The grounds of "there was no basis for the accusation"
- The first ground – the type of cases in which "there was no basis for the accusation" – speaks for itself, and we will not add to what was said until-25 in Halacha (see paragraphs 16 and 17-above). It has been said, however, that the concept of "there was no basis for the accusation" depicts an extreme situation of an island-Probability, and even if we say that the concept of "there was no foundation" applies itself not only to extreme cases in which there was no All The basis for the accusation, but also on the types of cases in which the basis of the accusation is a shaky foundation (cf. Bergman (Bartal) [5], Pp. 562-563Even then, we won't be able to go much further. Indeed, the main reason is the second ground, the same ground that bases itself on "other circumstances that justify it." In the living space of this cause, the hands of a house-There is a lot of trial for him, and the question is how the judge will guide himself when deciding on the issue of compensation and indemnity.
The Ground of "Other Circumstances That Justify It"
- Laying-The conclusion is that the acquittal of a person in law – but insofar as it is an acquittal – is not sufficient to establish grounds for indemnification and compensation from the state (see and compare Exhibit 511/79 Ben Bassat N. State of Israel [29], p450). A credit is a necessary condition, but it is not a sufficient condition. In addition to acquittal, there must be "other circumstances justifying" indemnification and compensation – or one of the two – and only if he is found to be home.-The law that such circumstances existed-These are just-He may then award indemnification and compensation or one of the following. In other words, something must be found-What is added to the acquittal, and nothing but-Obviously, but something-What teaches us that it is justified to award a defendant who has been acquitted of indemnification or compensation? We will add that the expression "circumstances... justifying it" does not necessarily direct itself to justice in purity. The term "justifying circumstances" means circumstances that make a defendant acquitted a person who deserves to be indemnified and compensated, or one of the two.
- At the outset, it was said – and this principle will accompany us all the way – that the process of awarding indemnity and compensation is nothing but an appendix to the criminal law, a minor proceeding to the main criminal proceeding. We must therefore be careful not to turn a tail into a head, not to be dragged into a long and complex proceeding whose subject is compensation and indemnification. We must warn ourselves against a proceeding-of-Slope,
A slope that may become a slippery slope. We will be aware and attentive to the fact that the process of indemnification and compensation must not turn into a repetition of a criminal trial in reverse: that this time the accused who is acquitted will be the accuser and the state will be the accused. It should also be remembered that a defendant who has been acquitted has at his disposal, in the appropriate case, a cause of action in tort (see The Gordon Case [26], at pp. 127-128), and hence there is an additional reason to treat an indemnification and compensation proceeding as provided in section 80 of the Penal Law, but as an appendix and a minor proceeding to the penal proceeding.
- As to the merits of those "other circumstances". First of all, you may be asked a question-This key: Where will those "other circumstances" that you instruct come from? Section 80(a) Are you talking about the law? And more precisely: is the intention only to the circumstances of the criminal proceeding itself, or perhaps to withdraw. The phrase itself about the circumstances of Labar-The Procedure-criminal such as the defendant's financial capacity. For example, if the defendant incurred heavy expenses, if he suffered special damages, or if he took out loans that made it difficult for him. And maybe we'll retire. The canopy of the law also on the circumstances of the proceeding as well as the circumstances of the Bar-The procedure? In examining the history of teaching Section 80(a) We did not find any clue that might be of any help to us. This is not the case with regard to indemnification and compensation for-Phi The Arrests Law.
As we have seen (in paragraph 14 above), it is possible to receive indemnification and compensation not only for a defendant who has been acquitted, but also for someone who has been arrested as a suspect of committing an offense and has not been indicted. The latter's right to indemnification and compensation was built according to the formulas of section 80(a), and thus he can be entitled to indemnification and compensation if the court finds "circumstances... that justify "indemnification or compensation." In the explanatory notes to the bill that granted this right to a person who was arrested and not indicted (see above, in paragraph 14), we find only one example of circumstances that justify indemnification or compensation, and that is "particularly serious damage" caused to the person who was arrested. Not a single example of the circumstances of the proceeding itself is presented. Indeed, with regard to the arrest proceeding itself, we are dealing only with the first ground, i.e., where there was no basis for the arrest. This may raise reflections in the heart of the commentator as to whether only personal circumstances that are capable of criminal proceedings fall within the framework of the formula of "circumstances... These considerations may even be strengthened when we remember that not all countries provide compensation for arrest and imprisonment.