at the end of the hearing, the detention period was shortened until July 26, 1999 (hereinafter: the appeal against the second extension of detention). On July 26, 1999, the respondent's detention was extended until July 30, 1999 (hereinafter: the third extension of detention).
On July 30, 1999, an indictment was filed against the respondent accusing him of sodomy of a minor (P.C. (Tel Aviv) 5155/99). Together with the indictment, a motion was filed to detain the respondent until the end of the proceedings (BS 91784/99). The date of the hearing of the application has been postponed from time to time. Ultimately, on August 18, 1999, the District Court (the Honorable Judge) ruled B. Ophir-Tom) that the respondent will be detained until the end of the proceedings. On August 31, 1999, an appeal was filed with the Supreme Court, against the decision to detain the respondent until the end of the proceedings. The hearing was postponed in light of the parties' announcement regarding the discovery of new investigative avenues (more on which will be discussed later).
On October 11, 1999, with the consent of the parties, the respondent was released to his home under restrictive conditions, after further investigative actions were carried out in his case and doubts arose as to his guilt. In total, the respondent was detained for 88 days. About two months after his release to house arrest, on January 26, 2000, the indictment against him was canceled, according to the prosecution's statement.
- On February 8, 2004, the respondent filed a request with the Tel Aviv-Jaffa District Court for compensation for his arrest and for payment of his defense expenses, under section 80(a) of the Penal Law, 5737-1977. This section states that the court may award a defendant who has been acquitted or whose indictment has been canceled for his defense expenses from the State Treasury, as well as compensation for the period of his detention, if he deems that there was no basis for the charge or if he sees other circumstances justifying it. In our case, the respondent argued that from the outset there was no basis for his accusation, and that the police refrained from exhausting investigative channels that could have prevented the continuation of his detention and the filing of the indictment against him. The respondent also claimed that the police and the State Attorney's Office were negligent and did not properly examine his alibi claim and his history on the day the offense was committed. The respondent also claimed that the interrogators lied to the court during the detention extensions, abused him, beat him several times, and interrogated him unfairly.