In the case of the murder in Duma, to which counsel for defendant 2 was referring (Serious Crimes Case (Central District) 932-01-16 State of Israel v. Ben Uliel et al. [published in Nevo] (June 19, 2018)), the court reiterated the case law, according to which:
"The invalidation of a confession due to defects in its collection does not invalidate another late confession, which was lawfully made. In accordance with the case law, it is necessary to examine, in any case, according to its circumstances, whether the factors that led to the disqualification of the first confession are valid or not. To the extent that these factors remain in effect, the additional confession will also be invalidated. However, if they are exhausted, the additional confession will be accepted as evidence... This rule, which deals with the invalidation of confessions under section 12, remains in place even after the judgment in the Issacharov case... In the case law, it was clarified that the natural consideration that the defendant makes in giving the second confession, according to which in any case damage has already been caused by the giving of his previous confession, does not constitute a factor that must be taken into account when examining the admissibility of the second confession."
In that case, the court invalidated statements made by the defendants in the framework of "necessary investigations" by the ISA, after determining that their rights had been severely violated; but ruled that "I do not see fit to accept the defense's position and establish a definitive legal presumption that any confession made after the use of violent means is invalid as evidence. Nor is there room to determine that in order to prove the severance of the connection between the confession given in the necessary interrogation and the later confessions, the existence of an external event, such as an encounter between the interrogee and his lawyer, is necessarily required." Accordingly, and in light of an examination of the concrete circumstances before it, the court there made a distinction between one defendant, in respect of whom it was determined that the subsequent confessions he gave were made of his own free will and were admissible; and another defendant, in respect of whom it was determined that it was not possible to make a distinction and disconnect between the results of the subsequent investigations conducted against him and the necessary investigations, and therefore most of his statements were disqualified.