See also the Macmillan case [18], at pp. 303-305, in which Justice Dorner seeks to adopt the guidelines of English law from 1973 and to establish correctly – also in light of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty – that as a rule, it is appropriate to receive compensation and expenses for a defendant who is found "absolutely" acquitted, as a derivative of that "absolute" acquittal. See also Beer Sheva (Tel Aviv) 529/97 Guetta v. State of Israel [33], by Justice A. Mudrik.
- So far – the winds that have begun to blow in our camp, winds whose intention is to expand – there are those who believe that to expand to the extreme – the right of a defendant who has been found guilty is entitled to receive indemnification for his expenses and compensation for days of arrest and imprisonment. However, whatever the desire to expand the right of a defendant-Eligible, to-It will be forgotten that we are within the boundaries of a statutory norm – which is a provision Article 80 The Penal Law – and the Law of Freedom teaches us that the acquittal of a defendant in his case, acquittal of any kind, is not sufficient to establish grounds for receiving indemnification and compensation from the state. The law hedges us on two grounds – a criminal trial in which "there was no basis for an accusation" and "other circumstances that justify it." We were not permitted to hover over these grounds and to entitle a certain person to indemnification and compensation, except as he was acquitted in his trial. Thus, as a rule; This is the case in our case, even-He is, and is the rule of law in the judiciary. See more and compare: Parashat Reich [8], p. 491; Parashat Macmillan [18], p. 304. Indeed, contrary to the English law which gave consideration to-"Open" opinion for the home-The Judgment to Award Indemnity to the Defendant, Provision Article 80 The Penal Law defines the consideration of-The Opinion of a House-The trial is on two grounds. We have not been allowed to break through the boundaries, but we have interpreted the law in the spirit of our times.
- In this context, it is appropriate to note another factor, a factor that can also make the consideration more flexible-The Opinion of a House-The trial in favor of a defendant who was acquitted is acquitted. We are referring to the authority given to the Minister of Justice – as a directive Section 80(b) To the law – to prescribe in the regulations, with the approval of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee of the Knesset, maximum amounts for indemnification and compensation. As we have seen (in paragraph 13 above), the Minister of Justice exercised this authority and enacted regulations in which he set maximum amounts for indemnification and compensation. The authority granted to the Minister of Justice is intended to serve as a brake, regulator and qualifier for consideration-The Opinion of a House-The judgment to award indemnity and compensation, and since the determination of the maximum amounts is subject to consideration-The opinion of the executive branch – under the supervision of the legislative branch – actually has the authority to determine them in order to supervise the overall and individual expenditure for indemnities and compensation of defendants who have been found innocent. See more and compare Parashat Reich [8], p. 491.
- How, then, is it to make a house?-The Law Use of Consideration-Is it permissible for him to award indemnity and compensation to a defendant who was acquitted? Needless to say, we do not intend – and we will not – write a full codex – or even a partial code – for the way a house will go-The law at the time will address the question of compensation and indemnification in a particular case. The Shades and My Son-The many shades are numbered, and in any case we can only draw guidelines, and even these can only be drawn in a general way. Bell-In this context, we have forgotten that the right to indemnification and compensation is the same as the right of a defendant who is acquitted –
applies even to those who were arrested and released without being indicted, and the court found that there was no basis for the arrest or that he saw other circumstances justifying compensation for the person (see section 38 of the Arrests Law, cited in paragraph 14 above).